an excellent narrative. Thank you
----- Original Message -----
From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Thursday, October 26, 2006 12:05 AM
Subject: RE: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Peter Jones writes: (> >)
> > That you don't experience HP universes is as much an argument against a
> > multiverse as it is an argument against a mathematical multiverse.
> (StP): (>)
> Not "as much". It depends on how constrained they are.
> Physical multiverses can be almost as constrained as single universes, or
almost as unconstrained as multiverses.
> in Platonia. Measure has to emerge naturally and necessarily for them.
>OK, if you put constraints on a physical multiverse so that it's smaller
than "every possible universe".
> (That's the "mathematical* mutiverse of course. A physical mutliverse is
an entirely different matter).
Here it comes:
Suppose God took Platonia, in all its richness, and made it physical. What
would expect to
experience in the next moment?
(a) can't be right. Although in the vast majority of universes in the next
moment your head
explodes or the laws of physics change such that your brain stops working
(sorry), as long as
there is at least one copy of you still conscious, you can expect to remain
(b) can't be right. However many copies of you there are, you only
experience being one at
a time. Even if one of the copies is mind-melded with others, that still
counts as an individual
with more complex experiences. Moreover, it is doubtful whether an
experience of everything
simultaneously - every possible thought, including all the incoherent ones -
is different to no
experience at all, much as a page covered in ink contains no more
information than a blank
Therefore, (c) must be right. You can expect to experience something. What
is it that you
might experience, if all possibilities are actualised? What will you
experience if no measure is
defined, or all the possibilities have equal measure?
Sure, objectively you could say they are all conscious simultaneously, but
asked any of them, how do you think they would describe their subjective
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