Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Le Mercredi 12 Juillet 2006 23:54, 1Z a écrit :
> > Bruno-computationalism is standard computationalism+platonism.
> > Since I reject platomnism, I reject Bruno-computationalism
> > (whilst having rather less problem with the standard computational
> > thesis, that "cognition is computation").
> If computationalism is true then platonism must also be true.
> Because if you were in a "simulation" and you have managed to get out of it,
> how can you know you have reach the bottom level of reality (ie: the material
> world then) ? How can you know the new real world you are now in is the real
> world and not another simulation ?
e.g it has some non-computable physics.
> It is the turtle on the turtle on the
> turtle... Even if you take "standard computational thesis", then by the
> reasoning upper you must reject a bottom level real... ie: a material world,
> a stuffy world... every reality is stuffy and real (from the inside).
"(seemingly) real (from the inside" just doesn't add up
to "really real". Your argument only works if you adopt
solipsistic premises to start with -- if you just want to have your
sensations explained. All you are saying is that if you don't
care about what is ultimately true, you do need to bother
with what is ultimately real. Equally, if you are interested in
truth, you will need ultimate reality. It has no impact on a realist at
(BTW, the same arguments that say you don't need matter mean
you don't need Other Minds, so solipsism is very much the word!)
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