Brent Meeker wrote:
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> > Le 20-sept.-06, à 14:08, 1Z a écrit :
> >
> >
> >>This isn't the only way COMP couldbe false. For instance, if
> >>matter exists, consciousness could be dependent on it. Thus,
> >>while the existence of matter might disprove the Bruno version of comp,
> >>it doesn't prove the existence of actual infintities.
> >
> >
> > If matter exists, and if consciousness is dependent on it, and if there
> > is no actual infinities on which my consciousness can depend, then that
> > piece of matter is turing emulable, and so by turing-emulating it, it
> > would lead to a zombie.
>
> I don't understand that.  Computations are Turing emulable - not material 
> objects.


There is a difference between an emulation which is "as good" as the
thing being emulated, and simulation, which is a degree of abstraction
away from the thing being simulated. Flight simulators don't
actually fly, but a Mac emulating a PC is as good as a PC.

The presence or absence of infinities only affect the ability
to *simulate* something (the ability
of a finite machine to model it abstractly). Emulation is all
about whether or not the added degree of abstraction makes a
difference.

> > OK then.
> > But now I have still less understanding of your notion of primitive
> > matter. You could define it by anything making comp false without using
> > actual infinities, and this would lead to ad hoc theories.
> > Again, from a strictly logical point of view you are correct, but then
> > we have to ask you what you mean by matter. It is no more something
> > describable by physics,
>
> I don't see that point either.  Perhaps you only mean that the mathematical
> descriptions used by physics would not *completely* constitute matter?
>
> >and it is above anything imaginable to link
> > that stuff to consciousness.
> > Unless you present some axiomatic of your notion of matter, I am afraid
> > we will not make progress.
>
> That seems backwards.  Physics works with matter which is defined ostensively 
> and by
> operational definitions.  To insist on an axiomatization seems to me to beg 
> the
> question of whether reality is a purely mathematical object.

Hear, hear!

> It is only descriptions
>   that can be axiomatized.
> 
> Brent Meeker


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