Want am I? Obviously, 'I' am an Observer-Moment. This current OM, including
writing this email, is not related to 'remembered' OMs except in that the
'remembered' OMs do happen to exist. There is no"I" that was one OM and then
'became' this OM. The block universe is static.
Of course, 'your' current OM, which includes reading this email, is
unrelated to 'my current' OM. But since all OMs exist I can be sure that
there will be an OM which includs 'I am Bruno and I am reading this merde'.
----- Original Message -----
From: Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Friday, March 09, 2001 12:03 PM
Subject: Re: on formally indescribable merde
> James Higgo wrote:
> >So what is it, this mystical soul, that 'transits' OMs?
> This mystical soul that transits is the person.
> The person, with its first, second and third person aspects.
> We have had a discussion on that and I guess we aknowledge
> our reciprocal misunderstanding, no?.
> But of course we have to come back on that point.
> I confess I am quite a naive believer in person. I believe
> in Kurt Godel, Agatha Christie and Mickey Mouse. They are exemple
> of person (thought the last one probably lacks personal first person
> attribute ...).
> What are you, if you are not a person? Are you Robot 21?
> In that case you win the turing test and the "person rights"
> applies to you (as person's interdictions).
> I believe so much in persons and person-ness, that it is
> by attributing personhood to the lobian machine that I have been
> able to interview it
> (+ its truth theory "G*", but note that I don't attribute
> personhood to the guardian angel).
> I also show in some sense that the universal machine, if
> looking introspectively to the border of its personhood,
> will see the roots of *everything*. And that's a TOE.
> And then persons are important once you take comp.
> You know I use grand mother psychology, also called folk
> psychology in the very definition of comp.
> I really don't understand why you want eliminate souls,
> persons, consciousness, and what would that mean?
> Of course those things are essentially first person, like
> matters ... Ontologically you know I take only numbers,
> and *then* I derive a phenomenology of persons, matters,
> many worlds, Hilbert space, etc. You cannot say person
> does not exists, you can say it is an illusion, and then
> explain the trick: how the illusion appears.
> >Bruno, I'm of the Liebnitz school: each OM is independent and unrelated
> >another except in that it will, of course, share certain characteristics.
> >It's bound to, as all OMs exist. What is the relevance of 'entangled
> OMs would be Leibnitz's Monads? Perhaps.
> The entangled histories exists by comp. I cannot eliminate them,
> no more can I eliminate the prime numbers.
> Actually entangled stories make possible
> for people to share "solid dreams". It is the entanglement of stories
> which transforms the solipsistic first person computational
> indeterminacy into sharable quantum-like first person *plural*
> computational indeterminacy. Entanglement of stories entails the
> duplication of the population of (virtual) machines in UD*, this
> gives eventually a computationalist decoherence preventing
> explosion of the set of white rabbits.
> Michael Rosefield wrote (to James Higgo):
> >Damn, I wish _I_ made sense....
> Thanks to incompleteness _I_ makes sense ... in more than one way
> for machines.
> A never fully satisfied _I_, though. That's its (godelian) price.