On Apr 4, 2014, at 1:25 PM, Milton L Mueller <[email protected]> wrote:

> 
> -----Original Message-----
> 
>> With an exhausted IPv4 pool, there are no "pool limitations at the 
>> time of allocation" as there are no allocations.  ARIN's role in IPv4 is 
>> primarily the third goal above: registry accuracy.
>> 
>> That's why I advocate removing needs-basis from transfers in a post- 
>> exhaustion world.  There's no pool to manage[1], so the only OFFICIAL 
>> mandate ARIN has from the network operator community is to run 
>> an accurate registry.
> 
> I agree with David. 
> Needs assessment was designed to be a rationing mechanism that filled in the 
> gap left by the absence of a price system for Ipv4 addresses. 

Continuing to make this assertion doesn’t make it any more true than it was the 
first time you uttered it.

Needs assessment existed long before any form of “rationing” of IP space was 
ever perceived as necessary. The nature and scrutiny of the process have 
evolved over time, but needs assessment has existed since the definition of 
network classes.

> Because ARIN hands out free pool number blocks for free, the absence of needs 
> assessment would provoke a first come first served land rush and subsequent 
> tragedy of the commons. Once you reach exhaust, however, no one gets number 
> blocks for free, everyone must pay a market price for them. The rationale for 
> needs assessment is totally gone. Restricting transfers in this environment 
> _will_ inevitably produce inaccuracies in the registry data. 

Can you back this assertion up with facts to support it? I think it is entirely 
possible that there will be some unpaid transfer arrangements after free pool 
runout for a variety of reasons. Yes, market rate transactions will likely be 
the predominant mechanism by which addresses are moved from one organization to 
another, but I haven’t seen anything to suggest that they will be the exclusive 
mechanism. Especially when you consider that there are various ways to define 
exhaustion and most definitions have more to do with when the RIR receives a 
request it cannot satisfy than when the RIR is no longer able to satisfy ANY 
request(s).

Further, nobody has yet offered any evidence that such restrictions will 
inevitably produce any greater level of registry inaccuracy than removing them. 
In fact, I think there is at least as strong a likelihood that removing such 
restrictions would eliminate almost all incentives to update registry data at 
any time.

Owen

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