Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Hi Brent,
> Le Vendredi 21 Juillet 2006 17:52, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>>That's simply an assumption.  When we know how to make a conscious brain we
>>may find that we do have a good idea of what it experiences - as evidenced
>>by its self-reports and other behavoir.
>>>On the other hand,
>>>if you know every empirical fact about a non-conscious entity well enough
>>>to make an exact working replica, then you know everything there is to
>>>know about it. We could define consciousness as what is left over when
>>>you subtract what can be known about an entity by an external observer
>>>from what can be known by being that entity yourself.
>>If there is anything left over.  I don't think it is sufficiently
>>appreciated that this "unknowability" is an assumption.
> Frow what you say, I understand that you could know what it is like to being 
> myself if I'd described to you my all life ? Whatever I could say about me 
> will be 3rd persons communicable fact... 

No, the hypothetical was stronger than that: it was that I knew exactly how 
your brain worked to the 
degree that I could make one.  You certainly don't know how your brain works, 
so while it is in 
princple communicable, it would not be part of your self description.

>Even when I describe a feeling, I 
> describe it in a 3rd communication way, and you could infer from your own 
> feeling what it would be like, never to be sure it is... because if you were 
> sure of this, then you'll no longer be Brent Meeker, but me.

I don't think that follows.  When I'm sure that my wife is in pain from torn 
cartilage in her knee, 
  it doesn't mean that I am my wife.  But in any case, being sure is a higher 
standard than we apply 
to any scientific belief.

Brent Meeker

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