Intelligence, to me, is the ability to achieve complex goals...
This is one way of being functional.... a paperclip though is very
functional yet not very intelligent...
ben g
On 5/20/07, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> Sure... I prefer to define intelligence in terms of behavioral
functionality rather than internal properties, but you are free to define it
differently ;-)
I wouldn't call learning/adaptability an internal(-only) property . . . .
>> I note that if the Chinese language changes over time, then the {Searle
+ rulebook} system will rapidly become less intelligent in this context !!!!
See. Now this indicates the funkiness of your definition . . . . Replace
intelligent with functional and it makes a lot more sense.
Actually, that raises a good question -- What is the difference between
your "intelligent" and your "functional"?
----- Original Message -----
*From:* Benjamin Goertzel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
*To:* [email protected]
*Sent:* Sunday, May 20, 2007 2:11 PM
*Subject:* Re: [agi] Relationship btw consciousness and intelligence
Sure... I prefer to define intelligence in terms of behavioral
functionality rather than internal properties, but you are free to define it
differently ;-)
I note that if the Chinese language changes over time, then the {Searle +
rulebook} system will rapidly become less intelligent in this context !!!!
ben g
On 5/20/07, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I liked most of your points, but . . . .
>
> >> However, Searle's example is pathological in the sense that it posits
> *a system with a high degree of intelligence* associated with a
> functionality that is NOT associated with any intensity-of-consciousness.
> But I suggest that this pathology is due to the unrealistically large amount
> of computing resources that the rulebook requires.
>
> Not by my definition of intelligence (which requires
> learning/adaptation).
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> *From:* Benjamin Goertzel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> *To:* [email protected]
> *Sent:* Sunday, May 20, 2007 1:24 PM
> *Subject:* [agi] Relationship btw consciousness and intelligence
>
>
> Hi all,
>
> Someone emailed me recently about Searle's Chinese Room argument,
>
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_room
>
> a topic that normally bores me to tears, but it occurred to me that part
> of my reply might be of interest to some
> on this list, because it pertains to the more general issue of the
> relationship btw consciousness and intelligence.
>
> It also ties in with the importance of thinking about "efficient
> intelligence" rather than just raw intelligence, as
> discussed in the recent thread on definitions of intelligence.
>
> Here is the relevant part of my reply about Searle:
>
> ****
> However, a key point is: The scenario Searle describes is likely not
> physically possible, due to the unrealistically large size of the rulebook.
> The structures that we associate with intelligence (will, focused awareness,
> etc.) in a human context, all come out of the need to do intelligent
> processing within modest space and time requirements.
>
> So when we say we feel like the {Searle+rulebook} system isn't really
> understanding Chinese, what we mean is: It isn't understanding Chinese
> according to the methods we are used to, which are methods adapted to deal
> with modest space and time resources.
>
> This ties in with the relationship btw intensity-of-consciousness and
> degree-of-intelligence. In real life, these seem often to be tied together,
> because the cognitive structures that correlate with intensity of
> consciousness are useful ones for achieving intelligent behaviors.
>
> However, Searle's example is pathological in the sense that it posits a
> system with a high degree of intelligence associated with a functionality
> that is NOT associated with any intensity-of-consciousness. But I suggest
> that this pathology is due to the unrealistically large amount of computing
> resources that the rulebook requires.
>
> I.e., it is finitude of resources that causes intelligence and
> intensity-of-consciousness to be correlated. The fact that this correlation
> breaks in a pathological, physically-impossible case that requires
> dramatically much resources, doesn't mean too much...
> ****
>
> Note that I write about intensity of consciousness rather than presence
> of consciousness. I tend toward panpsychism but I do accept that "while all
> animals are conscious, some animals are more conscious than others" (to
> pervert Orwell). I have elaborated on this perspective considerably in The
> Hidden Pattern.
>
> -- Ben G
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