On Mon, Jul 24, 2006 at 01:30:34PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > > I am afraid your solon will just have this application: to give a non > standard meaning to functionalism. Even a strict catholic can be a > functionalist in that sense: just imagine that the solon, thanks to > their non-comp (by construction) feature are connected to "Descartes' > God". >
Only if the Catholic notion of soul is that it is composed of intechangable parts like I described, which I doubt, but then IANAC! And is it really a nonstandard meaning to functionalism? I have read a bit on the subject - eg Dennett, Chalmers and than Plato.Stanford article, and nothing there indicates that there is something wrong with my interpretation. But I don't claim to be an guru. > > > >> It depends what you put in the "B". It is indeed a sort of scientific > >> knowledge when starting with B = the provability predicate of some > >> fixed theory like Peano arithmetic, but such a theory can > >> (autonomously) transcends itself in the (constructive) transfinite, > >> and > >> the "arithmetical" meaning of "B" will evolved, letting invariant the > >> modal logic G, G*, S4Grz, ... > >> Then the justification is that it works. It gives an unameable > >> creative > >> subject which lives in a non describable temporal structure, etc. You > >> can take this as a simplification. With comp the simple first person > >> already leads to a notion of arithmetical quantization. Then sensible > >> matter is also given by adding "& p" , but on "Bp & Dp", ... > > > > I can (sort of) see this. However, it is only one model, and not even > > a terribly convincing one (to me at least). > > > I don't think it is a model. Once we say yes to the doctor, it is > normal to be interested in what any machine (perhaps ideally correct) > can prove about herself, and then we inherit of the nuances *forced* by > incompleteness. The model is that knowledge is characterised by Bp & p - the Theatetus step. I have to take this with a grain of salt - it doesn't seem at all obvious to me, but I don't have any other proposal either. > We just cannot threw them in the trash, and then it is > just an amazing news that they behave like we were expecting. I have > worked with more complex definition (based on Kleene realizability and > on Hyland effective topos until I discover the variant of provability > were quite enough for distinguishing in number-theoretic terms the > notion of persons corresponding to their use in the UDA. > This does not preclude more fine grain "model" of course, but let us > first extract all the juice from simpler idea before. No? > > > > > Do you have any uniqueness > > results showing that the &p is necessary for obtaining the unamable > > creative subject or the temporality? > > > For Bp & p, I mentionned the appendix "Artemov" thesis of my text > "conscience et mécanisme", here: > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/Volume4CC/ > 6%20La%20these%20d'Artemov.pdf > Ah yes, I must get around to reading the Brussels version one day! > >> But by adding "& p", by a theorem similar to Tarski theorem, we are > >> lead to a first person self-reference (Bp & p) without any nameable > >> subject. It is the "I" which has no name. That "I", somehow, could > >> correctly said about himself that he is not a program, that he is not > >> duplicable (and indeed the first person is not duplicable from its > >> first person point of view (despite Chalmers). > > > > You would need to be more specific in your claims, but that would > > probably be the subject of a full scientific paper, and perhaps you > > are only speculating at present anyway. I will need to be patient. > > The whole thing is already in my SANE paper: > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/ > SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html I read that paper, but didn't get anything about self-awareness there. > > > > > > But even so, I don't see anywhere the necessity of 1st person > > self-awareness, which is what I was driving at. > > > What difference are you doing between self-awareness and > consciousness. Consciousness is the state of "being like something" to use Nagel's term. It is also the characteristic of the "reference class" in Anthropic reasoning. Self-awareness is being aware of oneself as a distinct thing different from the environment. It is not immediately obvious that these are identical - but perhaps I'm overlooking something. -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile) Mathematics 0425 253119 (") UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australia http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
