We are now well clear of anything resembling the thread of the original contribution by John Welsh which, incidentally certainly deserves more serious consideration than it's perhaps receiving. Aside from that, but under the same general heading Peter White wrote (amongst other things) :
It is an arguable point that Harry Schneider's glider buiding was moreThe last sentence is of special interest.
succesful than GAF/CAC? And I don't think he got a fraction of the
government funding that GAF/CAC did. He certainly got no support from the
GFA with the Platypus.
It's a throw-away line; it's been said quite often in one way or another, and Peter isn't the first person to use it.
Unfortunately it's also rubbish, quite wrong, and betrays a disturbing if probably blissful ignorance of what really happened. Not that I hold anything against Peter or the others who have stated it over the years. We all enjoy kicking the government of the day, even more so those of the past; however if lies are repeated often enough and no-one challenges their substance, they becomes folk lore. The statement "GFA did nothing to assist the Platypus" is probably now in that dubious category.
How can I say that? Quite simply because I was there. I was a member of the GFA Executive for at least some of the time during the latter stages of the Platypus development, and as a consequence of my office(s) in the Executive, and also my geographical location, closer to the whole matter than most others at that time.
Of course the final outcome is all that really matters, and in the end analysis the Platypus project did not succeed. That does not mean that GFA and the members of the Executive at the time sat back with their hands folded and did nothing.
On the contrary, the Platypus project occupied quite a bit of the Executive's business during those years, and we convened and attended several formal and informal meetings with the owners of the project and others to see just how we might be get this dream machine into every club in the GFA. Such enthusiasm had to be tempered with the fact that there was a limit as to just how much we could intrude into an existing private glider sales business, one of several operating within Australia at the time. Sensitive and "difficult" issues were involved, and negotiations and discussions were always constrained in some degree by these and other factors.
The first of those meetings which I attended was convened to establish just where the project was at, and how GFA might be able to assist. GFA took it seriously enough to arrange for someone with business experience beyond that of the two GFA exec delegates to come over from Melbourne for these discussions. The results of this meeting were really not all that satisfactory or encouraging because we soon discovered, if we didn't already know it, that the things that the project most needed to get off the ground were, firstly, finance to set up a manufacturing enterprise, and secondly, a guaranteed and predictable series of sales to be able to ensure its initial and preferably ongoing viability.
GFA at that time was not not exactly rolling in money and certainly didn't enjoy the cash reserves it reports today. While there was some reserve capital, it was far short of what was reasonably required to set up a production line. The precise figures have turned somewhat hazy over the years, but I seem to recall that an amount of some $250K + was calculated and accepted by all present as being the likely starting point to set up a production facility - the blow-out factor could easily take this to three or four hundred thousand. Certainly GFA could not have responsibly provided even a quarter of this amount at the time. I understand that informal overtures were subsequently made to other people involved in gliding at the time known to have an entrepreneurial flair, and possibly a few bob to invest in the future of the sport, but these were politely and firmly declined.
We could have levied each of the GFA members a hundred or so dollars, but, hell, none of us really wanted to face a lynching or the inevitable legal challenge(s) that would arise (hopefully before the lynch party assembled and got down to business.....) . The first challenge was one of finance, and there appeared to be no easy solutions to this short of winning a lottery somewhere.
The second issue - namely the one of somehow guaranteeing a steady source of sales also presented difficulties which are easily glossed over by those who didn't have to address them. Some limited enquiries were conducted around the movement as to the likely number of immediate purchases, and these were not encouraging. Certainly one didn't need a very big calculator to work out that the cost of production for even a run of 10 aircraft would mean that buyers would need to invest money far in excess of what they were used to paying in respect of then current aircraft prices. Everyone wanted one of course, but few were prepared to place an order with a reasonable holding deposit to get things started, not knowing how much it would cost, or even if they might get their money back if it all fell over. Besides, their Blaniks were still OK and while a Platypus would be nice, they needed a more concrete proposal than we were able to offer at that stage. My recollection is that the responses which indicated what might be interpreted as serious intention to purchase remained in the single figure range .
I can't say I blamed them. All the information we had assembled and the advice we had received suggested that the project was marginal in terms of its financial viability. No amount of conviction and enthusiasm as to the need for the aircraft and its very attractive features could be allowed to over-ride the hard business facts as they stood at the time, although there were plenty of people who thought otherwise.
