--- On Tue, 10/21/08, Joseph Polanik <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:


> What Does the Knowing Brain Know?
==============
Apparently nothing much.
Georges.
==============
> 
> Michael Eldred wrote:
> 
>  >[EMAIL PROTECTED] schrieb Wed, 15 Oct 2008 18:14:12
> EDT:
> 
>  >>[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
> 
>  >>>Hi Jud,Previously you said: *.... what cannot
> be known is that
>  >>>which does not exist to be known.* Standing
> alone, this statement
>  >>>infers that *known* is understood. But in your
> comments above you
>  >>>indicate that *knowledge* is really
> undefinable. This means that the
>  >>>quote I cite must be relativistically
> understood, in other words not
>  >>>understood in any absolute way. Could you make
> the same point without
>  >>>using *known?*
> 
>  >>Hi Richard:What I meant by that is that
> *knowledge* (like *ideas*
>  >>or *memes*) does not exist - it is a reification
> of the existential
>  >>modes of a knowing brain
> 
>  >ME: "knowing brain" That's a good one.
> The eliminative materialist has
>  >eliminated the/his mind, only to invoke the voodoo
> notion of a "knowing
>  >brain".
> 
> also eliminated is any awareness of the difference between
> truth and
> error or between knowledge and opinion.
> 
> examining the brain state of someone during the middle ages
> who thought
> that the sun revolved around the earth would reveal a brain
> in the
> existential modality of 'knowing' something that is
> false.
> 
> Joe
> 
> 
> -- 
> Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first
> person for the 
> first person. --- H-N Castaneda
> 
> @[EMAIL PROTECTED]@^@
>      http://what-am-i.net
> @[EMAIL PROTECTED]@^@
> 
> 

      

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