Thanks for this Davin. I have it queued up. Tim
http://www.ecologywithoutnature.blogspot.com On Jun 27, 2012, at 3:53 AM, davin heckman <davinheck...@gmail.com> wrote: > I have an article that I wrote about a year ago which discusses black > boxes, poetics, and default settings: Inside Out of the Box: Default > Settings and Electronic Poetics > http://www.dichtung-digital.org/2010/heckman/heckman.htm > > It might be a nice complement to the conversation. > > I will take a look at Graham's quadruple object. > > Davin > > On Wed, Jun 27, 2012 at 12:12 AM, Timothy Morton > <timothymorton...@gmail.com> wrote: >> Hi---each entity (a thought, an amethyst geode, a bartender) emits spacetime >> just as Einstein argued . Graham's The Quadruple Object and my not yet out >> Realist Magic go into this. >> >> Each entity "times" in the way Heidegger reserves for Da-sein and Derrida >> reserves to the trace. >> >> Time and space are not neutral containers but are emergent properties of >> beings. >> >> Tim >> >> >> >> http://www.ecologywithoutnature.blogspot.com >> >> On Jun 25, 2012, at 3:15 PM, davin heckman <davinheck...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >>> You are right.... I should do more reading. I find the thoughts >>> engaging and, since I am in transit, I am eager to get more >>> information where I can. >>> >>> Ultimately, underneath my questions, I suppose, are some thoughts on >>> relationality and time. You have all of these things that have to do >>> with chairs, but only the chair is the chair. And there are these >>> things that have to do with chairs, but which are real in their own >>> right. But an idea about a chair kind of flickers in and out of >>> consciousness, never having a discrete edge, and only become something >>> definitive when their edges are marked out in some way. It's tempting >>> to think that one's writing about a thought is separate from the >>> thought itself, but typically the act of writing or performing a >>> thought tends to calcify and reinforce it through a feedback loop. >>> Every time one thinks about a chair, one does not invent a new object. >>> Similar to a computer program pulling modular entities and reusing >>> them again and again, our thoughts repeat the concept in our >>> imagination. On the other hand, imaginary iterations are not the same >>> as digital iterations. Less like a computer, we pull the modular >>> concept into action and interpret it with a variety of tones. I >>> wouldn't want to say these singular thoughts don't exist, but on the >>> other hand, they don't have the same reality as those thoughts which >>> are articulated and taken up into collective discourse.... and even >>> still, a discursive "thing" gains a level of significance when it >>> represents some empirical process. >>> >>> I care about this because a chair changes from one moment to the next. >>> It becomes materially altered as time unfolds, yet we are comfortable >>> saying that the chair on day one is that chair on day five. In other >>> words, each moment does not unleash a separate chair. In my mind, >>> "weight" might be its subjective intensity, its empirical durability, >>> its social hegemony, its procedural utility, its digital ubiquity, its >>> aesthetic elegance.... though none of these qualities are directly >>> analogous to the other, suggesting that there are a variety of types >>> of being. >>> >>> All these thoughts are a jumble.... I'll take your advice and do some >>> reading. >>> >>> Davin >>> >>> On Mon, Jun 25, 2012 at 11:28 AM, Ian Bogost <ian.bog...@lcc.gatech.edu> >>> wrote: >>>> A chair is a chair. A picture of a chair is a picture of a chair. A >>>> definition of a chair is a definition of a chair. None are all chairs, but >>>> all have something to do with chairs. At least, that's the OOO contention. >>>> There are no planes of existence… except for Harman (and Tim, to some >>>> extent), who distinguishes sensual from real objects. For Graham, the idea >>>> of a chair is different from the real chair, which recedes from all >>>> encounters. I think this is maybe the conclusion you arrive at in your >>>> second paragraph below. >>>> >>>> NOTHING about OOO privileges the material (i.e., the tangible, physical) >>>> chair primacy over the others. As for "the same weight" — well, that >>>> depends >>>> on what you mean by "weight." What do you mean? >>>> >>>> I hate to say it, but it's maybe not possible to make further progress >>>> without reading some of this material in depth… >>>> >>>> Ian >>>> >>>> On Jun 25, 2012, at 3:13 AM, davin heckman wrote: >>>> >>>> Ian and Tim, >>>> >>>> Do the differences with which we treat objects syncs up with >>>> ontological difference, and thus, is there something to some of the >>>> different categorizations we could possibly develop for objects? >>>> >>>> I do think there is plenty of room to see these things from a fresh >>>> perspective, but I also