Hi---each entity (a thought, an amethyst geode, a bartender) emits spacetime just as Einstein argued . Graham's The Quadruple Object and my not yet out Realist Magic go into this.
Each entity "times" in the way Heidegger reserves for Da-sein and Derrida reserves to the trace. Time and space are not neutral containers but are emergent properties of beings. Tim http://www.ecologywithoutnature.blogspot.com On Jun 25, 2012, at 3:15 PM, davin heckman <davinheck...@gmail.com> wrote: > You are right.... I should do more reading. I find the thoughts > engaging and, since I am in transit, I am eager to get more > information where I can. > > Ultimately, underneath my questions, I suppose, are some thoughts on > relationality and time. You have all of these things that have to do > with chairs, but only the chair is the chair. And there are these > things that have to do with chairs, but which are real in their own > right. But an idea about a chair kind of flickers in and out of > consciousness, never having a discrete edge, and only become something > definitive when their edges are marked out in some way. It's tempting > to think that one's writing about a thought is separate from the > thought itself, but typically the act of writing or performing a > thought tends to calcify and reinforce it through a feedback loop. > Every time one thinks about a chair, one does not invent a new object. > Similar to a computer program pulling modular entities and reusing > them again and again, our thoughts repeat the concept in our > imagination. On the other hand, imaginary iterations are not the same > as digital iterations. Less like a computer, we pull the modular > concept into action and interpret it with a variety of tones. I > wouldn't want to say these singular thoughts don't exist, but on the > other hand, they don't have the same reality as those thoughts which > are articulated and taken up into collective discourse.... and even > still, a discursive "thing" gains a level of significance when it > represents some empirical process. > > I care about this because a chair changes from one moment to the next. > It becomes materially altered as time unfolds, yet we are comfortable > saying that the chair on day one is that chair on day five. In other > words, each moment does not unleash a separate chair. In my mind, > "weight" might be its subjective intensity, its empirical durability, > its social hegemony, its procedural utility, its digital ubiquity, its > aesthetic elegance.... though none of these qualities are directly > analogous to the other, suggesting that there are a variety of types > of being. > > All these thoughts are a jumble.... I'll take your advice and do some > reading. > > Davin > > On Mon, Jun 25, 2012 at 11:28 AM, Ian Bogost <ian.bog...@lcc.gatech.edu> > wrote: >> A chair is a chair. A picture of a chair is a picture of a chair. A >> definition of a chair is a definition of a chair. None are all chairs, but >> all have something to do with chairs. At least, that's the OOO contention. >> There are no planes of existence… except for Harman (and Tim, to some >> extent), who distinguishes sensual from real objects. For Graham, the idea >> of a chair is different from the real chair, which recedes from all >> encounters. I think this is maybe the conclusion you arrive at in your >> second paragraph below. >> >> NOTHING about OOO privileges the material (i.e., the tangible, physical) >> chair primacy over the others. As for "the same weight" — well, that depends >> on what you mean by "weight." What do you mean? >> >> I hate to say it, but it's maybe not possible to make further progress >> without reading some of this material in depth… >> >> Ian >> >> On Jun 25, 2012, at 3:13 AM, davin heckman wrote: >> >> Ian and Tim, >> >> Do the differences with which we treat objects syncs up with >> ontological difference, and thus, is there something to some of the >> different categorizations we could possibly develop for objects? >> >> I do think there is plenty of room to see these things from a fresh >> perspective, but I also wonder if not, for instance, Kosuth's chairs >> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One_and_Three_Chairs> highlight the ways >> that discrete objects can differ from each other, but also the ways in >> which there are consistencies that can yoke them together in odd ways. >> A picture of a chair is not a chair, a definition of chair is not a >> chair, instructions about a chair is not a chair, a chair as a >> sculpture is not necessarily a chair..... yet, in some fundamental >> way, all are chairs.... in a general sense of their concept and >> recognition. Put all three things together, and you have a "chair" >> which occupies all three planes of existence simultaneously. On the >> other hand, they can occupy niches within conceptual frameworks (a >> chair within a game, for instance, can be very "real" to the other >> objects in the game). >> >> Each way of recognizing the chair (the picture, instructions, the >> chair as chair, chair as sculpture, three chairs as conceptual work, >> etc) would suggest that each is a distinct object in some sense, which >> makes me wonder then, whether or not all other possible thoughts about >> a chair have being, or if we afford the material object of the chair >> primacy. In which case, does a digital rendering of the chair carry >> the same weight as an unexpressed idea about a chair, too. At some >> point, doesn't ontology lead into this thicket? >> >> Davin >> >> On Sun, Jun 24, 2012 at 9:08 PM, Ian Bogost <ian.bog...