Peter Jones writes: > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > Peter Jones writes: > > > > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > > > > > > Now, suppose some more complex variant of 3+2=3 implemented on your > > > > > > abacus has consciousness associated with it, which is just one of > > > > > > the tenets of computationalism. Some time later, you are walking in > > > > > > the Amazon rain forest and notice that > > > > > > ****under a certain mapping**** > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > of birds to beads and trees to wires, the forest is implementing > > > > > > the same computation as your abacus was. So if your abacus was > > > > > > conscious, and computationalism is true, the tree-bird sytem should > > > > > > also be conscious. > > > > > > > > > > No necessarily, because the mapping is required too. Why should > > > > > it still be conscious if no-one is around to make the mapping. > > > > > > > > Are you claiming that a conscious machine stops being conscious if its > > > > designers die > > > > and all the information about how it works is lost? > > > > > > You are, if anyone is. I don't agree that computation *must* be > > > interpreted, > > > although they *can* be re-interpreted. > > > > What I claim is this: > > > > A computation does not *need* to be interpreted, it just is. However, a > > computation > > does need to be interpreted, or interact with its environment in some way, > > if it is to be > > interesting or meaningful. > > A computation other than the one you are running needs to be > interpreted by you > to be meaningful to you. The computation you are running is useful > to you because it keeps you alive. > > > By analogy, a string of characters is a string of characters > > whether or not anyone interprets it, but it is not interesting or > > meaningful unless it is > > interpreted. But if a computation, or for that matter a string of > > characters, is conscious, > > then it is interesting and meaningful in at least one sense in the absence > > of an external > > observer: it is interesting and meaningful to itself. If it were not, then > > it wouldn't be > > conscious. The conscious things in the world have an internal life, a first > > person > > phenomenal experience, a certain ineffable something, whatever you want to > > call it, > > while the unconscious things do not. That is the difference between them. > > Which they manage to be aware of without the existence of an external > oberver, > so one of your premises must be wrong.
No, that's exactly what I was saying all along. An observer is needed for meaningfulness, but consciousness provides its own observer. A conscious entity may interact with its environment, and in fact that would have to be the reason consciousness evolved (nature is not self-indulgent), but the interaction is not logically necessary for consciousness. Stathis Papaioannou _________________________________________________________________ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