wonder if not, for instance, Kosuth's chairs >>>> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One_and_Three_Chairs> highlight the ways >>>> that discrete objects can differ from each other, but also the ways in >>>> which there are consistencies that can yoke them together in odd ways. >>>> A picture of a chair is not a chair, a definition of chair is not a >>>> chair, instructions about a chair is not a chair, a chair as a >>>> sculpture is not necessarily a chair..... yet, in some fundamental >>>> way, all are chairs.... in a general sense of their concept and >>>> recognition. Put all three things together, and you have a "chair" >>>> which occupies all three planes of existence simultaneously. On the >>>> other hand, they can occupy niches within conceptual frameworks (a >>>> chair within a game, for instance, can be very "real" to the other >>>> objects in the game). >>>> >>>> Each way of recognizing the chair (the picture, instructions, the >>>> chair as chair, chair as sculpture, three chairs as conceptual work, >>>> etc) would suggest that each is a distinct object in some sense, which >>>> makes me wonder then, whether or not all other possible thoughts about >>>> a chair have being, or if we afford the material object of the chair >>>> primacy. In which case, does a digital rendering of the chair carry >>>> the same weight as an unexpressed idea about a chair, too. At some >>>> point, doesn't ontology lead into this thicket? >>>> >>>> Davin >>>> >>>> On Sun, Jun 24, 2012 at 9:08 PM, Ian Bogost <ian.bog...@lcc.gatech.edu> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> There is no reason why holding that everything exists equally entails >>>> >>>> "reducing all that can be known about a being to a simple recognition of >>>> >>>> being." >>>> >>>> >>>> Ian >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Jun 24, 2012, at 5:44 AM, davin heckman wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> I agree, this is a good starting point.... that all things that exist >>>> >>>> have being as their common condition of existence (that is, they are >>>> >>>> not "not beings"), which is a sort of foundational ontological >>>> >>>> similarity. But if the only significant ontological claim we can make >>>> >>>> about things is either yes or no, do they exist or not, then this >>>> >>>> means all things carry this single quality, which is to say that there >>>> >>>> is no difference between things. If we admit difference, then we must >>>> >>>> account for those differences in meaningful ways. For instance, >>>> >>>> waffle #1 differs from waffle #2 in a different way than waffle #1 >>>> >>>> differs from a toaster (or waffle #1 changes in the course of being >>>> >>>> eaten, it is still in one meaningful sense the "same" waffle after it >>>> >>>> has been bitten, but in another sense, it is a different waffle, too. >>>> >>>> While both toasters and waffles are different from something like an >>>> >>>> idea or a "memory" rendered in media (a waffle recipe or story about >>>> >>>> waffles) or a process habituated in muscle memory (the habit of making >>>> >>>> a waffle or eating one). >>>> >>>> >>>> My concern is that if we reduce all that can be known about being to a >>>> >>>> simple recognition of being, we commit to a kind of abstraction and >>>> >>>> alienation from being of the sort that happens when markets try to >>>> >>>> mediate everything through the common denominator of dollars. >>>> >>>> >>>> Davin >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sat, Jun 23, 2012 at 4:46 PM, Timothy Morton >>>> >>>> <timothymorton...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> Hi Davin, >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> We obviously treat different entities differently. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> But this is not the same as saying that these entities are ontologically >>>> >>>> different. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Yours, Tim >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> http://www.ecologywithoutnature.blogspot.com >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Jun 20, 2012, at 5:51 AM, davin heckman <davinheck...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Thank you Ian, for these thoughts. My initial encounter with this >>>> >>>> >>>> work came via a brief discussion of "flat ontology," which I found >>>> >>>> >>>> somewhat offputting. I followed up by reading through the re:press >>>> >>>> >>>> book. What I like the most, I suppose, is the sense that the >>>> >>>> >>>> discussions are in motion with a lot of people participating. