Le 22-sept.-06, à 19:18, Russell Standish a écrit :

> > On Fri, Sep 22, 2006 at 12:18:37PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > ... > >> >> It is really the key to understand that if my 3-person I is a machine, >> then the I, (the 1-person I) is not! This can be used to explain why >> the 1-person is solipsist, although the 1-person does not need to be >> doctrinaire about that (fortunately enough). >> >> >> Bruno >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> > > I think this comment is most interesting, and perhaps you are finally > laying to rest my confusion. By 3-person, we really mean my extended > brain, which is quantum mechanically dstributed across the Multiverse > (see previous comments to Stathis et al.) Now I am completely confused. here you seem to assume the quantum multiverse like if you were abandoning your own theory. You are free to redefine the term I am using, but I thought have making clear that the 3-person is just the finite code the doctor is using to build a copy of yourself like in the duplication WM. The 3-person description is just a finite natural number, the one which at least you can already prove the existence in your theory (which I identify to Q1 Q2 Q3). I recall for this other in "french": Q1 says that zero is not a successor of any number = for all x NOT(0 = s(x)). Q2 says that the successor operation is injective, i.e. if for all x and y, if x is equal to y, then s(x) = s(y). Q3 says that all numbers are successor, except 0, i.e. for all x, if x is different from zero then there is a y such x = s(y). The intended (standard) model is the mathematical structure N = {0, s(0), s(s(0)), s(s(s(0))), ...} = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, ...}, but without means for adding and multiplying the numbers. > By 1-person, we mean the > projection of ourselves that we are (self-) aware of. This includes > that lump of grey porridge we call a brain. This would be the first person plural (intelligible matter). > > The 3 person could be something relatively complex like a computer, > but it could just as easily be Stathis's rock actually. What matters > is the 1-person, which is inherently non-computable. ... from its own point of view! Also I think all hypostases matters > > If I can just see why the anthropic principle follows in an obvious way > from this, I'll be even happier! It seems to me that comp assumes at the start a form of "turing-tropic" or "universal-tropic" (with Church Thesis) principle. From it we can derive all hypostases (n-person point of view, terrestrial (G viewed) or divine (G* viewed)) including the fourth one which should give physics, making comp testable. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---