Peter, I am afraid we are in a loop. I have already answer most of your comments, except this one:
> >> Again, from a strictly logical point > > As opposed to ? As opposed to the common sense needed for the choice of the axioms of the (logical) theory. To be sure I have not yet commented an earlier statement you made (that we cannot identify digital machine or program with number). This is an important remark and I will answer it soon or later. Bruno ----- original message --------- Le 20-sept.-06, à 14:40, 1Z a écrit : > > > Bruno Marchal wrote: >> Le 20-sept.-06, à 14:08, 1Z a écrit : >> >>> This isn't the only way COMP couldbe false. For instance, if >>> matter exists, consciousness could be dependent on it. Thus, >>> while the existence of matter might disprove the Bruno version of >>> comp, >>> it doesn't prove the existence of actual infintities. >> >> If matter exists, and if consciousness is dependent on it, and if >> there >> is no actual infinities on which my consciousness can depend, then >> that >> piece of matter is turing emulable, and so by turing-emulating it, it >> would lead to a zombie. > > > The matter isn't emulable at all. Only its behaviour. if there is prime > matteriality, and not just material behaviour, it is necessarily > non-emulable. > >> OK then. >> But now I have still less understanding of your notion of primitive >> matter. You could define it by anything making comp false without >> using >> actual infinities, and this would lead to ad hoc theories. > > Only something with no properties is necessarily non-emulable, > and there can be only one such something. > >> Again, from a strictly logical point > > As opposed to ? > >> of view you are correct, but then >> we have to ask you what you mean by matter. It is no more something >> describable by physics, and it is above anything imaginable to link >> that stuff to consciousness. > > What is immaterial doesn't exist, and what doesn't exist isn't > conscious. > > The link between mental properties and the bare substrate need be no > different > to the link between physical properties and the substrate. > >> Unless you present some axiomatic of your notion of matter, I am >> afraid >> we will not make progress. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
