I have an article that I wrote about a year ago which discusses black boxes, poetics, and default settings: Inside Out of the Box: Default Settings and Electronic Poetics http://www.dichtung-digital.org/2010/heckman/heckman.htm
It might be a nice complement to the conversation. I will take a look at Graham's quadruple object. Davin On Wed, Jun 27, 2012 at 12:12 AM, Timothy Morton <timothymorton...@gmail.com> wrote: > Hi---each entity (a thought, an amethyst geode, a bartender) emits spacetime > just as Einstein argued . Graham's The Quadruple Object and my not yet out > Realist Magic go into this. > > Each entity "times" in the way Heidegger reserves for Da-sein and Derrida > reserves to the trace. > > Time and space are not neutral containers but are emergent properties of > beings. > > Tim > > > > http://www.ecologywithoutnature.blogspot.com > > On Jun 25, 2012, at 3:15 PM, davin heckman <davinheck...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> You are right.... I should do more reading. I find the thoughts >> engaging and, since I am in transit, I am eager to get more >> information where I can. >> >> Ultimately, underneath my questions, I suppose, are some thoughts on >> relationality and time. You have all of these things that have to do >> with chairs, but only the chair is the chair. And there are these >> things that have to do with chairs, but which are real in their own >> right. But an idea about a chair kind of flickers in and out of >> consciousness, never having a discrete edge, and only become something >> definitive when their edges are marked out in some way. It's tempting >> to think that one's writing about a thought is separate from the >> thought itself, but typically the act of writing or performing a >> thought tends to calcify and reinforce it through a feedback loop. >> Every time one thinks about a chair, one does not invent a new object. >> Similar to a computer program pulling modular entities and reusing >> them again and again, our thoughts repeat the concept in our >> imagination. On the other hand, imaginary iterations are not the same >> as digital iterations. Less like a computer, we pull the modular >> concept into action and interpret it with a variety of tones. I >> wouldn't want to say these singular thoughts don't exist, but on the >> other hand, they don't have the same reality as those thoughts which >> are articulated and taken up into collective discourse.... and even >> still, a discursive "thing" gains a level of significance when it >> represents some empirical process. >> >> I care about this because a chair changes from one moment to the next. >> It becomes materially altered as time unfolds, yet we are comfortable >> saying that the chair on day one is that chair on day five. In other >> words, each moment does not unleash a separate chair. In my mind, >> "weight" might be its subjective intensity, its empirical durability, >> its social hegemony, its procedural utility, its digital ubiquity, its >> aesthetic elegance.... though none of these qualities are directly >> analogous to the other, suggesting that there are a variety of types >> of being. >> >> All these thoughts are a jumble.... I'll take your advice and do some >> reading. >> >> Davin >> >> On Mon, Jun 25, 2012 at 11:28 AM, Ian Bogost <ian.bog...@lcc.gatech.edu> >> wrote: >>> A chair is a chair. A picture of a chair is a picture of a chair. A >>> definition of a chair is a definition of a chair. None are all chairs, but >>> all have something to do with chairs. At least, that's the OOO contention. >>> There are no planes of existence… except for Harman (and Tim, to some >>> extent), who distinguishes sensual from real objects. For Graham, the idea >>> of a chair is different from the real chair, which recedes from all >>> encounters. I think this is maybe the conclusion you arrive at in your >>> second paragraph below. >>> >>> NOTHING about OOO privileges the material (i.e., the tangible, physical) >>> chair primacy over the others. As for "the same weight" — well, that depends >>> on what you mean by "weight." What do you mean? >>> >>> I hate to say it, but it's maybe not possible to make further progress >>> without reading some of this material in depth… >>> >>> Ian >>> >>> On Jun 25, 2012, at 3:13 AM, davin heckman wrote: >>> >>> Ian and Tim, >>> >>> Do the differences with which we treat objects syncs up with >>> ontological difference, and thus, is there something to some of the >>> different categorizations we could possibly develop for objects? >>> >>> I do think