@lcc.gatech.edu> >> wrote: >> >> There is no reason why holding that everything exists equally entails >> >> "reducing all that can be known about a being to a simple recognition of >> >> being." >> >> >> Ian >> >> >> >> On Jun 24, 2012, at 5:44 AM, davin heckman wrote: >> >> >> I agree, this is a good starting point.... that all things that exist >> >> have being as their common condition of existence (that is, they are >> >> not "not beings"), which is a sort of foundational ontological >> >> similarity. But if the only significant ontological claim we can make >> >> about things is either yes or no, do they exist or not, then this >> >> means all things carry this single quality, which is to say that there >> >> is no difference between things. If we admit difference, then we must >> >> account for those differences in meaningful ways. For instance, >> >> waffle #1 differs from waffle #2 in a different way than waffle #1 >> >> differs from a toaster (or waffle #1 changes in the course of being >> >> eaten, it is still in one meaningful sense the "same" waffle after it >> >> has been bitten, but in another sense, it is a different waffle, too. >> >> While both toasters and waffles are different from something like an >> >> idea or a "memory" rendered in media (a waffle recipe or story about >> >> waffles) or a process habituated in muscle memory (the habit of making >> >> a waffle or eating one). >> >> >> My concern is that if we reduce all that can be known about being to a >> >> simple recognition of being, we commit to a kind of abstraction and >> >> alienation from being of the sort that happens when markets try to >> >> mediate everything through the common denominator of dollars. >> >> >> Davin >> >> >> On Sat, Jun 23, 2012 at 4:46 PM, Timothy Morton >> >> <timothymorton...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> >> Hi Davin, >> >> >> >> We obviously treat different entities differently. >> >> >> >> But this is not the same as saying that these entities are ontologically >> >> different. >> >> >> >> Yours, Tim >> >> >> >> >> >> http://www.ecologywithoutnature.blogspot.com >> >> >> >> On Jun 20, 2012, at 5:51 AM, davin heckman <davinheck...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> Thank you Ian, for these thoughts. My initial encounter with this >> >> >> work came via a brief discussion of "flat ontology," which I found >> >> >> somewhat offputting. I followed up by reading through the re:press >> >> >> book. What I like the most, I suppose, is the sense that the >> >> >> discussions are in motion with a lot of people participating. >> >> >> >> Reading some of the discussion of mereology, I find they resonate with >> >> >> one of my favorite passages from Hegel. Pardon me for cannibalizing >> >> >> another piece of writing (a draft of which can be found here: >> >> >> http://isea2011.sabanciuniv.edu/paper/disturbed-dialectic-literary-criticism). >> >> >> * >> >> >> In The Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel describes the dialectical process: >> >> >> >> "The bud disappears in the bursting-forth of the blossom, and one >> >> >> might say the former is refuted by the latter; similarly, when the >> >> >> fruit appears, the blossom is shown up in its turn as a false >> >> >> manifestation of the plant, and the fruit now emerges as the truth of >> >> >> it instead. These forms are not just distinguished from one another, >> >> >> they also supplant one another as mutually incompatible. Yet at the >> >> >> same time their fluid nature makes them moments of an organic unity in >> >> >> which they not only do not conflict, but in which each is as necessary >> >> >> as the other; and this mutual necessity alone constitutes the life of >> >> >> the whole." [1] >> >> >> >> Viewed from within the Hegelian process, the Real is positioned >> >> >> outside its present manifestations, consisting, rather, of the dynamic >> >> >> processes that comprise its totality. >> >> >> >> This insight, crucial to critical practice, requires revision in light >> >> >> of technical change. By revision, I do not mean that we need to >> >> >> fundamentally alter Hegel’s argument, I only mean to suggest that we >> >> >> see this passage with respect to new temporal modalities that