Hi Saibal,

I don't know if there is an accepted formulation for QTI and the
conservation of memory, however, the only constraint that seems logical
to me is that the consciousness extensions should be logically
consistent, because logical consistenty is a prerequisite for

I can imagine certain branches in which memory is totally lost, (the
null case so to speak - because there is really no consciousness
continuation) and other branches where memory is totally conserved, yet
other cases where memory is transformed to reflect a different
past....All these will come true as long as there is a logical
explanation for them to happen. You must keep in mind as Jacques
mentionned, that memory is not necessary identical with the past. It
only represents the present brain state which reflects in a consistent
fashion more or less precisely what the past was.

In some branches you will experience increasing old age without limit...
all ou need is the logical explanation.
For example upon dying as a human, you may wake up as a billion year old
ten arm octopus living in a 30 dimensional space realizing that you were
just dreaming in 3-Land. The number of explanations seems limitless.

In this list, we are what we are, our age probably ranging from 20 to 80
because of our surrounding, because of anthropic reasons. Had we been a
billion year old group (with the corresponding historical-anthropic
reasons for being 1 billion year old), God knows what we would be
talking and worrying about, but we would certainly not be debating this
(F)allacious (I)nsane (N)onsense. :-) 


Saibal Mitra wrote:
> QTI, as formulated by some on this list (I call this conventional QTI), is
> supposed to imply that you should experience becoming arbitrarily old with
> probability one. It is this prediction that I am attacking.
> I have no problems with the fact that according to quantum mechanics there
> is a finite probability that bullets fired from a machine gun toward you
> will all tunnel through your body. Or, that if you are thrown into a black
> hole (Russell Standish's example), you might be emitted from the black hole
> as Hawking radiation.
> The mistake is that QTI ONLY considers certain branches were you survive
> without memory loss, other branches are not considered. This leads to the
> paradox that you should experience yourself being infinitely old etc..
> Saibal
> Charles Goodwin wrote:
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: Saibal Mitra [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
> > >
> > > In the case of a person suffering from a terminal disease, it
> > > is much more
> > > likely that he will survive in a branch where he was not
> > > diagnosed with the
> > > disease, than in a branch where the disease is magically
> > > cured. The latter
> > > possibility (conventional qti) can't be favoured above the first just
> > > because the surviving person is more similar to the original person.
> >
> > I don't understand this argument. The person survives (according to QTI)
> in both branches. In fact QTI postulates that an infinite
> > number of copies of a person survives (although the *proportion* of the
> multiverse in which he survives tends to zero - but that is
> > because the multivese is growing far faster than the branches in which a
> person survives). QTI postulates that ALL observer moments
> > are part of a series (of a vast number of series') which survive to
> timelike infinity.
> >
> > > You could object that in the first case your consciousness is somehow
> > > transferred to a different person (you ``jump´´ to a
> > > different branch that
> > > separated from the dying branch before you were diagnosed),
> > > but I would say
> > > that the surviving person has the same consciousness  the
> > > original person
> > > would have if you cured his disease and erased all memory of
> > > having the
> > > disease.
> >
> > That isn't necessary (according to QTI). The multiverse is large enough to
> accomodate an uncountable infinity of branches in which a
> > given person survives from ANY starting state, as well as a (larger)
> uncountable infinity in which he doesn't.
> >
> > Charles
> >

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