Quoting Jonathan Lundell <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > IRV's problem with ignoring later preferences and not always finding > a Condorcet winner is a direct consequence of the way it avoids > Condorcet's problem with encouraging insincere voting.
On what basis do you claim that a good Condorcet Method would encourage insincere voting? I have yet to see any convincing arguments that it does. Most of the attempts tend to center around a single group of voters attempting to manipulate the election to their advantage. The fundamental flaws with these particular arguments is that they assume that (a) no other groups will attempt counter-strategies, (b) that a single group of voters will even be capable of obtaining an accurate enough picture to figure out how to change their votes - accuracy they would need appears to be far greater then one is able to obtain with a scientific survey of voter opinion and (c) the fact that if multiple groups of voters are involved in insincere voting when a Condorcet Method is used that the ultimate resolution becomes quite chaotic and the worst possible winner may be selected. It is the potential for selected the least favorite choice that causes me to believe that a good Condorcet Method actually encourages sincere voting. ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