have >> >> >> shaken up the pursuit of knowledge. >> >> >> * >> >> >> I come at many of the same issues, but my inclination lead me to >> >> >> embrace a kind of "humanism," but one which cannot easily understand >> >> >> as we continually muddle the conversations of humanism with an >> >> >> ontology that is expressed in our metaphors. One grip I have with the >> >> >> use of Deleuze or McLuhan, is the idea that our capacity to >> >> >> personalize prosthetics has a tendency to be reduced to a situation in >> >> >> which it becomes possible to imagine that we see machines, >> >> >> interpersonal relationships, people with tools, etc. as the same >> >> >> thing. When, in fact, my psychic investment in my bike or computer, >> >> >> while deep, is not nearly as deep or as complex as my psychic >> >> >> investment in my (which I can only refer to as mine with a sense of >> >> >> obligation to, rather than ownership over) child. If my bike decided >> >> >> to bite me.....which it can't, even if it can hurt me.... I would not >> >> >> feel so simultaneously restrained in my response AND emotionally >> >> >> florid as I would if my 8 year old bit me for some crazy reason (but >> >> >> with my three year old, I he is only a missed nap away from engaging >> >> >> in something so obvious and horrible as biting someone). A bike, on >> >> >> the other hand, can hurt me a lot more than a bite from a toddler, and >> >> >> I suppose I am not above kicking a bike and yelling.... but I have >> >> >> very limited feelings about a bike malfunction or hitting my thumb >> >> >> with a hammer. On the other hand, a bike goes wherever I want it to >> >> >> go (except when there's an accident)..... a toddler, not so much.... >> >> >> an eight year old, he usually comes with a counter proposal (and it is >> >> >> a monstrous adult that would treat kids like a bike, insist that they >> >> >> only go where told, speak when it is demanded). A lot of really deep >> >> >> thinking about human subjectivty simply does not go this far.... and >> >> >> part of this has to do with a poor understanding of objects. What is >> >> >> worse is when this understanding infects interpersonal relationships >> >> >> in the context of a Randian sort of world where there is "no such >> >> >> thing as society, only individuals" (yet, bosses treat workers like >> >> >> bikes and bad boyfriends treat their partners like robots). >> >> >> >> I am very excited to read more. I feel like it is important to free >> >> >> our thinking from patterns and habits of the past. In particular, the >> >> >> culture of academic citation has gone from being about finding good >> >> >> ideas where they are to deriving authority from the aura of the great >> >> >> figure. I also have no problem with accumulations of wisdom that >> >> >> translate into an inherited perspective, but this can't close us off >> >> >> to thinking. So.... thank you for this! >> >> >> >> Davin >> >> >> >> On Fri, Jun 15, 2012 at 11:58 AM, Ian Bogost <ian.bog...@lcc.gatech.edu> >> >> wrote: >> >> >> Davin, >> >> >> >> I'm about to disappear into a mess of meetings, but let me offer a brief >> >> >> response: >> >> >> >> What you're touching on here is what Levi Byrant sometimes calls the "weird >> >> >> mereology" of OOO. The song isn't "just" the sound waves (what Harman calls >> >> >> an underming position) nor is it just the social context of creation and use >> >> >> (an overmining position). A song is a song, and indeed, the song in an MP3 >> >> >> file is a different thing than the song as an abstraction in human culture. >> >> >> Neither is more object nor more real (well, "real" has a different meaning >> >> >> for Harman than it does for Levi and me). >> >> >> >> I talk about this a bit in the first chapter of Alien Phenomenology, and >> >> >> Levi does as well in the mereology section of Democracy of Objects. Also, >> >> >> here are a blog post from Levi on the subject that weaves the two >> >> >> together: >> >> http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2010/08/12/more-strange-mereology/ >> >> >> >> I'm not answering sufficiently but wanted to get something out to you >> >> >> rapidly. >> >> >> >> ib >> >> >> >> Ian Bogost, Ph.D. >> >> >> Professor >> >> >> Director, Graduate Program in Digital Media >> >> >> >> Georgia Institute of Technology >> >> >> Digital Media/TSRB 320B >> >> >> 85 Fifth Street NW >> >> >> Atlanta, GA 30308-1030 >> >> >> >> ibog...