Tom Caylor wrote: > 1Z wrote: >> Brent Meeker wrote: >> >>> Quentin Anciaux wrote: >>>> Le Jeudi 26 Octobre 2006 18:02, 1Z a écrit : >>>>> Quentin Anciaux wrote: >>>>>>> But c breaks down into: >>>>>>> c1) I experience something coherent that obeys the laws of >>>>>>> physics >>>>>>> and >>>>>>> c2) I experience wild and crazy "harry Potter" stuff. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The memory-traces corresponding to c2 are a possible >>>>>>> configuration of matter, and so must exist in Platonia. But >>>>>>> I only experience c1. >>>>>> That means nothing... if you had experienced c2 you would never write >>>>>> this... >>>>> I could have experienced periods of causal >>>>> stability mixed with periods of HP. I could still communicate during >>>>> one >>>>> of the stable periods. >>>> Well in typical Everett MWI you also could... >>>> >>>>>> and in physical MW, HP/WR are not ruled out but of very low measure which >>>>>> means there is 100% chance that some instance (a tiny tiny number but at >>>>>> least one) of you will experience it. >>>>> Yes, yes, yes. I am objecting here to everythingism -- mathematical MW >>>>> --. not physical MW. >>>> But why ? consequences on HP/WR are exactly the same on both flavor ! In >>>> any >>>> case you have to have a measure function, in both case probability is not >>>> about what happens and what doesn't but the relative proportion of "what >>>> happens" at the time a choice is made. Even an infinitesimal probability >>>> is "instantiated" with 100% chance in MW. Since quantum mechanics does not >>>> prevent very weird events from occuring, those events then occur and are as >>>> real as this real. The chance to win the lottery is low, yet some wins... >>> No they are not the same. QM rules out lots of things - anything that >>> doesn't conserve 4-momentum for example. >> That is true. >> >>> Even more to the point QM rules out any future that doesn't evolve from >>> the present in accordance with the Hamiltonian of the universe. It also >>> rules out any universe that doesn't conform to quantum mechanics, e.g. a >>> Newtonian universe. The measure of QM universes relative to >>> "mathematically consistent universes" is essentially zero. I put >>> "mathematically consistent universes" in scare quotes because I understand >>> what it means for statements and propositions to be consistent, but I'm not >>> sure what it means for universes, simpliciter, to be consistent. >> That is true to. Consistency is a property of (sets of) propositions, >> not >> of structures. But if you Platonise all of current mathematics, it will >> divide into incompatible regions due to incompatible axioms. >> >>> Brent Meeker > > Bruno has tried to introduce us before to the concept of universes or > worlds made from logic, bottom up (a la constructing elephants). These > universes can be consistent or inconsistent. > > But approaching it from the empirical side (top down rather bottom up), > here is an example of a consistent structure: I think you assume that > you as a person are a structure, or that you can assume that > temporarily for the purpose of argument. You as a person can be > consistent in what you say, can you not? Given certain assumptions > (axioms) and inference rules you can be consistent or inconsistent in > what you say.
Depending on your definition of consistent and inconsistent, there need not be any axioms or inference rules at all. If I say "I'm married and I'm not married." then I've said something inconsistent - regardless of axioms or rules. But *I'm* not inconsistent - just what I've said is. > I'm not saying the what you say is all there is to who > you are. Actually this illustrates what I was saying before about the > need for a "reference frame" to talk about consistency, e.g. "what you > say, given your currently held axioms and rules". If you have axioms and rules and you can infer "X and not-X" then the axioms+rules are inconsistent - but so what? Nothing of import about the universe follows. > Another example would be an electric circuit: Given the structure of > an electric circuit, and axioms and rules about electricity, we can > predict what the output of the circuit will be. If we go through a > different sequence of contortions/calculations with that same > structure, axioms and rules, and get a different output value, then the > axioms, rules *together with the structure* are inconsistent. The structure can't be inconsistent - it's not a statement or proposition. Brent Meeker --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---