I do have to ask this, though: WoSign has at least one EV issuer. I do not know if there is an issuer with EV permissions in NSS, but WoSign does have an EV code signing issuer in the Microsoft root program. Has this issuer been checked to ensure that it could not have misissued certificates? (Yes, it's probably out of scope for mozilla's process. However, it's still something I'm curious about.)
Also, on #2: Will this audit apply to all WoSign issuers included in NSS, or just a single one? I count at least 4. And finally, where does this leave StartCom? Is there a need for inquiries regarding StartCom's operations? -Kyle H On 9/7/2016 03:06, Richard Wang wrote: > Hi Gerv, Kathleen and Richard, > > This discuss has been lasting two weeks, I think it is time to end it, it > doesn’t worth to waste everybody’s precious time. > I make my confession that our system and management do have some problems > which lead to the misissuance of some certificates. And I am very sorry that > WoSign don’t notify all browsers after the incident happened and even after > the problem fixed. > > I’d like to give my suggestion action for Mozilla as below: > 1. Mozilla will trust those SSL certificates only: > (1) The certificate notBefore date is before Jan. 1st 2015; > (2) The certificate notBefore date is from Jan. 1st 2015 to July 4th 2016 > that listed in the Google CT log server; > (3) The certificate notBefore date is from July 5th 2016 to Sept xx 2016 > that embedded SCT data in the certificate; > (4) The certificate notBefore date is from Sept xx 2016 that embedded SCT > data in the certificate and must have the “C=CN” in the certificate subject. > > 2. Mozilla can assign a WebTrust auditor to WoSign office to check and > inspect every incident, check every relevant issued certificate, and record a > report with: what happened, why this happened and what is being done to > prevent this in the future etc., WoSign will pay the audit cost. > > I’d like to make some supplements about 1. (4) above, this term means WoSign > will only issue SSL certificates to China subscribers. > WoSign issued about 120K SSL certificates for websites in China including > many central government websites like MIIT and many other local province > government websites, many university websites, many online banking websites, > 6 of the Top 10 ecommerce websites, big supermarket online store like > Walmart, 4 of the Top 5 cloud service in China, and many big companies that > listed in NYSE and Nasdaq, and many subsidiaries of foreign countries big > companies. > Those customers like to use WoSign certificate especially our support of > Chinese, local support and customer service. And some of them paid up to > 10-year certificate fee in advance, we need to renew their certificate for > free once it is about to expire at every three years for OV SSL. > > I wish Mozilla could accept my suggestion, and I am sure WoSign will do it > better after getting this so big lesson. > Thank you. > > > Best Regards, > > Richard Wang > CEO > WoSign CA Limited > > > -----Original Message----- > From: dev-security-policy > [mailto:dev-security-policy-bounces+richard=wosign....@lists.mozilla.org] On > Behalf Of Richard Wang > Sent: Sunday, September 4, 2016 5:49 PM > To: Gervase Markham <g...@mozilla.org>; > mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org > Subject: RE: Incidents involving the CA WoSign > > Hi all, > > We finished the investigation and released the incidents report today: > https://www.wosign.com/report/wosign_incidents_report_09042016.pdf > > This report has 20 pages, please let me if you still have any questions, > thanks. > > This report is just for Incident 0-2, we will release a separate report for > another incident X soon. > > > Best Regards, > > Richard Wang > CEO > WoSign CA Limited > > > -----Original Message----- > From: Gervase Markham [mailto:g...@mozilla.org] > Sent: Wednesday, August 24, 2016 9:08 PM > To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org > Cc: Richard Wang <rich...@wosign.com> > Subject: Incidents involving the CA WoSign > > Dear m.d.s.policy, > > Several incidents have come to our attention involving the CA "WoSign". > Mozilla is considering what action it should take in response to these > incidents. This email sets out our understanding of the situation. > > Before we begin, we note that Section 1 of the Mozilla CA Certificate > Enforcement Policy[0] says: "When a serious security concern is noticed, such > as a major root compromise, it should be treated as a security-sensitive bug, > and the Mozilla Policy for Handling Security Bugs should be followed." It is > clear to us, and appears to be clear to other CAs based on their actions, > that misissuances where domain control checks have failed fall into the > category of "serious security concern". > > Incident 0 > ---------- > > On or around April 23rd, 2015, WoSign's certificate issuance system for their > free certificates allowed the applicant to choose any port for validation. > Once validation had been completed, WoSign would issue certificates for that > domain. A researcher was able to obtain a certificate for a university by > opening a high-numbered port (>50,000) and getting WoSign to use that port > for validation of control. > > This problem was reported to Google, and thence to WoSign and resolved. > Mozilla only became aware of it recently. > > * Before the recent passage of Ballot 169 in the CAB Forum, which limits the > ports and paths which can be used, the Baseline