Back to Kant - things exist as is- (as existent - phenomena) versus in its self ( as circumscribed by concept - the luminal) neither is meant to be mistaken with how they come to be represented (subjectively objectified) - seemingly this endless discussion of the treacherous nature of language tends to be rooted in a failure to remember language does not exist as a thing but merely in itself as a means to represent (make present again) - that means it functions as a means to recall material and immaterial subject/objects
Sent from my iPhone Please excuse grammar and spelling errors Expect everything - fear nothing - or did I get that backwards Saul ostrow 646 528 8537 On Jul 30, 2012, at 7:56 AM, William Conger <[email protected]> wrote: > Your view seems to accept 'nature' as it is. The artists of the so-called Beaux > Arts Style (capital S signifies that Style is a perceptual method) did not > accept Nature as it is but sought to idealize it, to perfect it, according to an > imposed formal harmony. Where that harmony comes from is the issue because it > may be -- for Beaux-Arts artists -- potentially present in Nature, it was not > explicitly present. I came from the mind and it was divinely inspired, in > accordance with God. An effort to make art in accordance with God's will or plan > or grace was moral and it was exemplified by significant form (idealized form). > > The chief problem with your view "art moralizes nature; nature moralizes art' is > the absence of a definition of nature. Does this nature have a consciousness? Is > it God? Is it reality? And what is art if it can be separate from nature? > > Let's take the case of Constable. Here was an artist who wanted to paint nature > as it is. But of course he couldn't do that. He had to re-arrange, select, > exaggerate, abstract, invent, and yet in the end he made paintings that are > 'natural, seemingly unidealized presentations of nature. The same could be said > of Courbet. One could argue that both artists followed a 'significant form' > theory and yet their art does not have the graceful artificiality of the > Beaux-Arts Style. That art (Victoriana stuff and our friend Bouguereau) made the > most of linear harmony at the expense of natural complexity and the rough > presence of nature (as in Constable or Courbet). This both the nature of > Constable and Courbet and the Style (as in Bouguereau) seem to satisfy your > synthetic -- tautology? -- definition and the two kinds of art contradict each > other and both leave the notion of 'significant form' begging a stable > definition, too. > > Cheerskep stands ready to swing his sword at any IS but any definition requires > an IS as a bridge from one thig to another. > wc > > > ----- Original Message ---- > From: Michael Brady <[email protected]> > To: [email protected] > Sent: Sun, July 29, 2012 8:16:29 PM > Subject: Re: is list dead? > > On Jul 29, 2012, at 8:57 PM, William Conger <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Read my essay. I argue that the word moral and its implications was dropped >> after the early modernists talked about formalist theory, art for art's > sake, >> the significant form, etc. but their ideas were precisely the same as those >> embedded in the Beaux-Arts Style. In that way, the supposed break between >> Beaux-Arts and modernism was as much manufactured as it was true, maybe more >> manufactured. The art of the two types looks different but was it truly >> different in fundamental theory? Words like moral became taboo in serious > art >> talk. But to say the same thing with other words, like 'significant form' > was >> accepted, and still is. > > > I believe that all forms of art are exercises in imposing a moral order on the > exempla and models that Nature shows us. We humans declare this or that > configuration in artistic works to be harmonious or unharmonious, pleasing or > displeasing, etc., **based on*** their supposed effects on our human feelings > and perceptions. We impute to the instances in Nature the ability to engender > those feelings of pleasure or displeasure in us. We say, for example, that > certain lines or colors, sounds or movements in Nature are tranquil or exited, > and thereby instigate tranquil or excite states in us. We go further and say > that certain relationships and proportions are similarly conducive to good or > bad feelings (pleasing or displeasing proportions of a figure, of color > combination, of chords or sounds and tempos in music, etc.). > > These become "canonical" terms, terms of judgment, and are applied in such a > way to define and even guide others in the proper or approved modes of > appreciating. Consider in painting the different schemes of color harmony: > direct complementary opposites, split complements, near neighbors, etc. The > result is that eventually, every combination of colors is declared to be a > form of "color harmony"--harmonies, btw, that the artist and vieweer are > subject to but Nature is not! Nature does what it damn well pleases. > > At the very end of Annouilh's Beckett, one character says of Beckett, "With > him it's not morality, it's aesthetics." Those two practices are not very far > apart. > > > As I have said before, "Art moralizes nature; Nature demoralizes art." > > | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | > Michael Brady > www.michaelbradydesign.com/Blog/ | [email protected] > www.twitter.com/typehuile | www.linkedin.com/in/typehuile | > www.facebook.com/typehuile > > "Thinking Like a Designer" at https://www.createspace.com/3462255 or > http://snipurl.com/z43se