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Reading some of the discussion of mereology, I find they resonate with >>>> >>>> >>>> one of my favorite passages from Hegel. Pardon me for cannibalizing >>>> >>>> >>>> another piece of writing (a draft of which can be found here: >>>> >>>> >>>> http://isea2011.sabanciuniv.edu/paper/disturbed-dialectic-literary-criticism). >>>> >>>> >>>> * >>>> >>>> >>>> In The Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel describes the dialectical process: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> "The bud disappears in the bursting-forth of the blossom, and one >>>> >>>> >>>> might say the former is refuted by the latter; similarly, when the >>>> >>>> >>>> fruit appears, the blossom is shown up in its turn as a false >>>> >>>> >>>> manifestation of the plant, and the fruit now emerges as the truth of >>>> >>>> >>>> it instead. These forms are not just distinguished from one another, >>>> >>>> >>>> they also supplant one another as mutually incompatible. Yet at the >>>> >>>> >>>> same time their fluid nature makes them moments of an organic unity in >>>> >>>> >>>> which they not only do not conflict, but in which each is as necessary >>>> >>>> >>>> as the other; and this mutual necessity alone constitutes the life of >>>> >>>> >>>> the whole." [1] >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Viewed from within the Hegelian process, the Real is positioned >>>> >>>> >>>> outside its present manifestations, consisting, rather, of the dynamic >>>> >>>> >>>> processes that comprise its totality. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> This insight, crucial to critical practice, requires revision in light >>>> >>>> >>>> of technical change. By revision, I do not mean that we need to >>>> >>>> >>>> fundamentally alter Hegel’s argument, I only mean to suggest that we >>>> >>>> >>>> see this passage with respect to new temporal modalities that have >>>> >>>> >>>> shaken up the pursuit of knowledge. >>>> >>>> >>>> * >>>> >>>> >>>> I come at many of the same issues, but my inclination lead me to >>>> >>>> >>>> embrace a kind of "humanism," but one which cannot easily understand >>>> >>>> >>>> as we continually muddle the conversations of humanism with an >>>> >>>> >>>> ontology that is expressed in our metaphors. One grip I have with the >>>> >>>> >>>> use of Deleuze or McLuhan, is the idea that our capacity to >>>> >>>> >>>> personalize prosthetics has a tendency to be reduced to a situation in >>>> >>>> >>>> which it becomes possible to imagine that we see machines, >>>> >>>> >>>> interpersonal relationships, people with tools, etc. as the same >>>> >>>> >>>> thing. When, in fact, my psychic investment in my bike or computer, >>>> >>>> >>>> while deep, is not nearly as deep or as complex as my psychic >>>> >>>> >>>> investment in my (which I can only refer to as mine with a sense of >>>> >>>> >>>> obligation to, rather than ownership over) child. If my bike decided >>>> >>>> >>>> to bite me.....which it can't, even if it can hurt me.... I would not >>>> >>>> >>>> feel so simultaneously restrained in my response AND emotionally >>>> >>>> >>>> florid as I would if my 8 year old bit me for some crazy reason (but >>>> >>>> >>>> with my three year old, I he is only a missed nap away from engaging >>>> >>>> >>>> in something so obvious and horrible as biting someone). A bike, on >>>> >>>> >>>> the other hand, can hurt me a lot more than a bite from a toddler, and >>>> >>>> >>>> I suppose I am not above kicking a bike and yelling.... but I have >>>> >>>> >>>> very limited feelings about a bike malfunction or hitting my thumb >>>> >>>> >>>> with a hammer. On the other hand, a bike goes wherever I want it to >>>> >>>> >>>> go (except when there's an accident)..... a toddler, not so much.... >>>> >>>> >>>> an eight year old, he usually comes with a counter proposal (and it is >>>> >>>> >>>> a monstrous adult that would treat kids like a bike, insist that they >>>> >>>> >>>> only go where told, speak when it is demanded). A lot of really deep >>>> >>>> >>>> thinking about human subjectivty simply does not go this far.... and >>>> >>>> >>>> part of this has to do with a poor understanding of objects. What is >>>> >>>> >>>> worse is when this understanding infects interpersonal relationships >>>> >>>> >>>> in the context of a Randian sort of world where there is "no such >>>> >>>> >>>> thing as society, only individuals" (yet, bosses treat workers like >>>> >>>> >>>> bikes and bad boyfriends treat their partners like robots). >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I am very excited to read more. I feel like it is important to free >>>> >>>> >>>> our thinking from patterns and habits of the past. In particular, the >>>> >>>> >>>> culture of academic citation has gone from being about finding good >>>> >>>> >>>> ideas where they are to deriving authority from the aura of the great >>>> >>>> >>>> figure. I also have no problem with accumulations of wisdom that >>>> >>>> >>>> translate into an inherited perspective, but this can't close us off >>>> >>>> >>>> to thinking. So.... thank you for this! >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Davin >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Fri, Jun 15, 2012 at 11:58 AM, Ian Bogost <ian.bog...