I followed the UDA link and read the post and fell flat on my face when
I read the term "classical teleportation". I would like to know what is the
theoretical basis of a belief that "classical teleportation" is even
possible? I can accept TM emulability for the sake of the argument, but the
notion of classical teleportation is something that is equivalent to
perpetual motion machines in my thinking.
Does there exist an on-line explanation of "classical teleportation"
that I could read?
PS. How far have you considered Chu transforms?
----- Original Message -----
From: "Marchal Bruno" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Thursday, November 28, 2002 9:56 AM
Subject: RE: Re: The number 8. A TOE?
> Ben Goertzel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >> BG: You seem to be making points about the limitations
> >> >of the folk-psychology notion of identity, rather than about the
> >> >nature of the universe...
> >> BM: Then you should disagree at some point of the reasoning, for the
> >> reasoning is intended, at least, to show that it follows from
> >> the computationalist hypothesis, that physics is a subbranch of
> >> (machine) psychology, and that the actual nature of the universe
> >> can and must be recovered by machine psychology.
> >BG; I tend to think that "physics" and "machine psychology" are limiting
> >that will be thrown off within future science, in favor of a more unified
> Sure, but before having that future science we must use some terms.
> As I said in the first UDA posting
http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m1726.html, it is really the
> proof that "physics is a branch of psychology" which provides the
> explanation of such terms. Basically machine psychology is given by all
> true propositions that machine or collection of machine can prove
> or bet about themselves.
> Eventually it is given by the Godel Lob logic of provability with
> their modal variants. I take the fact that a consistent machine
> cannot prove its own consistency as a psychological theorem.
> Consciousness can then be approximated by the unconscious (automated,
> instinctive) anticipation of self-consistency.
> >Perhaps, from this more unified perspective, a better approximation will
> >to say that "physics" and "machine psychology" are subsets of each other
> >(perhaps formally, in the sense of hypersets, non-foundational set
> >who knows...)
> Perhaps. I guess a sort of adjunction, or a Chu transform? I don't know.
> >> Physics is taken as what is invariant in all possible (consistent)
> >> anticipation by (enough rich) machine, and this from the point of
> >> view of the machines. If arithmetic was complete, we would get
> >> just propositional calculus. But arithmetic is incomplete.
> >> This introduces nuances between proof, truth, consistency, etc.
> >> The technical part of the thesis shows that the invariant propositions
> >> about their probable neighborhoods (for
> >> possible anticipating machines) structure themtselves into a sort
> >> of quantum logic accompagned by some renormalization problem (which
> >> could be fatal for comp (making comp popperian-falsifiable)).
> >> This follows from the nuances which are made necessary by the
> >> Godel's incompleteness theorems, but also Lob and Solovay
> >> fundamental generalization of it. But it's better grasping first
> >> the UDA before tackling the AUDA, which is "just" the translation
> >> of the UDA in the language of a "Lobian" machine.
> >Could you point me to a formal presentation of AUDA, if one exists?
> >I have a math PhD and can follow formal arguments better than verbal
> >renditions of them sometimes...
> You can click on "proof of LASE" in my web page, and on Modal Logic
> if you need. The technical part of my thesis relies on the
> work of Godel, Lob, Solovay, Goldblatt, Boolos, Visser. Precise
> references are in my thesis (downloadable, but written in french).
> You can also look at the paper "Computation, Consciousness and the
> When I will have more time I can provide more explanations.
> Let me insist that that technics makes much more sense once you get
> the more informal, but nevertheless rigorous, UDA argument.