Requirements said that one > acceptable method of domain validation was "Having the Applicant demonstrate > practical control over the FQDN by making an agreed‐upon change to > information found on an online Web page identified by a uniform resource > identifier containing the FQDN". This method therefore did not violate the > letter of the BRs. However, Mozilla considers the basic security knowledge > that ports over 1024 are unprivileged should have led all CAs not to accept > validations of domain control on such ports, even when not documented in the > BRs. > > * The misissuance incident was not reported to Mozilla by WoSign as it should > have been (see above). > > * This misissuance incident did not turn up on WoSign's subsequent BR > audit[1]. > > Incident 1 > ---------- > > In June 2015, an applicant found a problem with WoSign's free certificate > service, which allowed them to get a certificate for the base domain if they > were able to prove control of a subdomain. > > The reporter proved the problem in two ways. They accidentally discovered it > when trying to get a certificate for med.ucf.edu and mistakenly also applied > for www.ucf.edu, which was approved. They then confirmed the problem by using > their control of theiraccount.github.com/theiraccount.github.io to get a cert > for github.com, github.io, and www.github.io. > > They reported this to WoSign, giving only the Github certificate as an > example. That cert was revoked and the vulnerability was fixed. However > recently, they got in touch with Google to note that the ucf.edu cert still > had not been revoked almost a year later. > > * The lack of revocation of the ucf.edu certificate (still unrevoked at time > of writing, although it may have been by time of posting) strongly suggests > that WoSign either did not or could not search their issuance databases for > other occurrences of the same problem. Mozilla considers such a search a > basic part of the response to disclosure of a vulnerability which causes > misissuance, and expects CAs to keep records detailed enough to make it > possible. > > * This misissuance incident was not reported to Mozilla by WoSign as it > should have been (see above). > > * This misissuance incident did not turn up on WoSign's subsequent BR > audit[1]. > > Incident 2 > ---------- > > In July 2016, it became clear that there was some problems with the > StartEncrypt automatic issuance service recently deployed by the CA StartCom. > As well as other problems it had, which are outside the scope of this > discussion, changing a simple API parameter in the POST request on the > submission page changed the root certificate to which the resulting > certificate chained up. The value "2" made a certificate signed by "StartCom > Class 1 DV Server CA", "1" selected "WoSign CA Free SSL Certificate G2" and > "0" selected "CA 沃通根证书", another root certificate owned by WoSign and trusted > by Firefox. > > Using the value "1" led to a certificate which had a notBefore date (usage > start date) of 20th December 2015, and which was signed using the > SHA-1 checksum algorithm. > > * The issuance of certificates using SHA-1 has been banned by the Baseline > Requirements since January 1st, 2016. Browsers, including Firefox, planned to > enforce this[2] by not trusting certs with a notBefore date after that date, > but in the case of Firefox the fix had to be backed out due to web > compatibility issues. However, we are considering how/when to reintroduce it, > and CAs presumably know this. > > * The issuance of backdated certificates is not forbidden, but is listed in > Mozilla's list of Problematic Practices[3]. It says "Minor tweaking for > technical compatibility reasons is accepted, but backdating certificates in > order to avoid some deadline or code-enforced restriction is not." > > * WoSign deny that their code backdated the certificates in order to avoid > browser-based restrictions - they say "this date is the day we stop to use > this code"[4]. If that is true, it is not clear to us how StartCom came to > deploy WoSign code that WoSign itself had abandoned. > > * It seems clear from publicly available information that StartCom's issuance > systems are linked to WoSign's issuance systems in some way. > Nevertheless, it should not have been possible for an application for a cert > from StartCom to produce a cert signed by WoSign. > > * This misissuance incident was not reported to Mozilla by WoSign as it > should have been. > > > Taking into account all these incidents and the actions of this CA, Mozilla > is considering what action to take. Your input is welcomed. > > Gerv, Kathleen and Richard > > > [0] > https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/about/governance/policies/security-group/certs/policy/enforcement/ > [1] https://cert.webtrust.org/SealFile?seal=2019&file=pdf > [2] https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=942515 > [3] > https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Problematic_Practices#Backdating_the_notBefore_date > [4] https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1293366 > _______________________________________________ > dev-security-policy mailing list > dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org > https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy > _______________________________________________ > dev-security-policy mailing list > dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org > https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