there is plenty of room to see these things from a fresh >>> perspective, but I also wonder if not, for instance, Kosuth's chairs >>> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One_and_Three_Chairs> highlight the ways >>> that discrete objects can differ from each other, but also the ways in >>> which there are consistencies that can yoke them together in odd ways. >>> A picture of a chair is not a chair, a definition of chair is not a >>> chair, instructions about a chair is not a chair, a chair as a >>> sculpture is not necessarily a chair..... yet, in some fundamental >>> way, all are chairs.... in a general sense of their concept and >>> recognition. Put all three things together, and you have a "chair" >>> which occupies all three planes of existence simultaneously. On the >>> other hand, they can occupy niches within conceptual frameworks (a >>> chair within a game, for instance, can be very "real" to the other >>> objects in the game). >>> >>> Each way of recognizing the chair (the picture, instructions, the >>> chair as chair, chair as sculpture, three chairs as conceptual work, >>> etc) would suggest that each is a distinct object in some sense, which >>> makes me wonder then, whether or not all other possible thoughts about >>> a chair have being, or if we afford the material object of the chair >>> primacy. In which case, does a digital rendering of the chair carry >>> the same weight as an unexpressed idea about a chair, too. At some >>> point, doesn't ontology lead into this thicket? >>> >>> Davin >>> >>> On Sun, Jun 24, 2012 at 9:08 PM, Ian Bogost <ian.bog...@lcc.gatech.edu> >>> wrote: >>> >>> There is no reason why holding that everything exists equally entails >>> >>> "reducing all that can be known about a being to a simple recognition of >>> >>> being." >>> >>> >>> Ian >>> >>> >>> >>> On Jun 24, 2012, at 5:44 AM, davin heckman wrote: >>> >>> >>> I agree, this is a good starting point.... that all things that exist >>> >>> have being as their common condition of existence (that is, they are >>> >>> not "not beings"), which is a sort of foundational ontological >>> >>> similarity. But if the only significant ontological claim we can make >>> >>> about things is either yes or no, do they exist or not, then this >>> >>> means all things carry this single quality, which is to say that there >>> >>> is no difference between things. If we admit difference, then we must >>> >>> account for those differences in meaningful ways. For instance, >>> >>> waffle #1 differs from waffle #2 in a different way than waffle #1 >>> >>> differs from a toaster (or waffle #1 changes in the course of being >>> >>> eaten, it is still in one meaningful sense the "same" waffle after it >>> >>> has been bitten, but in another sense, it is a different waffle, too. >>> >>> While both toasters and waffles are different from something like an >>> >>> idea or a "memory" rendered in media (a waffle recipe or story about >>> >>> waffles) or a process habituated in muscle memory (the habit of making >>> >>> a waffle or eating one). >>> >>> >>> My concern is that if we reduce all that can be known about being to a >>> >>> simple recognition of being, we commit to a kind of abstraction and >>> >>> alienation from being of the sort that happens when markets try to >>> >>> mediate everything through the common denominator of dollars. >>> >>> >>> Davin >>> >>> >>> On Sat, Jun 23, 2012 at 4:46 PM, Timothy Morton >>> >>> <timothymorton...@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>> >>> Hi Davin, >>> >>> >>> >>> We obviously treat different entities differently. >>> >>> >>> >>> But this is not the same as saying that these entities are ontologically >>> >>> different. >>> >>> >>> >>> Yours, Tim >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> http://www.ecologywithoutnature.blogspot.com >>> >>> >>> >>> On Jun 20, 2012, at 5:51 AM, davin heckman <davinheck...