Bruno wrote:
Le 12-déc.-05, à 18:07, Tom ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) a écrit :
...
In the Plenitude, everything washes out to zero. And Bruno, I would
even say that all consistent histories wash out to zero.
I am not sure why you say this.
See below.
It's interesting that symmetry (Bruno's requirement for LASE) has
come
up lately, because Stathis' question seems to be what we are all
wondering. That's the bottom line of multiverse theories: Where does
the symmetry breaking come from?
Actually comp put a big assymmetry at the start (the natural numbers:
0, 1, 2, 3, 4, ...), and my question for years was how to get the
symmetry
which apparently lives at the bottom of physics (already classical
physics,
still more with QM-without collapse).
See below.
I maintain still that it can't come from the multiverse itself.
But which "multiverse"? remember that the QM, or the existence
of any physical multiverse are not among the hypothesis. Indeed
the UDA forces us to justify completely the appearances of a
"physical" multiverse.
See below.
Even considering only consistent histories, there is no asymmetry to
be found.
This astonishes me a little bit. The very notion of "history", it
seems to me,
is assymetrical. But then I am not sure if you are talking about the
comp
consistent extensions of some machine (the comp histories) or the
quantum
histories of Everett, Hartle, and Co. ?
In this context I'm talking about your comp multiverse. Yes, our
common sense experience sees history as one way. But this is the
problem. Your requirement for LASE is that the accessibility relation
is symmetrical. This implies that it has to be just as consistent to
go backwards in history as forwards. From what you say above about the
natural numbers, it seems that the comp assumption of natural numbers
contradicts this.
I maintain that it needs to come from outside the multiverse, which
is something that we cannot explain.
It certainly (with comp) needs to be explain from outside any notion
of
"physical multiverse". Then the truth-provability gap (capture by the
modal
logic G* \ G, that is the set difference between the provable
self-referential
statements and the true self-referential statements) will "explain"
why we
cannot explain that something. I should perhaps make some summary.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
I'd appreciate it. As part of it, I think I would need an explanation
of what you mean by "physical universe". It seems to me that your
belief in the process of verification, when you talk about verifying
comp physics vs. quantum physics, is equivalent to a belief in a
physical universe.
Tom Caylor
