Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes (quoting David Nyman):
>
> > > The key aspect is that the structure of each OM is inherently what
> > > might be termed a perceiver-percept dyad - that is, it must contain
> > > whatever process or structure is involved both in *representing* the
> > > available information and *responding* perceptually to it. This makes
> > > each dyad *informationally* closed with respect to other such dyads,
> > > without reference to their 'temporal' or 'spatial' separation.
> >
> > I don't see why. Are you saying they are still closed
> > even if their information content is similar? Why should that be?
> > How can I fail to have similar information content
> > to myself five minutes form now? Why doesn't it apply
> > spatially? Why doensnt each neuron have its own
> > consciousness?
> >
> > > Consequently, in a BU, you shouldn't expect to have an experience of:
> > >
> > > > A consciousness spread across time.
> > >
> > > if by this, you mean some sort of simultaneous awareness of multiple
> > > 'I's. This would require an extra-hypothetical 'super-I' process or
> >
> > There is *a* process which links spatially separated neurons
> > into a single consciousness. I don't claim to know what it is.
> > But if time is just like space, as the BU theory has it, why doesn't
> > it apply across time.
> >
> > > > We *do* have simultaneous consciousness -- just not
> > > > the same consciousness.
> > >
> > > Which is precisely my point. Just as you *do* have simultaneous
> > > consciousness of all OMs in which you are present  - just not the same
> > > consciousness.
> >
> > But the difference of your and my consiousness
> > is explained by the difference in content. My consciousness
> > five minutes from now cannot fail to be 99% the same as my
> > consciousness
> > now, information-wise.
> >
> > >  There is no logical distinction between the two cases,
> > > unless you are positing the existence of a soul. The distinction
> > > between the OMs in which the 'I' is you, and those in which the 'I' is
> > > me, is entirely informationally determined and delimited. There is no
> > > other means of differentiation.
> >
> > Which is precisely my point. My consciousness
> > five minutes from now cannot fail to be 99% the same as my
> > consciousness
> > now, information-wise.
>
> I think it is simpler to go back to your own clones-in-the-next-room example
> rather than introducing the complication of neurophysiology (or indeed 
> physics).
> You are informed that your current stream of consciousness is either being
> generated by
>
> (a) a temporal sequence of clones, each of which lives for a second, then is
> instantly killed, and replaced by the next one in the series a microsecond 
> later
>
> or
>
> (b) a spatial series of clones, each of which lives for a second, then is 
> instantly
> killed, such that the whole experiment goes for a second but uses multiple
> adjacent rooms
>
> You have to guess whether you are in experiment (a) or (b). If appropriate 
> care
> is taken to provide you with no external clues do you think you would be able 
> to
> guess the right answer with greater than 1/2 probability?

It's quite possible that neither scenario can support a
subjective flow of time.


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