A codified description of how the all-universes model works would be nice.
Will a program that executes all programs really suffice? It seems more like
an analogy than an actual model. With a computational model of bacterial
growth, for example, one can simulate this on a computer screen as
multiplying dots, or possibly even provide a realistic visual image of a
growing bacterial population, but is that the same as an actual petri dish?

The 'laws of physics' is now a really outdated term, I think. The scope is
not so clear these days (where does physics end, and another field begin?).
One can even consider the all-universe model to be almost a 'law' of
physics, in the sense that it is often invoked to explain certain problems
in physics.

----- Original Message -----
From: "Charles Goodwin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Wednesday, September 05, 2001 2:15 PM
Subject: RE: My history or Peters??


> I was talking about the laws of physics. It's possible in principle for
those to be known (I think). One can also know all there is
> to know while knowing that one's knowledge is incomplete! Obviously a
complete description of reality is impossible (where would you
> store the information about the state of every particle?) but a complete
codified description of how reality works is another story.
>
> Charles
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Marchal [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
> > Sent: Thursday, 6 September 2001 4:14 a.m.
> > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > Subject: RE: My history or Peters??
> >
> >
> > Charles wrote (sometimes ago):
> >
> > >On the other hand we may eventually learn all there is to
> > learn. That's
> > >also possible.
> >
> > There is no unifying complete theory of just number theory or
> > Arithmetic,
> > neither computer science.
> >
> > You can try to solve the riddle in "diagonalisation 1". It is a
> > shortcut for understanding that Church thesis entails varieties of
> > incompleteness phenomena.
> > (http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m3079.html)
> > That will have bearing with David Deutsch Cantgotu environments.
> >
> > Universal machines (like amoebas, brain, fractran, computer
> > and cosmos
> > apparently) are just sort of relative self-speeding up
> > anticipation on
> > possible realities.
> >
> > Even without comp, the simple arithmetical existence of the universal
> > turing machine, makes any unifying attempt to describe
> > completely reality
> > infinite.
> >
> > Even if we are "more than" a universal computing machine, it is easy
> > to explain there is a sense in which we are *at least* universal
> > computing machines (even the kind which can know that()),
> > and that is
> > enough for making the world possibly very complex.
> >
> > There are tranfinities of surprises there, including uncomputable and
> > even unnameable one. And there is no universal
> > rules saying how to manage them. Is that not apparent with just
> > number theory? In any case this follows from incompleteness.
> > We can bet on rules which manage partially the things;
> >
> > Chaitin is right there is pure empirical truth in arithmetic, and
> > this is necessarily so and part of machine's worlds/psychology.
> >
> >
> >
> > () we can know we are universal machine. But we cannot know we are
> > consistent universal machine (unless we *are* inconsistent ...).
> >
> >
> > Bruno
>

Reply via email to