Le 22-août-06, à 15:26, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :

> OK, I suppose you could say "I'm intelligent" but not "I + my 
> environment are intelligent".
> That still allows that an inputless program might contain intelligent 
> beings, and you are left
> with the problem of how to decide whether a physical system is 
> implementing such a program
> given that you can't talk to it.

People who believes that inputs (being either absolute-material or 
relative-platonical) are needed for consciousness should not believe 
that we can be conscious in a dream, given the evidence that the brain 
is almost completely cut out from the environment during rem sleep. I 
guess they have no problem with comatose people either.
Of course they cannot be even just troubled by the UD, which is a 
program without inputs and without outputs.

Now, without digging in the movie-graph, I would still be interested if 
someone accepting "standard comp" (Peter's expression) could explain 
how a digital machine could correctly decide that her environment is 
"real-physical". If such machine and reasoning exist, it will be done 
in Platonia, and, worst, assuming comp, it will be done as correctly as 
the real machine argument. This would lead to the fact that in 
Platonia, there are (many) immaterial machines proving *correctly* that 
they are immaterial. Contradiction.

Remark: the key idea which is used here is that not only programs 
belong to Platonia, but their relative computations also. It is 
important to keep the distinction between (static) programs and their 
"dynamical" computations. I will write Fi, as the function computed by 
the ith programs in some universal enumeration of partial recursive 
functions (like an infinite list of fortran programs, say). I will 
write Fi(x) for the value of that function with input x, if that value 
exists. I will write sFi(x) the "s-trace" of that program (with input 
x), where the trace stops after the sth steps in the relative run of 
Fi(x). The trace is computer scientist name for a description of the 
computational steps---it can be shown that such computational steps can 
always be defined for the Fi and Wi.
I will define a (3-PERSON) computation of Fi(x) as being the sequence 
1Fi(x), 2Fi(x), 3Fi(x), etc ...
This is well defined relatively to some universal number or code. In 
this sense, computations belong to Platonia. The reason why I feel 
myself here and now can then be reduced to the relative 1-person comp 
indeterminacy a-la Washington/Moscow. Note that the adjective 
"relative" is capital here. Without it, the indexical conception of 
time (and space) would not work.



You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to