Tom Caylor wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
>> Brent Meeker wrote:
>>
>>> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>>> Le Jeudi 26 Octobre 2006 18:02, 1Z a écrit :
>>>>> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>>>>>> But c breaks down into:
>>>>>>> c1)  I experience something coherent that obeys the laws of
>>>>>>> physics
>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>> c2) I experience wild and crazy "harry Potter" stuff.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The memory-traces corresponding to c2 are a possible
>>>>>>> configuration of matter, and so must exist in Platonia. But
>>>>>>> I only experience c1.
>>>>>> That means nothing... if you had experienced c2 you would never write
>>>>>> this...
>>>>> I could have experienced periods of causal
>>>>> stability mixed with periods of HP. I could still communicate during
>>>>> one
>>>>> of the stable  periods.
>>>> Well in typical Everett MWI you also could...
>>>>
>>>>>> and in physical MW, HP/WR are not ruled out but of very low measure which
>>>>>> means there is 100% chance that some instance (a tiny tiny number but at
>>>>>> least one) of you will experience it.
>>>>> Yes, yes, yes. I am objecting here to everythingism -- mathematical MW
>>>>> --. not physical MW.
>>>> But why ? consequences on HP/WR are exactly the same on both flavor ! In 
>>>> any
>>>> case you have to have a measure function, in both case probability is not
>>>> about what happens and what doesn't but the relative proportion of "what
>>>> happens" at the time a choice is made. Even an infinitesimal probability
>>>> is "instantiated" with 100% chance in MW. Since quantum mechanics does not
>>>> prevent very weird events from occuring, those events then occur and are as
>>>> real as this real. The chance to win the lottery is low, yet some wins...
>>> No they are not the same.  QM rules out lots of things - anything that 
>>> doesn't conserve 4-momentum for example.
>> That is true.
>>
>>>  Even more to the point QM rules out any future that doesn't evolve from 
>>> the present in accordance with the Hamiltonian of the universe.  It also 
>>> rules out any universe that doesn't conform to quantum mechanics, e.g. a 
>>> Newtonian universe.  The measure of QM universes relative to 
>>> "mathematically consistent universes" is essentially zero.  I put 
>>> "mathematically consistent universes" in scare quotes because I understand 
>>> what it means for statements and propositions to be consistent, but I'm not 
>>> sure what it means for universes, simpliciter, to be consistent.
>> That is true to. Consistency is a property of (sets of) propositions,
>> not
>> of structures. But if you Platonise all of current mathematics, it will
>> divide into incompatible regions due to incompatible axioms.
>>
>>> Brent Meeker
> 
> Bruno has tried to introduce us before to the concept of universes or
> worlds made from logic, bottom up (a la constructing elephants).  These
> universes can be consistent or inconsistent.
> 
> But approaching it from the empirical side (top down rather bottom up),
> here is an example of a consistent structure:  I think you assume that
> you as a person are a structure, or that you can assume that
> temporarily for the purpose of argument.  You as a person can be
> consistent in what you say, can you not?  Given certain assumptions
> (axioms) and inference rules you can be consistent or inconsistent in
> what you say.  

Depending on your definition of consistent and inconsistent, there need not be 
any axioms or inference rules at all.  If I say "I'm married and I'm not 
married." then I've said something inconsistent - regardless of axioms or 
rules.  But *I'm* not inconsistent - just what I've said is.

> I'm not saying the what you say is all there is to who
> you are.  Actually this illustrates what I was saying before about the
> need for a "reference frame" to talk about consistency, e.g. "what you
> say, given your currently held axioms and rules".

If you have axioms and rules and you can infer "X and not-X" then the 
axioms+rules are inconsistent - but so what?  Nothing of import about the 
universe follows.
 
> Another example would be an electric circuit:  Given the structure of
> an electric circuit, and axioms and rules about electricity, we can
> predict what the output of the circuit will be.  If we go through a
> different sequence of contortions/calculations with that same
> structure, axioms and rules, and get a different output value, then the
> axioms, rules *together with the structure* are inconsistent.

The structure can't be inconsistent - it's not a statement or proposition.

Brent Meeker


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