Le 22-sept.-06, à 19:18, Russell Standish a écrit :

> On Fri, Sep 22, 2006 at 12:18:37PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> ...
>> It is really the key to understand that if my 3-person I is a machine,
>> then the I, (the 1-person I) is not! This can be used to explain why
>> the 1-person is solipsist, although the 1-person does not need to be
>> doctrinaire about that (fortunately enough).
>> Bruno
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> I think this comment is most interesting, and perhaps you are finally
> laying to rest my confusion. By 3-person, we really mean my extended
> brain, which is quantum mechanically dstributed across the Multiverse
> (see previous comments to Stathis et al.)

Now I am completely confused. here you seem to assume the quantum 
multiverse like if you were abandoning your own theory.
You are free to redefine the term I am using, but I thought have making 
clear that the 3-person is just the finite code the doctor is using to 
build a copy of yourself like in the duplication WM. The 3-person 
description is just a finite natural number, the one which at least you 
can already prove the existence in your theory (which I identify to Q1 
Q2 Q3).

I recall for this other in "french": Q1 says that zero is not a 
successor of any number = for all x NOT(0 = s(x)). Q2 says that the 
successor operation is injective, i.e. if for all x and y, if x is 
equal to y, then s(x) = s(y). Q3 says that all numbers are successor, 
except 0, i.e. for all x, if x is different from zero then there is a y 
such x = s(y).

The intended (standard) model is the mathematical structure N = {0, 
s(0), s(s(0)), s(s(s(0))), ...} = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, ...}, but without 
means for adding and multiplying the numbers.

> By 1-person, we mean the
> projection of ourselves that we are (self-) aware of. This includes
> that lump of grey porridge we call a brain.

This would be the first person plural (intelligible matter).

> The 3 person could be something relatively complex like a computer,
> but it could just as easily be Stathis's rock actually. What matters
> is the 1-person, which is inherently non-computable.

... from its own point of view! Also I think all hypostases matters

> If I can just see why the anthropic principle follows in an obvious way
> from this, I'll be even happier!

It seems to me that comp assumes at the start a form of "turing-tropic" 
or "universal-tropic" (with Church Thesis) principle.
 From it we can derive all hypostases (n-person point of view, 
terrestrial (G viewed) or divine (G* viewed)) including the fourth one 
which should give physics, making comp testable.



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