In the midst of this, someone somewhere started a "unofficial" Platypus fund, and many modest and indeed a few generous contributions were made by GFA members to that fund. While these indicated a certain degree of warm support from the grass root membership, the total raised did not come even a small distance towards setting up a production facility and sadly, the scheme eventually faded into oblivion. I've no idea what happened to the funds so raised.
The most exciting and promising prospect was the announcement, at some time in these proceedings, that a major investment company had became interested in the project. GFA representatives were invited to one of a series of discussions conducted between representatives from the investment company and the owner of the aircraft. This meeting was very promising, and the number crunchers from the company were clearly impressed with the project's potential based on discussions they had already been through with the owner. Quite clearly they had done their homework, and the depth and earnestness of their questions gave us considerable optimism. The GFA representatives expressed their strong support and encouragement for the project, undertook to assist in any way the Federation could, and as a practical contribution, offered to arrange for the certification and type approval to be done by GFA free of charge if the project were to proceed. This was estimated at the time to be worth at least $80K in commercial terms.
I still remember the mixture of surprise and dismay this produced when the certification offer was revealed at the subsequent GFA Exec. meeting - (YOU DID WHAT???) - but certainly those who had attended the meeting felt strongly enough about the project to feel that the offer HAD to be made. It received (somewhat cautious) Executive backing, we confirmed our support of the project to the company, and awaited their deliberations with eagerness and no small degree of optimism.
We were as dismayed as anyone else when it was subsequently revealed that they had decided not to proceed. As I recall, the reasons for this devastating decision were not conveyed officially as such to GFA, but in time, some hazy images were assembled from the wreckage. Certainly the issue of product liability seemed to be of special interest to them at the time - it was that point when aircraft manufacturers in the States were ceasing production of some lines for the same reason.
But there was one probable over-riding reason which we later uncovered. I don't intend to risk having defend a libel by repeating the story in detail, but can I suggest that with one phone call the company discovered good reason to suddenly (if unexpectedly) drop the project immediately. Let's leave it at that.
I think the feeling of the Executive after this rejection was that we had done all that we reasonably could to assist the project. We felt at the time, as I still do, deep disappointment that we had failed, but could not argue with the realistic assessment that all serious research had revealed. Especially damning was the final conclusion of the investment company whose research had clearly been so very thorough, and far in excess of what we might ever have be able to assemble with our own resources. If they were not prepared at that time to invest venture capital on the project, which was after all, as emphasised in the discussions, their business and trade to take such reasonable risks, it would clearly be inadvisable for GFA to take similar chances with member's funds.
Of course we received the condemnation of the movement, and a somewhat sarcastic response from several quarters at the next ACM. I recall vividly that one of the councillors at the time, after condemnation of GFA's efforts, announced with triumph that he was going to form a consortium/company to build the Platypus, and that this time it would be done properly, and they would succeed where GFA had failed. We are still awaiting the fruits of this promise.
I will admit in retrospect, that my deep personal disappointment at the decision was tempered with some slight relief that I as then chairman of the Tech Committee would not have to "come good" with the certification/type approval promise. Certainly we would have delivered somehow if the project had gone ahead, but the secondary effects of such a contribution and the upheaval it would have produced in the GFA air-worthiness area still causes me to shudder when I think about it.
So, Peter, and others who are interested, and wont to repeat the mantra that "GFA did nothing to help the Platypus project", please understand that more was done than you perhaps know about at the time by your fellow GFA members in their own time and at their own expense. Of course it all came to nought; that is all that really matters and that is what history will record. The fact that others tried where we failed and achieved a nil result is also sad, but gives some indications of the difficulties attending the commercial production of a new aircraft from scratch.
However there is still nothing to stop anyone who believes strongly in the project to get off their seats and get cracking. The Australian dollar allows a more competitive export proposition than at any time in recent history. In many respects you have a much better base from which to start than we had. The Blaniks are all dying of log book poisoning, and current replacement options are seriously expensive. GFA is certainly wealthier now than it was in the early 80's, and therefore presumably more able to assist if it so wished. There will probably never be a better time to put words into action.
In the meantime please be aware that GFA executive at the time did as much as it reasonably could in the midst of its other duties, projects and general fire fighting to assist the project, and while it will probably never be seen as enough, I am satisfied that we gave it our best shot with what we had at the time and the circumstances as they existed.
It would almost certainly add to the strength and accuracy of contributions here and elsewhere if this were to be kept in mind the next time someone feels compelled for whatever reason to suggest otherwise.
Regards,
Terry