@lcc.gatech.edu> >>>> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> Davin, >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I'm about to disappear into a mess of meetings, but let me offer a brief >>>> >>>> >>>> response: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> What you're touching on here is what Levi Byrant sometimes calls the "weird >>>> >>>> >>>> mereology" of OOO. The song isn't "just" the sound waves (what Harman calls >>>> >>>> >>>> an underming position) nor is it just the social context of creation and >>>> use >>>> >>>> >>>> (an overmining position). A song is a song, and indeed, the song in an MP3 >>>> >>>> >>>> file is a different thing than the song as an abstraction in human culture. >>>> >>>> >>>> Neither is more object nor more real (well, "real" has a different meaning >>>> >>>> >>>> for Harman than it does for Levi and me). >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I talk about this a bit in the first chapter of Alien Phenomenology, and >>>> >>>> >>>> Levi does as well in the mereology section of Democracy of Objects. Also, >>>> >>>> >>>> here are a blog post from Levi on the subject that weaves the two >>>> >>>> >>>> together: >>>> >>>> http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2010/08/12/more-strange-mereology/ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I'm not answering sufficiently but wanted to get something out to you >>>> >>>> >>>> rapidly. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> ib >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Ian Bogost, Ph.D. >>>> >>>> >>>> Professor >>>> >>>> >>>> Director, Graduate Program in Digital Media >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Georgia Institute of Technology >>>> >>>> >>>> Digital Media/TSRB 320B >>>> >>>> >>>> 85 Fifth Street NW >>>> >>>> >>>> Atlanta, GA 30308-1030 >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> ibog...@gatech.edu >>>> >>>> >>>> +1 (404) 894-1160 (tel) >>>> >>>> >>>> +1 (404) 894-2833 (fax) >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Jun 15, 2012, at 4:11 AM, davin heckman wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Ian, >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Since we are on the topic of OOO, I was wondering what the ontological >>>> >>>> >>>> status of something like a song is? I have to admit, I have a real >>>> >>>> >>>> hard time swallowing a pure ontology that essentially defines the >>>> >>>> >>>> subjective as outside of being, as a sort of on or off proposition, as >>>> >>>> >>>> opposed to also a turning on (or is it being turned on? Or simply to >>>> >>>> >>>> be turned or to turn?) (I am generally skeptical about a variety of >>>> >>>> >>>> posthumanisms that go beyond a critique of a monolithic Humanism, >>>> >>>> >>>> because I think that consciousness carries specific tendencies that >>>> >>>> >>>> seem to fundamentally frame all possibilities for knowledge). However >>>> >>>> >>>> it is entirely possible that I am missing out on a discussion that has >>>> >>>> >>>> been unfolding without me. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> But here's my thought: With a song, you have something that can be >>>> >>>> >>>> rendered in "objective" form.... maybe an mp3 file or a sheet of >>>> >>>> >>>> notes or record or something. If this is what we mean by a song, >>>> >>>> >>>> then, fine, that's an object. But a song only really starts doing >>>> >>>> >>>> something when it is unfolding within the context of memory and >>>> >>>> >>>> anticipation. It only is a song when it is listened to by a subject, >>>> >>>> >>>> which is to say it is an object that has a singular temporal being as >>>> >>>> >>>> it is listened to, which is distinct from how it is being listened to >>>> >>>> >>>> and replayed even by the same user. (And we aren't even beginning to >>>> >>>> >>>> talk about non-recorded music). The only way a song becomes a purely >>>> >>>> >>>> discrete object is when it is removed from its temporal existence and >>>> >>>> >>>> understood as a totality, and detached from an audience. And while we >>>> >>>> >>>> can sit around and all talk about, say, "Another One Bites the Dust," >>>> >>>> >>>> after we squeeze it into a conceptual file type and label it, the fact >>>> >>>> >>>> that we can discuss something that can only mean something if is >>>> >>>> >>>> experienced as a process AND an object within the context of a >>>> >>>> >>>> experience, suggests that sometimes being is realized by the relations >>>> >>>> >>>> of things, rather than the things themselves. My suggestion is that >>>> >>>> >>>> the ontological nature of the song cannot be described in objective >>>> >>>> >>>> terms without missing what a song is. Without the non-objective >>>> >>>> >>>> component of its being, a song is just sound. If we say, well, "Hey, >>>> >>>> >>>> when