Having questioned one side in the debate, let me question the other side. The discussion over the evidence for WMD that existed before Gulf War II seems to naturally flow out of what happened. Here's how I see what's happening.
1) There was general acceptance that Hussein has chemical and biological weapons when the inspectors left before the 1998 bombings by the US and GB. There was also evidence that he had a program to develop nuclear weapons that was in a fairly early stage. 2) Top leadership in the US and GB gave the impression, leading up to the war, that they had in hand intelligence that the WMD program was not just leftovers of the earlier program that were not totally destroyed. From these 16 words, and others, I got the impression that they had weapons that would test the US biological/chemical warfare defense. I also got the impression that the nuclear program was ongoing and making progress. 3) During and since the war various sources associated with the intelligence community seemed to indicate that these viewpoint expressed by the Administration was stronger than the intelligence actually supported. The reality was that the intelligence was consistent with a broad range of possibilities. Professionals use cautious words under these circumstances, for good reason. 4) Top leadership/management chose to ignore these cautions and use words that indicated certainty. I've seen that happen in other cases in business. Upper management in many companies put reports through a filter of what they know to be true in their hearts. They accept reports that fit this understanding, and find flaws with those that don't. Further, everyone in the organization knows what is wanted, and it takes courage to issue a contradictory report...especially if things are murky and top management might be right. I got the general feeling that, even if they thought that their case was a bit overstated, they knew that the weapons found after the liberation of Iraq would prove their point, so all that would get lost. As an aside here, during the war there were other criticisms of the Administrations viewpoints, both by retired professionals and by unnamed sources from within the military stating that Rumsfeld did not use enough heavy armor in the war. I was concerned at the time, but now happily admit that the heavy armor that was used was more than adequate for the task. Even then, with the concerns, I leaned towards believing that the US forces would do very well. Indeed, at the time, I was unique in my house in believing that the fall of Baghdad would take weeks, not months. The proof was in the pudding. With WMD, I expected the same. When Gautam stated that he was very confident that WMD would be found in a few months, I was too. Now, its over 3 months since the end of the war, and the closest thing to a smoking gun that has been reported is some centrifuges and plans that had not been destroyed in '98. The US has had control of the country for that time, and has found next to nothing. From the attitude and words of the administration, I expected that they had a pretty good idea where things were and that they knew the shell games the Iraqis were playing with the inspectors. Never would I have imagined that we would be left with little more evidence than was produced by the inspectors last fall and winter (they found plans too IIRC). So, in this case, the proof is also in the pudding. The administration overruled their own intelligence, as I'm guessing did the GB administration from the new coming from there, and overstated what was known. I don't actually think they lied because I think they believed what they said. However, they were wrong. When they overruled the military and attacked with less armor then recommended, they were right, and they deserve credit. When a political operative pressured the head of the CIA to go against his own folks and accept the claim of African uranium, they deserve to take the responsibility for that. The reason this is important is that the negatives for going into Iraq are long term. We are going to be occupying Iraq for a long time. I'm now seeing timeframes close to five years for this. Occupying and controlling an Arab country for this length of time does has the potential for tremendous risks. So, given the close nature of the risk/reward tradeoff in the minds of many people, the misrepresentation of the intelligence information was critical. Containment vs. attack as the best option was balanced on a knife's edge. I recently saw an interesting article arguing for three basis for going into Iraq: 1) Human Rights 2) risk to the US from WMD 3) Transforming the Middle East The author argued that the first reason has actually been strengthened since Gulf War II. The likelihood for the third reason is still uncertain. The second reasons appears less valid as time goes on. The chances of Hussein having a massive chemical/biological warfare system ready to deploy that vanishes with nary a trace seems remote to me. If we find little more than we see now after, say, one year, the logical conclusion would be that the extent of Hussein's system was significantly less than we thought. If the original range of estimates, with uncertainties, were presented by the administration, that would not be a major problem. But, when they invoked certainty in order to garner support for the war, it is important. Dan M. Dan M. _______________________________________________ http://www.mccmedia.com/mailman/listinfo/brin-l