@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> Thank you Ian, for these thoughts. My initial encounter with this >>> >>> >>> work came via a brief discussion of "flat ontology," which I found >>> >>> >>> somewhat offputting. I followed up by reading through the re:press >>> >>> >>> book. What I like the most, I suppose, is the sense that the >>> >>> >>> discussions are in motion with a lot of people participating. >>> >>> >>> >>> Reading some of the discussion of mereology, I find they resonate with >>> >>> >>> one of my favorite passages from Hegel. Pardon me for cannibalizing >>> >>> >>> another piece of writing (a draft of which can be found here: >>> >>> >>> http://isea2011.sabanciuniv.edu/paper/disturbed-dialectic-literary-criticism). >>> >>> >>> * >>> >>> >>> In The Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel describes the dialectical process: >>> >>> >>> >>> "The bud disappears in the bursting-forth of the blossom, and one >>> >>> >>> might say the former is refuted by the latter; similarly, when the >>> >>> >>> fruit appears, the blossom is shown up in its turn as a false >>> >>> >>> manifestation of the plant, and the fruit now emerges as the truth of >>> >>> >>> it instead. These forms are not just distinguished from one another, >>> >>> >>> they also supplant one another as mutually incompatible. Yet at the >>> >>> >>> same time their fluid nature makes them moments of an organic unity in >>> >>> >>> which they not only do not conflict, but in which each is as necessary >>> >>> >>> as the other; and this mutual necessity alone constitutes the life of >>> >>> >>> the whole." [1] >>> >>> >>> >>> Viewed from within the Hegelian process, the Real is positioned >>> >>> >>> outside its present manifestations, consisting, rather, of the dynamic >>> >>> >>> processes that comprise its totality. >>> >>> >>> >>> This insight, crucial to critical practice, requires revision in light >>> >>> >>> of technical change. By revision, I do not mean that we need to >>> >>> >>> fundamentally alter Hegel’s argument, I only mean to suggest that we >>> >>> >>> see this passage with respect to new temporal modalities that have >>> >>> >>> shaken up the pursuit of knowledge. >>> >>> >>> * >>> >>> >>> I come at many of the same issues, but my inclination lead me to >>> >>> >>> embrace a kind of "humanism," but one which cannot easily understand >>> >>> >>> as we continually muddle the conversations of humanism with an >>> >>> >>> ontology that is expressed in our metaphors. One grip I have with the >>> >>> >>> use of Deleuze or McLuhan, is the idea that our capacity to >>> >>> >>> personalize prosthetics has a tendency to be reduced to a situation in >>> >>> >>> which it becomes possible to imagine that we see machines, >>> >>> >>> interpersonal relationships, people with tools, etc. as the same >>> >>> >>> thing. When, in fact, my psychic investment in my bike or computer, >>> >>> >>> while deep, is not nearly as deep or as complex as my psychic >>> >>> >>> investment in my (which I can only refer to as mine with a sense of >>> >>> >>> obligation to, rather than ownership over) child. If my bike decided >>> >>> >>> to bite me.....which it can't, even if it can hurt me.... I would not >>> >>> >>> feel so simultaneously restrained in my response AND emotionally >>> >>> >>> florid as I would if my 8 year old bit me for some crazy reason (but >>> >>> >>> with my three year old, I he is only a missed nap away from engaging >>> >>> >>> in something so obvious and horrible as biting someone). A bike, on >>> >>> >>> the other hand, can hurt me a lot more than a bite from a toddler, and >>> >>> >>> I suppose I am not above kicking a bike and yelling.... but I have >>> >>> >>> very limited feelings about a bike malfunction or hitting my thumb >>> >>> >>> with a hammer. On the other hand, a bike goes wherever I want it to >>> >>> >>> go (except when there's an accident)..... a toddler, not so much.... >>> >>> >>> an eight year old, he usually comes with a counter proposal (and it is >>> >>> >>> a monstrous adult that would treat kids like a bike, insist that they >>> >>> >>> only go where told, speak when it is demanded). A lot of really deep >>> >>> >>> thinking about human subjectivty simply does not go this far.... and >>> >>> >>> part of this has to do with a poor understanding of objects. What is >>> >>> >>> worse is when this understanding infects interpersonal relationships >>> >>> >>> in the context of a Randian sort of world where there is "no such >>> >>> >>> thing as society, only individuals" (yet, bosses treat workers like >>> >>> >>> bikes and bad boyfriends treat their partners like robots). >>> >>> >>> >>> I am very excited to read more. I feel like it is important to free >>> >>> >>> our thinking from patterns and habits of the past. In particular, the >>> >>> >>> culture of academic citation has gone from being about finding good >>> >>> >>> ideas where they are to deriving authority from the aura of the great >>> >>> >>> figure. I also have no problem with accumulations of wisdom that >>> >>> >>> translate into an inherited perspective, but this can't close us off >>> >>> >>> to thinking. So.... thank you for this! >>> >>> >>> >>> Davin >>> >>> >>> >>> On Fri, Jun 15, 2012 at 11:58 AM, Ian Bogost <ian.bog...