George Levy wrote:
the infinite number of histories refer to the continuum of histories. The
first person observer can only perceive through his own experiments that
physics in his own world, provides a infinite number of histories as large
as the continuum. All he knows is that his own history is embedded in a
continuum of histories.
I don't understand why he can't say there's a measure on that continuum,
though. And surely an infinite number of histories can be broken into a
finite number of subsets based on a single criterion, like "the set of all
future histories in which the next roll of this die will come up 6" and "the
set of all future histories in which the next roll of this die will not come
up 6", with different measures assigned to the subsets (in this case, one
would ordinarily assume the first subset has measure 1/6 and the second has
Also, I'm still confused about your original argument:
"Since you agree that the number of histories is on a continuum, you must
accept that no matter how large or small a segment of the continuum is
considered, the number of histories is the same. Hence measure is the same
for any observer."
What is the "number of histories" that is the same here? Weren't you saying
the number is infinity? And do you agree that in general it is not correct
to say that because two sets contain an infinite number of elements, that
means their measure must be the same?