I liked most of your points, but . . . . >> However, Searle's example is pathological in the sense that it posits a >> system with a high degree of intelligence associated with a functionality >> that is NOT associated with any intensity-of-consciousness. But I suggest >> that this pathology is due to the unrealistically large amount of computing >> resources that the rulebook requires.
Not by my definition of intelligence (which requires learning/adaptation). ----- Original Message ----- From: Benjamin Goertzel To: [email protected] Sent: Sunday, May 20, 2007 1:24 PM Subject: [agi] Relationship btw consciousness and intelligence Hi all, Someone emailed me recently about Searle's Chinese Room argument, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_room a topic that normally bores me to tears, but it occurred to me that part of my reply might be of interest to some on this list, because it pertains to the more general issue of the relationship btw consciousness and intelligence. It also ties in with the importance of thinking about "efficient intelligence" rather than just raw intelligence, as discussed in the recent thread on definitions of intelligence. Here is the relevant part of my reply about Searle: **** However, a key point is: The scenario Searle describes is likely not physically possible, due to the unrealistically large size of the rulebook. The structures that we associate with intelligence (will, focused awareness, etc.) in a human context, all come out of the need to do intelligent processing within modest space and time requirements. So when we say we feel like the {Searle+rulebook} system isn't really understanding Chinese, what we mean is: It isn't understanding Chinese according to the methods we are used to, which are methods adapted to deal with modest space and time resources. This ties in with the relationship btw intensity-of-consciousness and degree-of-intelligence. In real life, these seem often to be tied together, because the cognitive structures that correlate with intensity of consciousness are useful ones for achieving intelligent behaviors. However, Searle's example is pathological in the sense that it posits a system with a high degree of intelligence associated with a functionality that is NOT associated with any intensity-of-consciousness. But I suggest that this pathology is due to the unrealistically large amount of computing resources that the rulebook requires. I.e., it is finitude of resources that causes intelligence and intensity-of-consciousness to be correlated. The fact that this correlation breaks in a pathological, physically-impossible case that requires dramatically much resources, doesn't mean too much... **** Note that I write about intensity of consciousness rather than presence of consciousness. I tend toward panpsychism but I do accept that "while all animals are conscious, some animals are more conscious than others" (to pervert Orwell). I have elaborated on this perspective considerably in The Hidden Pattern. -- Ben G ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?&; ----- This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?member_id=231415&user_secret=fabd7936
