Seems to me like you're going through *a lot* of effort for the same effect + a
lot of confusion
You "conjecture that highly efficiently intelligent systems will necessarily
possess intense consciousness and self-understanding".
Isn't "possess intense consciousness and self-understanding" exactly the same
as learn?
So aren't you just saying that "highly efficiently intelligent systems will
necessarily" learn?
And why don't we just simplify "highly efficiently intelligent" as intelligent
-- and just, by fiat, declare that anything that isn't "highly efficiently
intelligent" is merely (at best) reflexively functional.
Your way, you've just moved the problem off to definitions of "intense
consciousness and self-understanding" ( a well-known homunculus).
>> intelligence {roughly =} efficient intelligence
So do you also conjecture that highly intelligent systems will necessarily
possess intense consciousness and self-understanding (i.e. learn).
----- Original Message -----
From: Benjamin Goertzel
To: [email protected]
Sent: Sunday, May 20, 2007 3:10 PM
Subject: Re: [agi] Relationship btw consciousness and intelligence
But I don't see "vulnerability to Searle's pathology" as a flaw in my
definition of intelligence...
The system {Searle + rulebook} **is** intelligent but not efficiently
intelligent
I conjecture that highly efficiently intelligent systems will necessarily
possess intense consciousness and self-understanding. (Because I think that
intense consciousness and self-understanding result from certain cognitive
structures and dynamics, that I think are necessary for achieving efficient
intelligence.)
I don't think that high intelligence in principle implies intense
consciousness or self-understanding...
The reason this confuses people is that
intelligence {roughly =} efficient intelligence
for any real systems we have ever seen or know how to construct. The only
intelligent but not efficiently intelligent systems we can talk about are
hypothetical ones like {Searle+rulebook} or AIXI or AIXItl ...
-- Ben G
On 5/20/07, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Rough approximations maybe . . . . but you yourself have now pointed out
that your definition is vulnerable to Searle's pathology (which is even simpler
than the infinite AIXI effect :-)
----- Original Message -----
From: Benjamin Goertzel
To: [email protected]
Sent: Sunday, May 20, 2007 3:00 PM
Subject: Re: [agi] Relationship btw consciousness and intelligence
Sure, that's fine...
I mean: I have given a mathematical definition before, so all these
verbal paraphrases
should be viewed as rough approximations anyway...
On 5/20/07, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Allow me to paraphrase . . . .
Something is intelligent if it is functional over a wide variety of
complex goals.
Is that a reasonable shot at your definition?
----- Original Message -----
From: Benjamin Goertzel
To: [email protected]
Sent: Sunday, May 20, 2007 2:41 PM
Subject: Re: [agi] Relationship btw consciousness and intelligence
Intelligence, to me, is the ability to achieve complex goals...
This is one way of being functional.... a paperclip though is very
functional yet not very intelligent...
ben g
On 5/20/07, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> Sure... I prefer to define intelligence in terms of behavioral
functionality rather than internal properties, but you are free to define it
differently ;-)
I wouldn't call learning/adaptability an internal(-only) property .
. . .
>> I note that if the Chinese language changes over time, then the
{Searle + rulebook} system will rapidly become less intelligent in this context
!!!!
See. Now this indicates the funkiness of your definition . . . .
Replace intelligent with functional and it makes a lot more sense.
Actually, that raises a good question -- What is the difference
between your "intelligent" and your "functional"?
----- Original Message -----
From: Benjamin Goertzel
To: [email protected]
Sent: Sunday, May 20, 2007 2:11 PM
Subject: Re: [agi] Relationship btw consciousness and intelligence
Sure... I prefer to define intelligence in terms of behavioral
functionality rather than internal properties, but you are free to define it
differently ;-)
I note that if the Chinese language changes over time, then the
{Searle + rulebook} system will rapidly become less intelligent in this context
!!!!
ben g
On 5/20/07, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED] > wrote:
I liked most of your points, but . . . .
>> However, Searle's example is pathological in the sense that
it posits a system with a high degree of intelligence associated with a
functionality that is NOT associated with any intensity-of-consciousness. But
I suggest that this pathology is due to the unrealistically large amount of
computing resources that the rulebook requires.
Not by my definition of intelligence (which requires
learning/adaptation).
----- Original Message -----
From: Benjamin Goertzel
To: [email protected]
Sent: Sunday, May 20, 2007 1:24 PM
Subject: [agi] Relationship btw consciousness and intelligence
Hi all,
Someone emailed me recently about Searle's Chinese Room
argument,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_room
a topic that normally bores me to tears, but it occurred to
me that part of my reply might be of interest to some
on this list, because it pertains to the more general issue
of the relationship btw consciousness and intelligence.
It also ties in with the importance of thinking about
"efficient intelligence" rather than just raw intelligence, as
discussed in the recent thread on definitions of intelligence.
Here is the relevant part of my reply about Searle:
****
However, a key point is: The scenario Searle describes is
likely not physically possible, due to the unrealistically large size of the
rulebook. The structures that we associate with intelligence (will, focused
awareness, etc.) in a human context, all come out of the need to do intelligent
processing within modest space and time requirements.
So when we say we feel like the {Searle+rulebook} system
isn't really understanding Chinese, what we mean is: It isn't understanding
Chinese according to the methods we are used to, which are methods adapted to
deal with modest space and time resources.
This ties in with the relationship btw
intensity-of-consciousness and degree-of-intelligence. In real life, these
seem often to be tied together, because the cognitive structures that correlate
with intensity of consciousness are useful ones for achieving intelligent
behaviors.
However, Searle's example is pathological in the sense that
it posits a system with a high degree of intelligence associated with a
functionality that is NOT associated with any intensity-of-consciousness. But
I suggest that this pathology is due to the unrealistically large amount of
computing resources that the rulebook requires.
I.e., it is finitude of resources that causes intelligence
and intensity-of-consciousness to be correlated. The fact that this
correlation breaks in a pathological, physically-impossible case that requires
dramatically much resources, doesn't mean too much...
****
Note that I write about intensity of consciousness rather
than presence of consciousness. I tend toward panpsychism but I do accept that
"while all animals are conscious, some animals are more conscious than others"
(to pervert Orwell). I have elaborated on this perspective considerably in The
Hidden Pattern.
-- Ben G
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