Le 10-août-06, à 22:44, 1Z a écrit :
>> > > With the materialist hypothesis there is also no dualism. This is defensible but necessitates a solution of the mind-body problem, to explain the relation between sensations and "matter". The traditional implicit or explicit solution of the materialist is comp. And then I show it does not work. Even the traditional comp or standard comp (as you call it) makes "matter" epistemologically devoid of any explicative power (cf the UDA). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
