Allen Pulsifer wrote: > I have a thought on a possibly improved IRV method that I would like to > run by the list.
I believe the method you describe is essentially the same as one I called Double IRV in the following posts: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/instantrunoff-freewheeling/message/343 http://groups.yahoo.com/group/instantrunoff-freewheeling/message/344 I don't make it clear how to handle tied ranks, but your fractional solution seems the most natural. Are they the same or did I miss a substantial difference? > This method of elimination would seem to pass the Condorcet criteria, > because in order to be eliminated, a candidate would have to lose a > pair-wise contest against all remaining candidates. Well, it is a Condorcet method because a candidate would have to lose a pairwise contest against *some* remaining candidate, so a voted Condorcet winner could never be eliminated. Double IRV and BTR-IRV were two IRV-like methods I thought might be salable to IRV advocates as worthy of their support. -- Rob LeGrand, psephologist [EMAIL PROTECTED] Citizens for Approval Voting http://www.approvalvoting.org/ __________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around http://mail.yahoo.com ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
