George Levy wrote:

the infinite number of histories refer to the continuum of histories. The first person observer can only perceive through his own experiments that physics in his own world, provides a infinite number of histories as large as the continuum. All he knows is that his own history is embedded in a continuum of histories.


I don't understand why he can't say there's a measure on that continuum, though. And surely an infinite number of histories can be broken into a finite number of subsets based on a single criterion, like "the set of all future histories in which the next roll of this die will come up 6" and "the set of all future histories in which the next roll of this die will not come up 6", with different measures assigned to the subsets (in this case, one would ordinarily assume the first subset has measure 1/6 and the second has measure 5/6).

Also, I'm still confused about your original argument:

"Since you agree that the number of histories is on a continuum, you must accept that no matter how large or small a segment of the continuum is considered, the number of histories is the same. Hence measure is the same for any observer."

What is the "number of histories" that is the same here? Weren't you saying the number is infinity? And do you agree that in general it is not correct to say that because two sets contain an infinite number of elements, that means their measure must be the same?


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