@gatech.edu >> >> >> +1 (404) 894-1160 (tel) >> >> >> +1 (404) 894-2833 (fax) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Jun 15, 2012, at 4:11 AM, davin heckman wrote: >> >> >> >> Ian, >> >> >> >> Since we are on the topic of OOO, I was wondering what the ontological >> >> >> status of something like a song is? I have to admit, I have a real >> >> >> hard time swallowing a pure ontology that essentially defines the >> >> >> subjective as outside of being, as a sort of on or off proposition, as >> >> >> opposed to also a turning on (or is it being turned on? Or simply to >> >> >> be turned or to turn?) (I am generally skeptical about a variety of >> >> >> posthumanisms that go beyond a critique of a monolithic Humanism, >> >> >> because I think that consciousness carries specific tendencies that >> >> >> seem to fundamentally frame all possibilities for knowledge). However >> >> >> it is entirely possible that I am missing out on a discussion that has >> >> >> been unfolding without me. >> >> >> >> But here's my thought: With a song, you have something that can be >> >> >> rendered in "objective" form.... maybe an mp3 file or a sheet of >> >> >> notes or record or something. If this is what we mean by a song, >> >> >> then, fine, that's an object. But a song only really starts doing >> >> >> something when it is unfolding within the context of memory and >> >> >> anticipation. It only is a song when it is listened to by a subject, >> >> >> which is to say it is an object that has a singular temporal being as >> >> >> it is listened to, which is distinct from how it is being listened to >> >> >> and replayed even by the same user. (And we aren't even beginning to >> >> >> talk about non-recorded music). The only way a song becomes a purely >> >> >> discrete object is when it is removed from its temporal existence and >> >> >> understood as a totality, and detached from an audience. And while we >> >> >> can sit around and all talk about, say, "Another One Bites the Dust," >> >> >> after we squeeze it into a conceptual file type and label it, the fact >> >> >> that we can discuss something that can only mean something if is >> >> >> experienced as a process AND an object within the context of a >> >> >> experience, suggests that sometimes being is realized by the relations >> >> >> of things, rather than the things themselves. My suggestion is that >> >> >> the ontological nature of the song cannot be described in objective >> >> >> terms without missing what a song is. Without the non-objective >> >> >> component of its being, a song is just sound. If we say, well, "Hey, >> >> >> when this sound occurs, people do X, Y, and Z," we can find ourself >> >> >> thinking that these effects are produced by the object, but this sort >> >> >> of thought experiment only gives us half an understanding of the >> >> >> object's being. You also have to think of that song in relation to >> >> >> the current context, to itself over time, to the individual and >> >> >> collective experience of its audience, to the culture, etc. Again, a >> >> >> great means to produce estrangement, but not the complete account of >> >> >> what the thing is. At the risk of sounding chauvinistic, I can see >> >> >> that it might be expedient to regard a distant moon without regard to >> >> >> its historical relationship to the human. It's useful to think of a >> >> >> distant moon as a quantity of data. But the closer we get to human >> >> >> existence, the more likely we are to encounter types of things that >> >> >> exist, but that cannot be understood properly as a bundle of discrete >> >> >> data. Maybe there are some texts that address precisly these sorts of >> >> >> concerns. >> >> >> >> This is where I think ontology cannot simply be objective. It must, >> >> >> of course, be able to establish the differences between things, to >> >> >> render those things it claims to understand in discrete form, insofar >> >> >> as they can be considered as such. On the other hand, we know that >> >> >> most of what the world is made of is common and that the laws of >> >> >> physics, for instance, harness discrete things under a kind of >> >> >> continuity. So, along with the conditions of radical difference that >> >> >> a philosophy of objects implies, there are the conditions of radical >> >> >> connectivity. Both features are equally present, which is to say they >> >> >> offer us little in the way of productive knowledge EXCEPT insofar as >> >> >> we can bind and sever, cut or tie, digitize or analogize within this >> >> >> framework of matter. The 21st century loves digitizing things..... >> >> >> it helps computers see the world, it helps them count us, predict our >> >> >> behavior, weigh it, value it, direct it, etc. But the digital is only >> >> >> half of our existence.... the analog process is equally present in >> >> >> language and cognition.... and it is just as equpped to help us >> >> >> understand the world by creating categories of things and identifying >> >> >> common qualities. In "Notes on the Uncanny," Freud identifies this >> >> >> struggle as productive of a kind of unsettling (the person that acts >> >> >> like an object/the object that acts like a person)... but it does not >> >> >> simply have to be a "scary" process.... the move from discrete to >> >> >> connected or from one into multiple can also be deeply satisfying