Gautam: > There's certainly a lot of evidence > to support that - including Hitler's own statements (to the extent that > those are evidence one way or the other, of course). OTOH, there's also > some evidence that one of the reasons for the invasion of Normandy was that > Hitler viewed it as a jumping-off point for an eventual invasion of the US,
I assume you mean either the uncompleted invasion of Britain, or that of Russia? I don't doubt that if Britain had negotiated an armistice with Nazi Germany in 1940 or 1941 that, sooner or later Britain and Germany would have faced off again. Britain controlled the Middle Eastern oil, including Iraq and Iran and the Germans were already fomenting anti-British movements in both those countries. Rommel later kept pointing out that he could take the Saudi oilfields if given enough support, and then link up with the drive through the Caucuses. Ironically, most of the North African war was fought on top of as yet undiscovered Libyan oilfields. Sooner or later a Cold War would probably have developed between the US and a Nazi-controlled Europe, whether Britain still remained extant or not. But if Germany couldn't invade Britain in 1940/41 I can't see how even another ten years or more would get them into a position to be able to invade the US. At worst, the world would have been divided up into 3 spheres of influence: German, Japanese and American. It was always most likely that enough of Britain's empire would remain (principally Canada and Australia) that a fourth sphere, including most of Africa and probably India, would remain, too. The detail would be in determining how much of Russia and China would remain outside German and Japanese control. > so it could go the other way, of course. But I don't think they could have > linked up in Afghanistan via Burma and India, because the Japanese were > stopped cold at Imphal-Kohima. Nor, in fact, was such a linkage really > necessary. > When I said that the Germans and Japanese could have met I should have made it clear that I do not think that they would have, except maybe by fighting the war that they should have, and not the one that they did. > Of course in the larger frame there's the serious question of what the > Japanese could possibly have been thinking in fighting a war with the United > States anyways. It was fundamentally a misreading of the American > character. One of my profs argues that they _knew_ that they would lose the > war, but thought that the US would limit itself to a small campaign and then > concede dominance in Asia to Japan. This was, of course, a rather > catastrophic misinterpretation of the American character. Of course, they > weren't the last people to make that same mistake... > I fully agree, Japan was stupid to take on the US in the way that they did. Admiral Yamamoto knew it was wrong but either didn't or couldn't make anyone else listen. I wrote some time back about what I saw as the options open to Japan (actually, it was what the Japanese saw, themselves, too): 1. Strike Russia 2. Strike against Malaysia (British) and Netherlands East Indies and hope the US stays out of the fight. (French IndoChina had already been taken over without a fight in mid 1941, and Thailand had been "persuaded" to ally with Japan) 3. Option 2 plus strike against the US and then fortify the Pacific to make the US decide it was too difficult to fight back. Option 3, the option with the greatest potential risk, was the one that they took. It didn't work. Had they taken option 2 they would, in all likelihood have at least got all the oil, rubber and alumina resources available from what is now Malaysia and Indonesia, enough to continue the war against China. I really, really doubt that the US would have come into a war against Japan - regardless of what Roosevelt said - to fight for British and Dutch colonial possessions. The US may (emphasis on may) have come in to protect Australia, but frankly I doubt that. Had the Japanese clearly said that they would leave the Philippines alone, I think the Pacific War would have been very different. BTW, I think Australia would still exist along with New Zealand but we may have been pretty well cut off from the US. Papua New Guinea, though, I would have expected to be taken by the Japanese, probably Fiji too. At the same time, a few command and other changes in Malaysia/Singapore could well have stopped the Japanese there in 1942. Percival should not have been in command, and Bennet (the Australian commander) was probably the worst option available to the Australian Army. If one or both of those generals had been elsewhere- say, retired- Pacific history might anyway be very different. The British and Indian forces stopped the Japanese at the India/Burma border at Imphal. It took a lot of US air support, that may not have existed otherwise, both in the battle and in supplying the British forces as they retreated through Burma. There was also a lot of US supplies available to the defending British forces. For example, the British were using Stuart (M2) and Grant (M3) tanks, all US made, at Imphal. India, could have revolted against Britain somewhere along the way. That was the worst case scenario for the Allies. The Sikh contingent captured at Singapore almost all went over to the Japanese, and the Japanese set up but then abused, an Indian National Army. There was a lot of support in India for the Japanese, up until reports of how the Japanese treated captured Indians came to light. (The Japanese had used hundreds of Indian soldiers for bayonet and decapitation practice, and dozens were used for chemical/biological trials at Harbin by Unit 731). Churchill basically had to surrender Indian independence (one of his greatest fears) as the price for Indian involvement against Japan. Fortunately so. The Japanese Navy had already hit Sri Lanka, sinking a British aircraft carrier and a couple of cruisers, added to the 2 battleships sunk defending Malaya. Up until about 2 months ago, that was the last time Japanese warships sailed the Indian Ocean. Britain in 1942 didn't have very many resources to throw against Japan, anyway. As it was, Churchill tried all he could to divert the returning 6th and 7th Australian divisions (almost all our forces were in North Africa when the Japanese attacked) to Burma when they were crucial to defending Australia. We didn't get the 9th Division back until after El Alamein and only 2 Australian squadrons of the 20 or so operating in Europe returned to fight against Japan (plus 1 British squadron). Most of the Australian Navy was in the Mediterranean, too. As it was, Hitler derailed his own drive on the Chechen oilfields by concentrating on Stalingrad, so the chance never arose. Brett