@lcc.gatech.edu> >>> >>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> Davin, >>> >>> >>> >>> I'm about to disappear into a mess of meetings, but let me offer a brief >>> >>> >>> response: >>> >>> >>> >>> What you're touching on here is what Levi Byrant sometimes calls the "weird >>> >>> >>> mereology" of OOO. The song isn't "just" the sound waves (what Harman calls >>> >>> >>> an underming position) nor is it just the social context of creation and use >>> >>> >>> (an overmining position). A song is a song, and indeed, the song in an MP3 >>> >>> >>> file is a different thing than the song as an abstraction in human culture. >>> >>> >>> Neither is more object nor more real (well, "real" has a different meaning >>> >>> >>> for Harman than it does for Levi and me). >>> >>> >>> >>> I talk about this a bit in the first chapter of Alien Phenomenology, and >>> >>> >>> Levi does as well in the mereology section of Democracy of Objects. Also, >>> >>> >>> here are a blog post from Levi on the subject that weaves the two >>> >>> >>> together: >>> >>> http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2010/08/12/more-strange-mereology/ >>> >>> >>> >>> I'm not answering sufficiently but wanted to get something out to you >>> >>> >>> rapidly. >>> >>> >>> >>> ib >>> >>> >>> >>> Ian Bogost, Ph.D. >>> >>> >>> Professor >>> >>> >>> Director, Graduate Program in Digital Media >>> >>> >>> >>> Georgia Institute of Technology >>> >>> >>> Digital Media/TSRB 320B >>> >>> >>> 85 Fifth Street NW >>> >>> >>> Atlanta, GA 30308-1030 >>> >>> >>> >>> ibog...@gatech.edu >>> >>> >>> +1 (404) 894-1160 (tel) >>> >>> >>> +1 (404) 894-2833 (fax) >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Jun 15, 2012, at 4:11 AM, davin heckman wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> Ian, >>> >>> >>> >>> Since we are on the topic of OOO, I was wondering what the ontological >>> >>> >>> status of something like a song is? I have to admit, I have a real >>> >>> >>> hard time swallowing a pure ontology that essentially defines the >>> >>> >>> subjective as outside of being, as a sort of on or off proposition, as >>> >>> >>> opposed to also a turning on (or is it being turned on? Or simply to >>> >>> >>> be turned or to turn?) (I am generally skeptical about a variety of >>> >>> >>> posthumanisms that go beyond a critique of a monolithic Humanism, >>> >>> >>> because I think that consciousness carries specific tendencies that >>> >>> >>> seem to fundamentally frame all possibilities for knowledge). However >>> >>> >>> it is entirely possible that I am missing out on a discussion that has >>> >>> >>> been unfolding without me. >>> >>> >>> >>> But here's my thought: With a song, you have something that can be >>> >>> >>> rendered in "objective" form.... maybe an mp3 file or a sheet of >>> >>> >>> notes or record or something. If this is what we mean by a song, >>> >>> >>> then, fine, that's an object. But a song only really starts doing >>> >>> >>> something when it is unfolding within the context of memory and >>> >>> >>> anticipation. It only is a song when it is listened to by a subject, >>> >>> >>> which is to say it is an object that has a singular temporal being as >>> >>> >>> it is listened to, which is distinct from how it is being listened to >>> >>> >>> and replayed even by the same user. (And we aren't even beginning to >>> >>> >>> talk about non-recorded music). The only way a song becomes a purely >>> >>> >>> discrete object is when it is removed from its temporal existence and >>> >>> >>> understood as a totality, and detached from an audience. And while we >>> >>> >>> can sit around and all talk about, say, "Another One Bites the Dust," >>> >>> >>> after we squeeze it into a conceptual file type and label it, the fact >>> >>> >>> that we can discuss something that can only mean something if is >>> >>> >>> experienced as a process AND an object within the context of a >>> >>> >>> experience, suggests that sometimes being is realized by the relations >>> >>> >>> of things, rather than the things themselves. My suggestion is that >>> >>> >>> the ontological nature of the song cannot be described in objective >>> >>> >>> terms without missing what a song is. Without the non-objective >>> >>> >>> component of its being, a song is just sound. If we say, well, "Hey, >>> >>> >>> when this sound occurs, people do X, Y, and Z," we can find ourself >>> >>> >>> thinking that these effects are produced