this sound occurs, people do X, Y, and Z," we can find ourself >>>> >>>> >>>> thinking that these effects are produced by the object, but this sort >>>> >>>> >>>> of thought experiment only gives us half an understanding of the >>>> >>>> >>>> object's being. You also have to think of that song in relation to >>>> >>>> >>>> the current context, to itself over time, to the individual and >>>> >>>> >>>> collective experience of its audience, to the culture, etc. Again, a >>>> >>>> >>>> great means to produce estrangement, but not the complete account of >>>> >>>> >>>> what the thing is. At the risk of sounding chauvinistic, I can see >>>> >>>> >>>> that it might be expedient to regard a distant moon without regard to >>>> >>>> >>>> its historical relationship to the human. It's useful to think of a >>>> >>>> >>>> distant moon as a quantity of data. But the closer we get to human >>>> >>>> >>>> existence, the more likely we are to encounter types of things that >>>> >>>> >>>> exist, but that cannot be understood properly as a bundle of discrete >>>> >>>> >>>> data. Maybe there are some texts that address precisly these sorts of >>>> >>>> >>>> concerns. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> This is where I think ontology cannot simply be objective. It must, >>>> >>>> >>>> of course, be able to establish the differences between things, to >>>> >>>> >>>> render those things it claims to understand in discrete form, insofar >>>> >>>> >>>> as they can be considered as such. On the other hand, we know that >>>> >>>> >>>> most of what the world is made of is common and that the laws of >>>> >>>> >>>> physics, for instance, harness discrete things under a kind of >>>> >>>> >>>> continuity. So, along with the conditions of radical difference that >>>> >>>> >>>> a philosophy of objects implies, there are the conditions of radical >>>> >>>> >>>> connectivity. Both features are equally present, which is to say they >>>> >>>> >>>> offer us little in the way of productive knowledge EXCEPT insofar as >>>> >>>> >>>> we can bind and sever, cut or tie, digitize or analogize within this >>>> >>>> >>>> framework of matter. The 21st century loves digitizing things..... >>>> >>>> >>>> it helps computers see the world, it helps them count us, predict our >>>> >>>> >>>> behavior, weigh it, value it, direct it, etc. But the digital is only >>>> >>>> >>>> half of our existence.... the analog process is equally present in >>>> >>>> >>>> language and cognition.... and it is just as equpped to help us >>>> >>>> >>>> understand the world by creating categories of things and identifying >>>> >>>> >>>> common qualities. In "Notes on the Uncanny," Freud identifies this >>>> >>>> >>>> struggle as productive of a kind of unsettling (the person that acts >>>> >>>> >>>> like an object/the object that acts like a person)... but it does not >>>> >>>> >>>> simply have to be a "scary" process.... the move from discrete to >>>> >>>> >>>> connected or from one into multiple can also be deeply satisfying and >>>> >>>> >>>> reassuring of being. If both processes are equally useful, then what >>>> >>>> >>>> presides over these two tendencies? Temporal consciousness that can >>>> >>>> >>>> mobilize processes of digitization and analogy? Another place to >>>> >>>> >>>> think through this is in relation to a variety of attempts at >>>> >>>> >>>> taxonomy. At some point, a poodle has to be a poodle and a wolf has >>>> >>>> >>>> to be a wolf, but in relation to squids, both can be canines. We >>>> >>>> >>>> could say that well, we are talking about layers of qualities that >>>> >>>> >>>> enable us to categorize this object or that object. But without the >>>> >>>> >>>> history of the poodle we don't really know how one canine can be a >>>> >>>> >>>> fashion accessory and the other is a part of a wild ecology, all of >>>> >>>> >>>> which (domesticating work dogs, turning tool animals into fashion >>>> >>>> >>>> animals, thinking about animals as people, killing wild animals, >>>> >>>> >>>> restoring wildness, etc) radically alter the parameters of being based >>>> >>>> >>>> on thoughts about being. To take it back to queer thought, around the >>>> >>>> >>>> bend of singular identities is the knowlege that such queerness does >>>> >>>> >>>> not preclude deep relationality. My reading is that the fruits of >>>> >>>> >>>> this thought are an affirmation of the idea that the well-worn paths >>>> >>>> >>>> of prescribed human behavior do not necessarily lead to earnest >>>> >>>> >>>> relationships, it is not to reject relationship itself in favor of >>>> >>>> >>>> individualism because capitalism has been doing this since the >>>> >>>> >>>> transformation of labor into commodity. