On Aug 4, 2014, at 9:21 AM, Rob Stradling <rob.stradl...@comodo.com> wrote:

> On 04/08/14 14:16, Gervase Markham wrote:
>> On 02/08/14 15:20, Jesper Kristensen wrote:
>>> * Have you considered adding support for multiple ocsp staples to allow
>>> stapeling of CA certs?
>> 
>> There is a proposed standard for multi-stapling but as far as I remember
>> it's not even finished yet, yet alone implemented and deployed. We
>> decided that we can't wait for it.
> 
> FWIW, it's a Standards Track RFC now.
> 
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6961
> 
> I'm not aware of any implementations though.


Funny enough, I'm an author on RFC 6169 :)
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6169

Multi-stapling seems like a reasonable idea in principle.  However, given the 
lack of implementation, it seems like a OneCRL-like strategy for intermediates 
is likely to have more impact faster.

--Richard



> 
>>> * Why not allow short-lived CA certs without revocation info, just like
>>> EE certs?
>> 
>> I'm not sure there are any CAs out there who would like to get their
>> root key out of it secure storage every 3 days.
> 
> Ouch.  Painful.
> 
>>> * While must-staple and short-lived certificates seem to be scalable
>>> solutions, OneCRL seems to be a hack needed to make things work in the
>>> current situation. It would be nice if this could be explicitly stated,
>>> and even better if you could declare it as a temporary solution intended
>>> to be used only until more scalable solutions are specced, implemented
>>> and deployed.
>> 
>> It's not a temporary solution for intermediate certs. Well, perhaps it's
>> possible that multi-stapling could eventually supplant it (if TCP init
>> windows also enlarge) but I don't think it's really necessary to
>> speculate on that yet.
>> 
>> Gerv
>> 
>> 
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> 
> -- 
> Rob Stradling
> Senior Research & Development Scientist
> COMODO - Creating Trust Online
> 
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