Tom Caylor wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
>> Brent Meeker wrote:
>>> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>>> Le Jeudi 26 Octobre 2006 18:02, 1Z a écrit :
>>>>> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>>>>>> But c breaks down into:
>>>>>>> c1) I experience something coherent that obeys the laws of
>>>>>>> c2) I experience wild and crazy "harry Potter" stuff.
>>>>>>> The memory-traces corresponding to c2 are a possible
>>>>>>> configuration of matter, and so must exist in Platonia. But
>>>>>>> I only experience c1.
>>>>>> That means nothing... if you had experienced c2 you would never write
>>>>> I could have experienced periods of causal
>>>>> stability mixed with periods of HP. I could still communicate during
>>>>> of the stable periods.
>>>> Well in typical Everett MWI you also could...
>>>>>> and in physical MW, HP/WR are not ruled out but of very low measure which
>>>>>> means there is 100% chance that some instance (a tiny tiny number but at
>>>>>> least one) of you will experience it.
>>>>> Yes, yes, yes. I am objecting here to everythingism -- mathematical MW
>>>>> --. not physical MW.
>>>> But why ? consequences on HP/WR are exactly the same on both flavor ! In
>>>> case you have to have a measure function, in both case probability is not
>>>> about what happens and what doesn't but the relative proportion of "what
>>>> happens" at the time a choice is made. Even an infinitesimal probability
>>>> is "instantiated" with 100% chance in MW. Since quantum mechanics does not
>>>> prevent very weird events from occuring, those events then occur and are as
>>>> real as this real. The chance to win the lottery is low, yet some wins...
>>> No they are not the same. QM rules out lots of things - anything that
>>> doesn't conserve 4-momentum for example.
>> That is true.
>>> Even more to the point QM rules out any future that doesn't evolve from
>>> the present in accordance with the Hamiltonian of the universe. It also
>>> rules out any universe that doesn't conform to quantum mechanics, e.g. a
>>> Newtonian universe. The measure of QM universes relative to
>>> "mathematically consistent universes" is essentially zero. I put
>>> "mathematically consistent universes" in scare quotes because I understand
>>> what it means for statements and propositions to be consistent, but I'm not
>>> sure what it means for universes, simpliciter, to be consistent.
>> That is true to. Consistency is a property of (sets of) propositions,
>> of structures. But if you Platonise all of current mathematics, it will
>> divide into incompatible regions due to incompatible axioms.
>>> Brent Meeker
> Bruno has tried to introduce us before to the concept of universes or
> worlds made from logic, bottom up (a la constructing elephants). These
> universes can be consistent or inconsistent.
> But approaching it from the empirical side (top down rather bottom up),
> here is an example of a consistent structure: I think you assume that
> you as a person are a structure, or that you can assume that
> temporarily for the purpose of argument. You as a person can be
> consistent in what you say, can you not? Given certain assumptions
> (axioms) and inference rules you can be consistent or inconsistent in
> what you say.
Depending on your definition of consistent and inconsistent, there need not be
any axioms or inference rules at all. If I say "I'm married and I'm not
married." then I've said something inconsistent - regardless of axioms or
rules. But *I'm* not inconsistent - just what I've said is.
> I'm not saying the what you say is all there is to who
> you are. Actually this illustrates what I was saying before about the
> need for a "reference frame" to talk about consistency, e.g. "what you
> say, given your currently held axioms and rules".
If you have axioms and rules and you can infer "X and not-X" then the
axioms+rules are inconsistent - but so what? Nothing of import about the
> Another example would be an electric circuit: Given the structure of
> an electric circuit, and axioms and rules about electricity, we can
> predict what the output of the circuit will be. If we go through a
> different sequence of contortions/calculations with that same
> structure, axioms and rules, and get a different output value, then the
> axioms, rules *together with the structure* are inconsistent.
The structure can't be inconsistent - it's not a statement or proposition.
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to email@example.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at