James Rogers wrote: >> I would say that consciousness is at its essence a purely inferred >> self-model, which naturally requires a fairly large machine to >> support the model.
Ben Goertzel wrote: > Of course, this captures part of the "consciousness" phenomenon, but > it's very much a Daniel-Dennett-esque reductionist model, which > accounts ONLY for the "cold" (structural, dynamical) aspects and not > for the "hot" (experiential) aspects.... It seems natural to some that this immediate and direct sense of self is exactly what would be expected from these processes. No matter how the question is asked, the mechanism is going to report that it perceives itself as separate from "other". It's only on a philosophical basis that built-in evolutionary biases are superceded and the mechanism reports that it observes nothing more special than lots of intertwingled processes with no definite location that could harbor a "self". Of course the strong sense of immediacy and directness trumps logical and philosophical arguments. In a very circular (and conventionally correct way) we certainly are our feelings. And in the bigger picture, that self is an illusion -- scary (or liberating, depending on your viewpoint.) Again and again, clarity is gained by broadening the context. - Jef ------- To unsubscribe, change your address, or temporarily deactivate your subscription, please go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/[EMAIL PROTECTED]