by the object, but this sort >>> >>> >>> of thought experiment only gives us half an understanding of the >>> >>> >>> object's being. You also have to think of that song in relation to >>> >>> >>> the current context, to itself over time, to the individual and >>> >>> >>> collective experience of its audience, to the culture, etc. Again, a >>> >>> >>> great means to produce estrangement, but not the complete account of >>> >>> >>> what the thing is. At the risk of sounding chauvinistic, I can see >>> >>> >>> that it might be expedient to regard a distant moon without regard to >>> >>> >>> its historical relationship to the human. It's useful to think of a >>> >>> >>> distant moon as a quantity of data. But the closer we get to human >>> >>> >>> existence, the more likely we are to encounter types of things that >>> >>> >>> exist, but that cannot be understood properly as a bundle of discrete >>> >>> >>> data. Maybe there are some texts that address precisly these sorts of >>> >>> >>> concerns. >>> >>> >>> >>> This is where I think ontology cannot simply be objective. It must, >>> >>> >>> of course, be able to establish the differences between things, to >>> >>> >>> render those things it claims to understand in discrete form, insofar >>> >>> >>> as they can be considered as such. On the other hand, we know that >>> >>> >>> most of what the world is made of is common and that the laws of >>> >>> >>> physics, for instance, harness discrete things under a kind of >>> >>> >>> continuity. So, along with the conditions of radical difference that >>> >>> >>> a philosophy of objects implies, there are the conditions of radical >>> >>> >>> connectivity. Both features are equally present, which is to say they >>> >>> >>> offer us little in the way of productive knowledge EXCEPT insofar as >>> >>> >>> we can bind and sever, cut or tie, digitize or analogize within this >>> >>> >>> framework of matter. The 21st century loves digitizing things..... >>> >>> >>> it helps computers see the world, it helps them count us, predict our >>> >>> >>> behavior, weigh it, value it, direct it, etc. But the digital is only >>> >>> >>> half of our existence.... the analog process is equally present in >>> >>> >>> language and cognition.... and it is just as equpped to help us >>> >>> >>> understand the world by creating categories of things and identifying >>> >>> >>> common qualities. In "Notes on the Uncanny," Freud identifies this >>> >>> >>> struggle as productive of a kind of unsettling (the person that acts >>> >>> >>> like an object/the object that acts like a person)... but it does not >>> >>> >>> simply have to be a "scary" process.... the move from discrete to >>> >>> >>> connected or from one into multiple can also be deeply satisfying and >>> >>> >>> reassuring of being. If both processes are equally useful, then what >>> >>> >>> presides over these two tendencies? Temporal consciousness that can >>> >>> >>> mobilize processes of digitization and analogy? Another place to >>> >>> >>> think through this is in relation to a variety of attempts at >>> >>> >>> taxonomy. At some point, a poodle has to be a poodle and a wolf has >>> >>> >>> to be a wolf, but in relation to squids, both can be canines. We >>> >>> >>> could say that well, we are talking about layers of qualities that >>> >>> >>> enable us to categorize this object or that object. But without the >>> >>> >>> history of the poodle we don't really know how one canine can be a >>> >>> >>> fashion accessory and the other is a part of a wild ecology, all of >>> >>> >>> which (domesticating work dogs, turning tool animals into fashion >>> >>> >>> animals, thinking about animals as people, killing wild animals, >>> >>> >>> restoring wildness, etc) radically alter the parameters of being based >>> >>> >>> on thoughts about being. To take it back to queer thought, around the >>> >>> >>> bend of singular identities is the knowlege that such queerness does >>> >>> >>> not preclude deep relationality. My reading is that the fruits of >>> >>> >>> this thought are an affirmation of the idea that the well-worn paths >>> >>> >>> of prescribed human behavior do not necessarily lead to earnest >>> >>> >>> relationships, it is not to reject relationship itself in favor of >>> >>> >>> individualism because capitalism has been doing this since the >>> >>> >>> transformation of labor into commodity. >>> >>> >>> >>> Why does this matter? I care about politics, but I am not going to >>> >>> >>> say that OOO cleaves to this or that kind of politics.... it doesn't >>> >>> >>> matter. If a statement is discernibly true, then I have an obligation >>> >>> >>> to bend my ideas around the true statement. And my sense, based on >>> >>> >>> very limited reading, is that OOO is trying to figure out what we can >>> >>> >>> know about being. So, while it is worth considering the political >>> >>> >>> implications of speculative thought, I think Galloway is a bit wrong >>> >>> >>> to suggest that something is "bourgeois" or something just because >>> >>> >>> financial markets also offer a flat ontology via capital. The only >>> >>> >>> thing that really matters is whether or not a philosophy can get us to >>> >>> >>> a mutually agreed upon knowledge of the world that can be transmitted >>> >>> >>> effectively from one context to another and continue to be useful. >>> >>> >>> >>> I have been lazy about following this month's discussion, but I like >>> >>> >>> the idea of queering technology, of the productively broken tool. It >>> >>> >>> is an area that has affinities with regards to my own reading of >>> >>> >>> electronic literature..... taking Jakobson's discussion of poetics up >>> >>> >>> through Darko Suvin's discussion of "cognitive estrangement," and >>> >>> >>> looking at the ways that digital literary practices perform a similar >>> >>> >>> process with regards to instrumental languages. My thought is that OOO >>> >>> >>> is productive in that it asks us to engage in a thought experiment >>> >>> >>> about pure objectivitiy, and in doing so, reveals the critical >>> >>> >>> necessity of subjective and intersubjective aspects of human being >>> >>> >>> that are embedded in our broader assertions about being. I think that >>> >>> >>> a lot of the "posthumanisms" try to simply go beyond something that we >>> >>> >>> have never understood in the first place: that being human is >>> >>> >>> essentially a kind of queer existence, all the much more so when we >>> >>> >>> insist that it is not. For my part, I want my human rights. So while >>> >>> >>> I am sympathetic, generally, with many of the aims of the >>> >>> >>> posthumanists I encounter, I generally think that "Humanism" has yet >>> >>> >>> to adequately describe being human. Like Habermas said of modernity, >>> >>> >>> it's daunting and messy and incomplete (like most things worth doing). >>> >>> >>> Living in Norway right now (moving in a couple weeks, unfortunately), >>> >>> >>> humanism seems to be working out pretty well here. The problems of >>> >>> >>> the world do not stem from a love of humanity, they stem from our >>> >>> >>> growing estrangment from humanity and increased clustering into >>> >>> >>> paranoid, exclusionary enclaves (Why do you think everyone watches >>> >>> >>> Zombie movies? Blasting away at legions of dirty anthropoidal morons >>> >>> >>> trying to eat what you have, a perfect gospel for post democratic >>> >>> >>> capitalism). In a world of Darwinian evolution, we are not entirely >>> >>> >>> selected, we alter the landscape of an objective process through our >>> >>> >>> dialogue with an objective sphere that exists, that we inhabit, and >>> >>> >>> that we think about, but which does not simply constitute us. >>> >>> >>> >>> I admit these thoughts are poorly formed.... and I am very busy these >>> >>> >>> days.... so I might not be able to reply as quickly as I would >>> >>> >>> normally. But am very interested in these conversations. >>> >>> >>> >>> Davin >>> >>> >>> >>> On Thu, Jun 14, 2012 at 4:16 PM, frederic neyrat <fney...@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> Hi, >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> I would like - if possible - to get one or two examples about the >>> >>> >>> >>> objects concerned by your statement:"all objects equally exist, but >>> >>> >>> >>> not all objects exist equally." I guess - but I just guess - that the >>> >>> >>> >>> first part of the sentence is ontological and the second part could be >>> >>> >>> >>> political, but maybe I'm wrong. Thanks in advance. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Frederic Neyrat >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> 2012/6/14 Ian Bogost <ian.bog...@lcc.gatech.edu>: >>> >>> >>> >>> Ok, sigh, let me try this again. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> The "as much as" is not a judgement of value, but of existence. This is the >>> >>> >>> >>> fundamental disagreement that played out in the comments to Galloway's work >>> >>> >>> >>> and in the many responses elsewhere. The world is big and contains many >>> >>> >>> >>> things. I've put this principle thusly: "all objects equally exist, but not >>> >>> >>> >>> all objects exist equally." >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> It's possible that such a metaphysical position isn't for everyone. But if >>> >>> >>> >>> your idea of "being political" is as exclusionary and deprecatory as both >>> >>> >>> >>> Galloway's post and my limited experience thusfar here on empyre, then >>> >>> >>> >>> perhaps you can explain why that a model worth aspiring for? Why that is >>> >>> >>> >>> virtuous and righteous? >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Ian >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Jun 14, 2012, at 2:57 PM, Rob Myers wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On 06/14/2012 07:02 PM, Ian Bogost wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> As for queer and feminist formulations, I agree with the spirit of what >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> you say, but I'll reiterate my observation that SR/OOO is moving in a >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> slightly different direction—one that concerns toasters and quasars as >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> much as human subjects (note the "as much as" here). Why not take this >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> work for what it is, at least for starters, rather than for what it >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> isn't? >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> The "as much as" is precisely the problem. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Galloway's critique of OOO that Zach mentioned explains why: >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> http://itself.wordpress.com/2012/06/03/a-response-to-graham-harmans-marginalia-on-radical-thinking/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> But I wouldn't lump Meillassoux in with Harman. I think Meillassoux's >>> >>> >>> >>> philosophy can indeed be interesting for this debate because of its >>> >>> >>> >>> embracing of contingency and possibility. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> - Rob. >>> >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> >>> >>> >>> empyre forum >>> >>> >>> >>> empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au >>> >>> >>> >>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> >>> >>> >>> empyre forum >>> >>> >>> >>> empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au >>> >>> >>> >>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre >>> >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> >>> >>> >>> empyre forum >>> >>> >>> >>> empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au >>> >>> >>> >>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre >>> >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> >>> >>> empyre forum >>> >>> >>> empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au >>> >>> >>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> >>> >>> empyre forum >>> >>> >>> empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au >>> >>> >>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> >>> >>> empyre forum >>> >>> >>> empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au >>> >>> >>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> >>> >>> empyre forum >>> >>> >>> empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au >>> >>> >>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> >>> empyre forum >>> >>> empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au >>> >>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> >>> empyre forum >>> >>> empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au >>> >>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> empyre forum >>> empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au >>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre >>> >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> empyre forum >>> empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au >>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre >> _______________________________________________ >> empyre forum >> empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au >> http://www.subtle.net/empyre > _______________________________________________ > empyre forum > empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au > http://www.subtle.net/empyre _______________________________________________ empyre forum empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au http://www.subtle.net/empyre