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Why does this matter? I care about politics, but I am not going to >>>> >>>> >>>> say that OOO cleaves to this or that kind of politics.... it doesn't >>>> >>>> >>>> matter. If a statement is discernibly true, then I have an obligation >>>> >>>> >>>> to bend my ideas around the true statement. And my sense, based on >>>> >>>> >>>> very limited reading, is that OOO is trying to figure out what we can >>>> >>>> >>>> know about being. So, while it is worth considering the political >>>> >>>> >>>> implications of speculative thought, I think Galloway is a bit wrong >>>> >>>> >>>> to suggest that something is "bourgeois" or something just because >>>> >>>> >>>> financial markets also offer a flat ontology via capital. The only >>>> >>>> >>>> thing that really matters is whether or not a philosophy can get us to >>>> >>>> >>>> a mutually agreed upon knowledge of the world that can be transmitted >>>> >>>> >>>> effectively from one context to another and continue to be useful. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I have been lazy about following this month's discussion, but I like >>>> >>>> >>>> the idea of queering technology, of the productively broken tool. It >>>> >>>> >>>> is an area that has affinities with regards to my own reading of >>>> >>>> >>>> electronic literature..... taking Jakobson's discussion of poetics up >>>> >>>> >>>> through Darko Suvin's discussion of "cognitive estrangement," and >>>> >>>> >>>> looking at the ways that digital literary practices perform a similar >>>> >>>> >>>> process with regards to instrumental languages. My thought is that OOO >>>> >>>> >>>> is productive in that it asks us to engage in a thought experiment >>>> >>>> >>>> about pure objectivitiy, and in doing so, reveals the critical >>>> >>>> >>>> necessity of subjective and intersubjective aspects of human being >>>> >>>> >>>> that are embedded in our broader assertions about being. I think that >>>> >>>> >>>> a lot of the "posthumanisms" try to simply go beyond something that we >>>> >>>> >>>> have never understood in the first place: that being human is >>>> >>>> >>>> essentially a kind of queer existence, all the much more so when we >>>> >>>> >>>> insist that it is not. For my part, I want my human rights. So while >>>> >>>> >>>> I am sympathetic, generally, with many of the aims of the >>>> >>>> >>>> posthumanists I encounter, I generally think that "Humanism" has yet >>>> >>>> >>>> to adequately describe being human. Like Habermas said of modernity, >>>> >>>> >>>> it's daunting and messy and incomplete (like most things worth doing). >>>> >>>> >>>> Living in Norway right now (moving in a couple weeks, unfortunately), >>>> >>>> >>>> humanism seems to be working out pretty well here. The problems of >>>> >>>> >>>> the world do not stem from a love of humanity, they stem from our >>>> >>>> >>>> growing estrangment from humanity and increased clustering into >>>> >>>> >>>> paranoid, exclusionary enclaves (Why do you think everyone watches >>>> >>>> >>>> Zombie movies? Blasting away at legions of dirty anthropoidal morons >>>> >>>> >>>> trying to eat what you have, a perfect gospel for post democratic >>>> >>>> >>>> capitalism). In a world of Darwinian evolution, we are not entirely >>>> >>>> >>>> selected, we alter the landscape of an objective process through our >>>> >>>> >>>> dialogue with an objective sphere that exists, that we inhabit, and >>>> >>>> >>>> that we think about, but which does not simply constitute us. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I admit these thoughts are poorly formed.... and I am very busy these >>>> >>>> >>>> days.... so I might not be able to reply as quickly as I would >>>> >>>> >>>> normally. But am very interested in these conversations. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Davin >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Thu, Jun 14, 2012 at 4:16 PM, frederic neyrat <fney...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Hi, >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I would like - if possible - to get one or two examples about the >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> objects concerned by your statement:"all objects equally exist, but >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> not all objects exist equally." I guess - but I just guess - that the >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> first part of the sentence is ontological and the second part could be >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> political, but maybe I'm wrong. Thanks in advance. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Frederic Neyrat >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> 2012/6/14 Ian Bogost <ian.bog...@lcc.gatech.edu>: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Ok, sigh, let me try this again. