Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Peter Jones writes (quoting David Nyman): > > > > The key aspect is that the structure of each OM is inherently what > > > might be termed a perceiver-percept dyad - that is, it must contain > > > whatever process or structure is involved both in *representing* the > > > available information and *responding* perceptually to it. This makes > > > each dyad *informationally* closed with respect to other such dyads, > > > without reference to their 'temporal' or 'spatial' separation. > > > > I don't see why. Are you saying they are still closed > > even if their information content is similar? Why should that be? > > How can I fail to have similar information content > > to myself five minutes form now? Why doesn't it apply > > spatially? Why doensnt each neuron have its own > > consciousness? > > > > > Consequently, in a BU, you shouldn't expect to have an experience of: > > > > > > > A consciousness spread across time. > > > > > > if by this, you mean some sort of simultaneous awareness of multiple > > > 'I's. This would require an extra-hypothetical 'super-I' process or > > > > There is *a* process which links spatially separated neurons > > into a single consciousness. I don't claim to know what it is. > > But if time is just like space, as the BU theory has it, why doesn't > > it apply across time. > > > > > > We *do* have simultaneous consciousness -- just not > > > > the same consciousness. > > > > > > Which is precisely my point. Just as you *do* have simultaneous > > > consciousness of all OMs in which you are present - just not the same > > > consciousness. > > > > But the difference of your and my consiousness > > is explained by the difference in content. My consciousness > > five minutes from now cannot fail to be 99% the same as my > > consciousness > > now, information-wise. > > > > > There is no logical distinction between the two cases, > > > unless you are positing the existence of a soul. The distinction > > > between the OMs in which the 'I' is you, and those in which the 'I' is > > > me, is entirely informationally determined and delimited. There is no > > > other means of differentiation. > > > > Which is precisely my point. My consciousness > > five minutes from now cannot fail to be 99% the same as my > > consciousness > > now, information-wise. > > I think it is simpler to go back to your own clones-in-the-next-room example > rather than introducing the complication of neurophysiology (or indeed > physics). > You are informed that your current stream of consciousness is either being > generated by > > (a) a temporal sequence of clones, each of which lives for a second, then is > instantly killed, and replaced by the next one in the series a microsecond > later > > or > > (b) a spatial series of clones, each of which lives for a second, then is > instantly > killed, such that the whole experiment goes for a second but uses multiple > adjacent rooms > > You have to guess whether you are in experiment (a) or (b). If appropriate > care > is taken to provide you with no external clues do you think you would be able > to > guess the right answer with greater than 1/2 probability?
It's quite possible that neither scenario can support a subjective flow of time. --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---