Allow me to paraphrase . . . .
Something is intelligent if it is functional over a wide variety of complex
goals.
Is that a reasonable shot at your definition?
----- Original Message -----
From: Benjamin Goertzel
To: [email protected]
Sent: Sunday, May 20, 2007 2:41 PM
Subject: Re: [agi] Relationship btw consciousness and intelligence
Intelligence, to me, is the ability to achieve complex goals...
This is one way of being functional.... a paperclip though is very
functional yet not very intelligent...
ben g
On 5/20/07, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> Sure... I prefer to define intelligence in terms of behavioral
functionality rather than internal properties, but you are free to define it
differently ;-)
I wouldn't call learning/adaptability an internal(-only) property . . . .
>> I note that if the Chinese language changes over time, then the {Searle
+ rulebook} system will rapidly become less intelligent in this context !!!!
See. Now this indicates the funkiness of your definition . . . . Replace
intelligent with functional and it makes a lot more sense.
Actually, that raises a good question -- What is the difference between
your "intelligent" and your "functional"?
----- Original Message -----
From: Benjamin Goertzel
To: [email protected]
Sent: Sunday, May 20, 2007 2:11 PM
Subject: Re: [agi] Relationship btw consciousness and intelligence
Sure... I prefer to define intelligence in terms of behavioral
functionality rather than internal properties, but you are free to define it
differently ;-)
I note that if the Chinese language changes over time, then the {Searle +
rulebook} system will rapidly become less intelligent in this context !!!!
ben g
On 5/20/07, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
I liked most of your points, but . . . .
>> However, Searle's example is pathological in the sense that it
posits a system with a high degree of intelligence associated with a
functionality that is NOT associated with any intensity-of-consciousness. But
I suggest that this pathology is due to the unrealistically large amount of
computing resources that the rulebook requires.
Not by my definition of intelligence (which requires
learning/adaptation).
----- Original Message -----
From: Benjamin Goertzel
To: [email protected]
Sent: Sunday, May 20, 2007 1:24 PM
Subject: [agi] Relationship btw consciousness and intelligence
Hi all,
Someone emailed me recently about Searle's Chinese Room argument,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_room
a topic that normally bores me to tears, but it occurred to me that
part of my reply might be of interest to some
on this list, because it pertains to the more general issue of the
relationship btw consciousness and intelligence.
It also ties in with the importance of thinking about "efficient
intelligence" rather than just raw intelligence, as
discussed in the recent thread on definitions of intelligence.
Here is the relevant part of my reply about Searle:
****
However, a key point is: The scenario Searle describes is likely not
physically possible, due to the unrealistically large size of the rulebook.
The structures that we associate with intelligence (will, focused awareness,
etc.) in a human context, all come out of the need to do intelligent processing
within modest space and time requirements.
So when we say we feel like the {Searle+rulebook} system isn't really
understanding Chinese, what we mean is: It isn't understanding Chinese
according to the methods we are used to, which are methods adapted to deal with
modest space and time resources.
This ties in with the relationship btw intensity-of-consciousness and
degree-of-intelligence. In real life, these seem often to be tied together,
because the cognitive structures that correlate with intensity of consciousness
are useful ones for achieving intelligent behaviors.
However, Searle's example is pathological in the sense that it posits
a system with a high degree of intelligence associated with a functionality
that is NOT associated with any intensity-of-consciousness. But I suggest that
this pathology is due to the unrealistically large amount of computing
resources that the rulebook requires.
I.e., it is finitude of resources that causes intelligence and
intensity-of-consciousness to be correlated. The fact that this correlation
breaks in a pathological, physically-impossible case that requires dramatically
much resources, doesn't mean too much...
****
Note that I write about intensity of consciousness rather than
presence of consciousness. I tend toward panpsychism but I do accept that
"while all animals are conscious, some animals are more conscious than others"
(to pervert Orwell). I have elaborated on this perspective considerably in The
Hidden Pattern.
-- Ben G
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