Le 10-août-06, à 22:44, 1Z a écrit :

> With the materialist hypothesis there is also no dualism.

This is defensible but necessitates a solution of the mind-body 
problem, to explain the relation between sensations and "matter".
The traditional implicit or explicit solution of the materialist is 
And then I show it does not work. Even the traditional comp or standard 
comp (as you call it) makes "matter" epistemologically devoid of any 
explicative power (cf the UDA).



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