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> The "as much as" is not a judgement of value, but of existence. This is the >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> fundamental disagreement that played out in the comments to Galloway's work >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> and in the many responses elsewhere. The world is big and contains many >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> things. I've put this principle thusly: "all objects equally exist, but not >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> all objects exist equally." >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> It's possible that such a metaphysical position isn't for everyone. But if >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> your idea of "being political" is as exclusionary and deprecatory as both >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Galloway's post and my limited experience thusfar here on empyre, then >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> perhaps you can explain why that a model worth aspiring for? Why that is >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> virtuous and righteous? >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Ian >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Jun 14, 2012, at 2:57 PM, Rob Myers wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 06/14/2012 07:02 PM, Ian Bogost wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> As for queer and feminist formulations, I agree with the spirit of what >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> you say, but I'll reiterate my observation that SR/OOO is moving in a >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> slightly different direction—one that concerns toasters and quasars as >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> much as human subjects (note the "as much as" here). Why not take this >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> work for what it is, at least for starters, rather than for what it >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> isn't? >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> The "as much as" is precisely the problem. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Galloway's critique of OOO that Zach mentioned explains why: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> http://itself.wordpress.com/2012/06/03/a-response-to-graham-harmans-marginalia-on-radical-thinking/ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> But I wouldn't lump Meillassoux in with Harman. I think Meillassoux's >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> philosophy can indeed be interesting for this debate because of its >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> embracing of contingency and possibility. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> - Rob. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> empyre forum >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> empyre forum >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> empyre forum >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> >>>> >>>> empyre forum >>>> >>>> >>>> empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au >>>> >>>> >>>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> >>>> >>>> empyre forum >>>> >>>> >>>> empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au >>>> >>>> >>>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre >>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> >>>> >>>> empyre forum >>>> >>>> >>>> empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au >>>> >>>> >>>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre >>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> >>>> >>>> empyre forum >>>> >>>> >>>> empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au >>>> >>>> >>>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre >>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> >>>> empyre forum >>>> >>>> empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au >>>> >>>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> >>>> empyre forum >>>> >>>> empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au >>>> >>>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> empyre forum >>>> empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au >>>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> empyre forum >>>> empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au >>>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre >>> _______________________________________________ >>> empyre forum >>> empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au >>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre >> _______________________________________________ >> empyre forum >> empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au >> http://www.subtle.net/empyre > _______________________________________________ > empyre forum > empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au > http://www.subtle.net/empyre _______________________________________________ empyre forum empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au http://www.subtle.net/empyre
