Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 22-août-06, à 15:26, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
> > OK, I suppose you could say "I'm intelligent" but not "I + my
> > environment are intelligent".
> > That still allows that an inputless program might contain intelligent
> > beings, and you are left
> > with the problem of how to decide whether a physical system is
> > implementing such a program
> > given that you can't talk to it.
> People who believes that inputs (being either absolute-material or
> relative-platonical) are needed for consciousness should not believe
> that we can be conscious in a dream, given the evidence that the brain
> is almost completely cut out from the environment during rem sleep.

The brain didn't evolve to dream.

> I
> guess they have no problem with comatose people either.
> Of course they cannot be even just troubled by the UD, which is a
> program without inputs and without outputs.
> Now, without digging in the movie-graph, I would still be interested if
> someone accepting "standard comp" (Peter's expression) could explain
> how a digital machine could correctly decide that her environment is
> "real-physical".

A *person* can decide their enviroment is *uncomputable*.

If classical physics had been true, the environment would
have been uncomputable.

> If such machine and reasoning exist, it will be done
> in Platonia, and, worst, assuming comp, it will be done as correctly as
> the real machine argument. This would lead to the fact that in
> Platonia, there are (many) immaterial machines proving *correctly* that
> they are immaterial. Contradiction.

If the mind is a computation, its errors are computations
as well. Platonia wil contain every mathematical possibility --
every combination of mind and environment.
Competent minds correctly judging their environments are computable,
competent minds correctly judging their environments are uncomputable,
incompetent minds incorrectly judging their environments are
uncomputable,  incompetent minds incorrectly judging their environments
are computable.

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at

Reply via email to