Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: > >> The problem is that cells are defined and understood only through being > >> observed with our phenomenal consciousness. > > > > Not "only". Cognition and instrumentation are needed too. > > Yes. But the instruments are observed. All the instruments do is extend > the causal chain between your phenomenality and the observed phenomena. > Provided you can justify the causal source...all is OK... but that's part > of the critical argument process using existing knowledge. The observer is > fundamentally in the causal chain from the deepest levels all the way > through all of the instrumentation and into the sensory systems of the > observer. The observer is part of every observation.
Hmmm. Are you sure? Is an earthbound astronomer fundamentally part of a supernovca which exploded millionsof years ago ? What do you mean by "fundamentally" ? > > Why not? Cars cannot understand themselves, but they > > cannot understand anything else. The fact that the brain > > is being refelexively usd to understand itself is > > a unique feature of cosnciousness studies, > > but it is not clear why it make cosnciousness studies flatly > > impossible. > > You might expect it to make the study of consiousness > > easier, in sone respects. > > > > The current literature has traced the conscious processes of primordial > emotions (those related to the 'appetites'/homeostasis) out of the cortex > to the basal areas and into the reptilian brain. This has been done > empirically. > > Derek Denton > The primordial emotions: The dawning of consciousness > > Phenomenal consciousness does not need a cortex to exist. It does not need > an explicit self model or reflexivity/indexicality. The "I" of a lizard > can be implicit (it hurts 'ME', I am hungry, I need air etc...ergo > behave). > > This means that single neurons and/or small groups of neurons are all that > is needed for _phenomenal_ consciousness. > > 'Consciousness' is therefore at least traced back through the vertebrate > line of evolution and to the very origins of the basal brain structures. > This supports the potential for cosnciousness in possibly in invertebrates > and back to single cell animals... > > Consciousness is not a 'high level' emergent property of massive numbers > of neurons in a cortex context. It is a fundamental property of matter > that single excitable cells make good use of that is automatically > assembled along with assembling cells in certain ways. There are a number of leaps there. from "basal" areas to "single neurons", for instance. > cheers > colin hales --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