and >> >> >> reassuring of being. If both processes are equally useful, then what >> >> >> presides over these two tendencies? Temporal consciousness that can >> >> >> mobilize processes of digitization and analogy? Another place to >> >> >> think through this is in relation to a variety of attempts at >> >> >> taxonomy. At some point, a poodle has to be a poodle and a wolf has >> >> >> to be a wolf, but in relation to squids, both can be canines. We >> >> >> could say that well, we are talking about layers of qualities that >> >> >> enable us to categorize this object or that object. But without the >> >> >> history of the poodle we don't really know how one canine can be a >> >> >> fashion accessory and the other is a part of a wild ecology, all of >> >> >> which (domesticating work dogs, turning tool animals into fashion >> >> >> animals, thinking about animals as people, killing wild animals, >> >> >> restoring wildness, etc) radically alter the parameters of being based >> >> >> on thoughts about being. To take it back to queer thought, around the >> >> >> bend of singular identities is the knowlege that such queerness does >> >> >> not preclude deep relationality. My reading is that the fruits of >> >> >> this thought are an affirmation of the idea that the well-worn paths >> >> >> of prescribed human behavior do not necessarily lead to earnest >> >> >> relationships, it is not to reject relationship itself in favor of >> >> >> individualism because capitalism has been doing this since the >> >> >> transformation of labor into commodity. >> >> >> >> Why does this matter? I care about politics, but I am not going to >> >> >> say that OOO cleaves to this or that kind of politics.... it doesn't >> >> >> matter. If a statement is discernibly true, then I have an obligation >> >> >> to bend my ideas around the true statement. And my sense, based on >> >> >> very limited reading, is that OOO is trying to figure out what we can >> >> >> know about being. So, while it is worth considering the political >> >> >> implications of speculative thought, I think Galloway is a bit wrong >> >> >> to suggest that something is "bourgeois" or something just because >> >> >> financial markets also offer a flat ontology via capital. The only >> >> >> thing that really matters is whether or not a philosophy can get us to >> >> >> a mutually agreed upon knowledge of the world that can be transmitted >> >> >> effectively from one context to another and continue to be useful. >> >> >> >> I have been lazy about following this month's discussion, but I like >> >> >> the idea of queering technology, of the productively broken tool. It >> >> >> is an area that has affinities with regards to my own reading of >> >> >> electronic literature..... taking Jakobson's discussion of poetics up >> >> >> through Darko Suvin's discussion of "cognitive estrangement," and >> >> >> looking at the ways that digital literary practices perform a similar >> >> >> process with regards to instrumental languages. My thought is that OOO >> >> >> is productive in that it asks us to engage in a thought experiment >> >> >> about pure objectivitiy, and in doing so, reveals the critical >> >> >> necessity of subjective and intersubjective aspects of human being >> >> >> that are embedded in our broader assertions about being. I think that >> >> >> a lot of the "posthumanisms" try to simply go beyond something that we >> >> >> have never understood in the first place: that being human is >> >> >> essentially a kind of queer existence, all the much more so when we >> >> >> insist that it is not. For my part, I want my human rights. So while >> >> >> I am sympathetic, generally, with many of the aims of the >> >> >> posthumanists I encounter, I generally think that "Humanism" has yet >> >> >> to adequately describe being human. Like Habermas said of modernity, >> >> >> it's daunting and messy and incomplete (like most things worth doing). >> >> >> Living in Norway right now (moving in a couple weeks, unfortunately), >> >> >> humanism seems to be working out pretty well here. The problems of >> >> >> the world do not stem from a love of humanity, they stem from our >> >> >> growing estrangment from humanity and increased clustering into >> >> >> paranoid, exclusionary enclaves (Why do you think everyone watches >> >> >> Zombie movies? Blasting away at legions of dirty anthropoidal morons >> >> >> trying to eat what you have, a perfect gospel for post democratic >> >> >> capitalism). In a world of Darwinian evolution, we are not entirely >> >> >> selected, we alter the landscape of an objective process through our >> >> >> dialogue with an objective sphere that exists, that we inhabit, and >> >> >> that we think about, but which does not simply constitute us. >> >> >> >> I admit these thoughts are poorly formed.... and I am very busy these >> >> >> days.... so I might not be able to reply as quickly as I would >> >> >> normally. But am very interested in these conversations. >> >> >> >> Davin >> >> >> >> On Thu, Jun 14, 2012 at 4:16 PM, frederic neyrat <fney...