> -----Original Message-----
> From: Fred Chen [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
>
> A codified description of how the all-universes model works would be nice.
> Will a program that executes all programs really suffice? It seems more like
> an analogy than an actual model. With a computational model of bacterial
> growth, for example, one can simulate this on a computer screen as
> multiplying dots, or possibly even provide a realistic visual image of a
> growing bacterial population, but is that the same as an actual petri dish?

Did someone suggest it was?

> The 'laws of physics' is now a really outdated term, I think. The scope is
> not so clear these days (where does physics end, and another field begin?).
> One can even consider the all-universe model to be almost a 'law' of
> physics, in the sense that it is often invoked to explain certain problems
> in physics.

The term 'laws of physics' is shorthand for whatever rules the universe operates by on 
the most fundamental scale. What you call it
or what field you consider yourself to be in isn't really relevant. For example the 
currently understood 'laws of physics' include
the four forces, the nature of matter and the nature of space-time. The sort of thing 
we're discussing here can often be
conveniently abbreviated as 'the laws of physics'. I'm not sure what point you're 
trying to make by arguing about semantics?

Charles

> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Charles Goodwin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Cc: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Sent: Wednesday, September 05, 2001 2:15 PM
> Subject: RE: My history or Peters??
>
>
> > I was talking about the laws of physics. It's possible in
> principle for
> those to be known (I think). One can also know all there is
> > to know while knowing that one's knowledge is incomplete!
> Obviously a
> complete description of reality is impossible (where would you
> > store the information about the state of every particle?)
> but a complete
> codified description of how reality works is another story.
> >
> > Charles
> >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: Marchal [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
> > > Sent: Thursday, 6 September 2001 4:14 a.m.
> > > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > > Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > > Subject: RE: My history or Peters??
> > >
> > >
> > > Charles wrote (sometimes ago):
> > >
> > > >On the other hand we may eventually learn all there is to
> > > learn. That's
> > > >also possible.
> > >
> > > There is no unifying complete theory of just number theory or
> > > Arithmetic,
> > > neither computer science.
> > >
> > > You can try to solve the riddle in "diagonalisation 1". It is a
> > > shortcut for understanding that Church thesis entails varieties of
> > > incompleteness phenomena.
> > > (http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m3079.html)
> > > That will have bearing with David Deutsch Cantgotu environments.
> > >
> > > Universal machines (like amoebas, brain, fractran, computer
> > > and cosmos
> > > apparently) are just sort of relative self-speeding up
> > > anticipation on
> > > possible realities.
> > >
> > > Even without comp, the simple arithmetical existence of
> the universal
> > > turing machine, makes any unifying attempt to describe
> > > completely reality
> > > infinite.
> > >
> > > Even if we are "more than" a universal computing machine,
> it is easy
> > > to explain there is a sense in which we are *at least* universal
> > > computing machines (even the kind which can know that()),
> > > and that is
> > > enough for making the world possibly very complex.
> > >
> > > There are tranfinities of surprises there, including
> uncomputable and
> > > even unnameable one. And there is no universal
> > > rules saying how to manage them. Is that not apparent with just
> > > number theory? In any case this follows from incompleteness.
> > > We can bet on rules which manage partially the things;
> > >
> > > Chaitin is right there is pure empirical truth in arithmetic, and
> > > this is necessarily so and part of machine's worlds/psychology.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > () we can know we are universal machine. But we cannot
> know we are
> > > consistent universal machine (unless we *are* inconsistent ...).
> > >
> > >
> > > Bruno
> >

Reply via email to