Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Peter Jones writes: > > >> And such a universe could be emulated as a running, deterministic process. >> But >> that won't get you into Plato's heaven, because it is a *running* process -- >> it >> is still dynamic. A recording of the process could exist in Plato's heaven, >> but >> it wouldn't have all the counterfactuals, so the computationalist is not >> required to believe that it contains any real sentience -- the simulated >> beings >> in it would have no more consciousness of their own than the characters in a >> movie! >> >> Likewise, the computationalist is not required to believe that an unexecuted >> programme is sentient (even though it has, theoretically, the >> counterfactuals). >> >> No-one would believe that a brain-scan, however detailed, is conscious, so >> not >> computationalist, however ardent, is required to believe that a progamme >> gathering udston a shelf is sentient, however good a piece of AI code it is. > > > Leave aside for the moment the computer running in Platonia and consider a > real > computer. You say that a computer program is defined in part by its ability to > handle counterfactuals, distinguishing it from a mere recording, but it is > this > distinction with which I have difficulties. The characters in a film are not > conscious because the film only simulates external appearance, not because it > lacks if-then statements. A film obviously does handle if-then statements, > because > if the patterns on the film are different the projection on the screen would > also > be different.
That's not a proper example though. It would imply to a rock - it would be different if it weren't a rock. To be intelligent (much less conscious) the if-then must be inresponse to different environmental inputs. >A computer program basically does the same thing: it consistently > produces a certain output for a certain input. That's why you can't tell whether a program is intelligent by giving it a "certain input". There must be a variety of inputs and the response will in general be different depending on their order (smart programs have memory). >In the MWI of QM a computer program > or human mind may have more luxuriant branchings than a recording, This seems to reify the branches as part of the program. They are part of the *process of running* the program. The branches arise from different inputs. >but that is > just a matter of degree, and in any case there is no reason to suppose that a > program is any less valid or less conscious because of the presence or > absence of > near-copies segregated in parallel universes. In the CI of QM it would be > possible > to introduce true randomness into a computer program but the same could be > done > for a recording, and again there is no reason to suppose that a program is any > less valid or less conscious because it isn't random. Randomness and/or > parallel > processes are not a prerequisite for a classical computer to function. I agree with that. > You might say that a computer program has a two-way interaction with its > environment while a recording does not, but it is easy to imagine a situation > where this can be perfectly reproduced by a recording. In run no. 1, you > start up > the computer program and have a conversation with it. In run no. 2 you start > up > the computer program and play it the recording of your voice from run no. 1. > As > far as the program is aware, it receives exactly the same inputs and goes > through > exactly the same responses on both runs, but one is a recording and the other > is > not. Run no. 2 is exactly analogous to a film: a fixed input resulting in a > fixed > output, even though if the input had been different the output would also have > been different. I don't see how you could say that the computer is conscious > in > run no. 1 but not in run no. 2. If the program is intelligent it'll be bored by 2. :-) You seem to mixing questions of discovering whether a program is intelligent, with what it means for it to be intelligent. Brent Meeker --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
