Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 20-sept.-06, à 14:08, 1Z a écrit :
>
> > This isn't the only way COMP couldbe false. For instance, if
> > matter exists, consciousness could be dependent on it. Thus,
> > while the existence of matter might disprove the Bruno version of comp,
> > it doesn't prove the existence of actual infintities.
>
> If matter exists, and if consciousness is dependent on it, and if there
> is no actual infinities on which my consciousness can depend, then that
> piece of matter is turing emulable, and so by turing-emulating it, it
> would lead to a zombie.


The matter isn't emulable at all. Only its behaviour. if there is prime
matteriality, and not just material behaviour, it is necessarily
non-emulable.

> OK then.
> But now I have still less understanding of your notion of primitive
> matter. You could define it by anything making comp false without using
> actual infinities, and this would lead to ad hoc theories.

Only something with no properties is necessarily non-emulable,
and there can be only one such something.

> Again, from a strictly logical point

As opposed to ?

> of view you are correct, but then
> we have to ask you what you mean by matter. It is no more something
> describable by physics, and it is above anything imaginable to link
> that stuff to consciousness.

What is immaterial doesn't exist, and what doesn't exist isn't
conscious.

The link between mental properties and the bare substrate need be no
different
to the link between physical properties and the substrate.

> Unless you present some axiomatic of your notion of matter, I am afraid
> we will not make progress.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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