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> Hi, >> >> >> >> >> I would like - if possible - to get one or two examples about the >> >> >> >> objects concerned by your statement:"all objects equally exist, but >> >> >> >> not all objects exist equally." I guess - but I just guess - that the >> >> >> >> first part of the sentence is ontological and the second part could be >> >> >> >> political, but maybe I'm wrong. Thanks in advance. >> >> >> >> >> Best, >> >> >> >> >> Frederic Neyrat >> >> >> >> >> 2012/6/14 Ian Bogost <ian.bog...@lcc.gatech.edu>: >> >> >> >> Ok, sigh, let me try this again. >> >> >> >> >> The "as much as" is not a judgement of value, but of existence. This is the >> >> >> >> fundamental disagreement that played out in the comments to Galloway's work >> >> >> >> and in the many responses elsewhere. The world is big and contains many >> >> >> >> things. I've put this principle thusly: "all objects equally exist, but not >> >> >> >> all objects exist equally." >> >> >> >> >> It's possible that such a metaphysical position isn't for everyone. But if >> >> >> >> your idea of "being political" is as exclusionary and deprecatory as both >> >> >> >> Galloway's post and my limited experience thusfar here on empyre, then >> >> >> >> perhaps you can explain why that a model worth aspiring for? Why that is >> >> >> >> virtuous and righteous? >> >> >> >> >> Ian >> >> >> >> >> On Jun 14, 2012, at 2:57 PM, Rob Myers wrote: >> >> >> >> >> On 06/14/2012 07:02 PM, Ian Bogost wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> As for queer and feminist formulations, I agree with the spirit of what >> >> >> >> >> you say, but I'll reiterate my observation that SR/OOO is moving in a >> >> >> >> >> slightly different direction—one that concerns toasters and quasars as >> >> >> >> >> much as human subjects (note the "as much as" here). Why not take this >> >> >> >> >> work for what it is, at least for starters, rather than for what it >> >> >> >> >> isn't? >> >> >> >> >> >> The "as much as" is precisely the problem. >> >> >> >> >> Galloway's critique of OOO that Zach mentioned explains why: >> >> >> >> >> http://itself.wordpress.com/2012/06/03/a-response-to-graham-harmans-marginalia-on-radical-thinking/ >> >> >> >> >> But I wouldn't lump Meillassoux in with Harman. I think Meillassoux's >> >> >> >> philosophy can indeed be interesting for this debate because of its >> >> >> >> embracing of contingency and possibility. >> >> >> >> >> - Rob. >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> >> >> >> empyre forum >> >> >> >> empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au >> >> >> >> http://www.subtle.net/empyre >> >> >> >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> >> >> >> empyre forum >> >> >> >> empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au >> >> >> >> http://www.subtle.net/empyre >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> >> >> >> empyre forum >> >> >> >> empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au >> >> >> >> http://www.subtle.net/empyre >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> >> >> empyre forum >> >> >> empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au >> >> >> http://www.subtle.net/empyre >> >> >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> >> >> empyre forum >> >> >> empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au >> >> >> http://www.subtle.net/empyre >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> >> >> empyre forum >> >> >> empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au >> >> >> http://www.subtle.net/empyre >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> >> >> empyre forum >> >> >> empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au >> >> >> http://www.subtle.net/empyre >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> >> empyre forum >> >> empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au >> >> http://www.subtle.net/empyre >> >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> >> empyre forum >> >> empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au >> >> http://www.subtle.net/empyre >> >> _______________________________________________ >> empyre forum >> empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au >> http://www.subtle.net/empyre >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> empyre forum >> empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au >> http://www.subtle.net/empyre > _______________________________________________ > empyre forum > empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au > http://www.subtle.net/empyre _______________________________________________ empyre forum empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au http://www.subtle.net/empyre
