Gordon wrote: >Marchal wrote: >> >> Gordon wrote: >> >> >[GORDON]This is not Everett or Deustch this is still the CI approach >> >just with more Observers to Create the Single Universe from there Magic >> >Computer minds,which bring me to something else are you saying also that >> >the Math(comp)Structures came before Physical Reality? >> > >> >I would say Without the Physical how can we think of the math :) >> >> Please Gordon I have always defend the idea that there is no collapse, >> nor any single history/universe. >> >[GORDON]I am sorry on that one,but from what you have said before >sounded like the Philosophy of Collapse was I wrong on that too?
I guess so. I propose an argument showing that the computationalist hypothesis in cognitive sciences/philosophy of mind necessarily entails a many many things view (not unlike most many worlders, everythingers, etc.). A priori we have too much worlds, we are hunting white rabbits ... >[Bruno] >> But yes I think math, at least elementary arithmetic is necessary for >> the existence of "thinking", and I give an argument (UDA) showing that >> comp implies the physical emerges from all possible computational >> histories/dream (thus a form of thinking is prior to the physical). >> >[GORDON]So what is this comp/thinking/Dream made off is it real or >NONreal It is not made of. It is just number theory + angles, where angles are defined by (godel) number of universal machine. It is number theory including its multiple and various intensional variations. The intension takes into account the relative point of view possible. >From outside: just the sigma1 (UD accessible) sentences, but from the infinite variety of inside point of view, like with skolem paradox in set theory, it is most generaly, unboundly vast. >and would it say that we should give up UFT of GR and QM? Honestly I think that would be premature :) (to say the least). My "technical result" is perhaps also an evidence that some part of QM could be logically necessary (with comp), and some part of realities could be necessarily empirical. >> Bruno:This should not be confuse with the idea that there is a >>universe and >> that this universe is "equivalent" with a special computation. >> >[..] >What I say is that the appearance of the physical law emerge from >> interference between *all* computations. It would be quite consistent >> with comp that the apparent universe is not reductible to any >> computation. >> That is comp could as well entails that the "universe" is not turing >> emulable. We just currently don't know. >> >[GORDON]This would still imply that your comp is building a single >classical Universe even if comp is using other comp Histories. The comp ontology is *all computations*. Some "point of view refinement", single out gigantesc lattice of virtual lawfull relative "realities". Perhaps an ortholattice. There could be appearance of classical universes but comp predict that machines looking at their most probable neighborhood below their sharable level of substitution of their shared computations will just discover sort of multiverses. It is due to the computational indeterminacy. We are fungible (Deutsch sense) with the huge realities consistent with our state through our very vast ignorance, and others, perhaps ugly dummy computations. Comp entails many "realities" and can be used as vaccin against any attempt to make a reductive (complete) theory of the possibilities of the universal machine(s). Questions: Is it hard to imagine, at least one moment, that the laws of physics could emerge themselves from invariant related to number theory and its many multiple inside "point of views"? perfectly defined in an axiomatic way (and having arithmetical models, through Godel Kleene Lob ... arithmetisation of metamathematics). Would not physical knowledge be better founded in case that knowledge is shown part of the necessary belief of the typical sound universal machine relatively to its most probable (and deep) computations? Bruno
