Le 03-déc.-05, à 11:12, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :

Bruno Marchal writes:

Le 01-déc.-05, à 07:17, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :

Why does an OM need to contain so much information to link it to other OMs making up a person? [the complete message is below].

I am not sure I understand. Are you saying, like Saibal Mitra, that OMs (Observer-Moments) are not related? How, in this case, would you interpret your own talk about "next observer moment" (those which could be dead end)? Is there not a confusion between the idea of physicalist (causal) view of the relation between OMs (which, as Brent meeker said should be explained from a more primitive (mathematical, immaterial, not causal, ...) notion of OM, with those very (more primitive) OMs. Are you assuming some notion of multiverse richer than (or just different from) a notion of multi-OMs?

In our ordinary experience, the OMs making up an individual's stream of consciousness are causally related by virtue of the fact that that they occur inside the same brain. If we consider thought experiments involving teleportation or mind uploading, again the sequential OMs are causally related due to transfer of the relevant brain pattern (or whatever) information. However, this information tranfer is not actually *necessary* for the OMs to be experienced as moments in the same stream of consciousness. Say an observer experiencing OM a1 enters a teleporter which then causes another observer experiencing OM a2 to be created at the receiving station. Then a1 and a2 are sequential OMs, constituting a stream of consciousness a1a2 sampled from the life of an individual. If this is so, then if a1 occurs anywhere in the multiverse, and a2 occurs anywhere else, the same stream of consciousness a1a2 should be experienced - even if a1 and a2 occur completely at random, with no "causal link" between them.

No causal link. OK. But there is an arithmetical or computer-science-theoretical link. This includes memories, consistency conditions, etc.

I am agnostic regarding the question of whether OMs are primitive or derivative. The world could be as it appears: the physical universe (whatever that means) gives rise to certain special physical processes which result in moments of conscious experience, and those moments which are related through being the product of circumscribed subsets of physical processes constitute a stream of consciousness in an individual life. On the other hand, in a world where exactly the same OMs as postulated in the previous sentence exist, but all mixed up and not connected to any (or any particular) physical process, exactly the same individual streams of consciousness would result.

OK. So why ever postulate a physical world, given that the OMs you describe already exist independently of us (in arithmetical platonia), and that nobody has ever succeed in explaining what a primitive physical world could be, and that nobody has ever succeed in relating OMs as lived by people and some putative concrete substantial reality? I think that with OCCAM, any notion of computationalist OMs, makes the idea of a ontologically primitive physical multiverse useless. (and the Olympia/movie-graph makes it senseless, but here I would say that remark is off-topic).



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