James Higgo wrote:
>So what is it, this mystical soul, that 'transits' OMs?
This mystical soul that transits is the person.
The person, with its first, second and third person aspects.
We have had a discussion on that and I guess we aknowledge
our reciprocal misunderstanding, no?.
But of course we have to come back on that point.
I confess I am quite a naive believer in person. I believe
in Kurt Godel, Agatha Christie and Mickey Mouse. They are exemple
of person (thought the last one probably lacks personal first person
What are you, if you are not a person? Are you Robot 21?
In that case you win the turing test and the "person rights"
applies to you (as person's interdictions).
I believe so much in persons and person-ness, that it is
by attributing personhood to the lobian machine that I have been
able to interview it
(+ its truth theory "G*", but note that I don't attribute
personhood to the guardian angel).
I also show in some sense that the universal machine, if
looking introspectively to the border of its personhood,
will see the roots of *everything*. And that's a TOE.
And then persons are important once you take comp.
You know I use grand mother psychology, also called folk
psychology in the very definition of comp.
I really don't understand why you want eliminate souls,
persons, consciousness, and what would that mean?
Of course those things are essentially first person, like
matters ... Ontologically you know I take only numbers,
and *then* I derive a phenomenology of persons, matters,
many worlds, Hilbert space, etc. You cannot say person
does not exists, you can say it is an illusion, and then
explain the trick: how the illusion appears.
>Bruno, I'm of the Liebnitz school: each OM is independent and unrelated to
>another except in that it will, of course, share certain characteristics.
>It's bound to, as all OMs exist. What is the relevance of 'entangled
OMs would be Leibnitz's Monads? Perhaps.
The entangled histories exists by comp. I cannot eliminate them,
no more can I eliminate the prime numbers.
Actually entangled stories make possible
for people to share "solid dreams". It is the entanglement of stories
which transforms the solipsistic first person computational
indeterminacy into sharable quantum-like first person *plural*
computational indeterminacy. Entanglement of stories entails the
duplication of the population of (virtual) machines in UD*, this
gives eventually a computationalist decoherence preventing
explosion of the set of white rabbits.
Michael Rosefield wrote (to James Higgo):
>Damn, I wish _I_ made sense....
Thanks to incompleteness _I_ makes sense ... in more than one way
A never fully satisfied _I_, though. That's its (godelian) price.