A codified description of how the all-universes model works would be nice. Will a program that executes all programs really suffice? It seems more like an analogy than an actual model. With a computational model of bacterial growth, for example, one can simulate this on a computer screen as multiplying dots, or possibly even provide a realistic visual image of a growing bacterial population, but is that the same as an actual petri dish?
The 'laws of physics' is now a really outdated term, I think. The scope is not so clear these days (where does physics end, and another field begin?). One can even consider the all-universe model to be almost a 'law' of physics, in the sense that it is often invoked to explain certain problems in physics. ----- Original Message ----- From: "Charles Goodwin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Cc: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Wednesday, September 05, 2001 2:15 PM Subject: RE: My history or Peters?? > I was talking about the laws of physics. It's possible in principle for those to be known (I think). One can also know all there is > to know while knowing that one's knowledge is incomplete! Obviously a complete description of reality is impossible (where would you > store the information about the state of every particle?) but a complete codified description of how reality works is another story. > > Charles > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Marchal [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > > Sent: Thursday, 6 September 2001 4:14 a.m. > > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > Subject: RE: My history or Peters?? > > > > > > Charles wrote (sometimes ago): > > > > >On the other hand we may eventually learn all there is to > > learn. That's > > >also possible. > > > > There is no unifying complete theory of just number theory or > > Arithmetic, > > neither computer science. > > > > You can try to solve the riddle in "diagonalisation 1". It is a > > shortcut for understanding that Church thesis entails varieties of > > incompleteness phenomena. > > (http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m3079.html) > > That will have bearing with David Deutsch Cantgotu environments. > > > > Universal machines (like amoebas, brain, fractran, computer > > and cosmos > > apparently) are just sort of relative self-speeding up > > anticipation on > > possible realities. > > > > Even without comp, the simple arithmetical existence of the universal > > turing machine, makes any unifying attempt to describe > > completely reality > > infinite. > > > > Even if we are "more than" a universal computing machine, it is easy > > to explain there is a sense in which we are *at least* universal > > computing machines (even the kind which can know that(�)), > > and that is > > enough for making the world possibly very complex. > > > > There are tranfinities of surprises there, including uncomputable and > > even unnameable one. And there is no universal > > rules saying how to manage them. Is that not apparent with just > > number theory? In any case this follows from incompleteness. > > We can bet on rules which manage partially the things; > > > > Chaitin is right there is pure empirical truth in arithmetic, and > > this is necessarily so and part of machine's worlds/psychology. > > > > > > > > (�) we can know we are universal machine. But we cannot know we are > > consistent universal machine (unless we *are* inconsistent ...). > > > > > > Bruno >
