Brent Meeker wrote: > Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > > Le 20-sept.-06, à 14:08, 1Z a écrit : > > > > > >>This isn't the only way COMP couldbe false. For instance, if > >>matter exists, consciousness could be dependent on it. Thus, > >>while the existence of matter might disprove the Bruno version of comp, > >>it doesn't prove the existence of actual infintities. > > > > > > If matter exists, and if consciousness is dependent on it, and if there > > is no actual infinities on which my consciousness can depend, then that > > piece of matter is turing emulable, and so by turing-emulating it, it > > would lead to a zombie. > > I don't understand that. Computations are Turing emulable - not material > objects.
There is a difference between an emulation which is "as good" as the thing being emulated, and simulation, which is a degree of abstraction away from the thing being simulated. Flight simulators don't actually fly, but a Mac emulating a PC is as good as a PC. The presence or absence of infinities only affect the ability to *simulate* something (the ability of a finite machine to model it abstractly). Emulation is all about whether or not the added degree of abstraction makes a difference. > > OK then. > > But now I have still less understanding of your notion of primitive > > matter. You could define it by anything making comp false without using > > actual infinities, and this would lead to ad hoc theories. > > Again, from a strictly logical point of view you are correct, but then > > we have to ask you what you mean by matter. It is no more something > > describable by physics, > > I don't see that point either. Perhaps you only mean that the mathematical > descriptions used by physics would not *completely* constitute matter? > > >and it is above anything imaginable to link > > that stuff to consciousness. > > Unless you present some axiomatic of your notion of matter, I am afraid > > we will not make progress. > > That seems backwards. Physics works with matter which is defined ostensively > and by > operational definitions. To insist on an axiomatization seems to me to beg > the > question of whether reality is a purely mathematical object. Hear, hear! > It is only descriptions > that can be axiomatized. > > Brent Meeker --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
