Peter Jones writes (quoting David Nyman):

> > The key aspect is that the structure of each OM is inherently what
> > might be termed a perceiver-percept dyad - that is, it must contain
> > whatever process or structure is involved both in *representing* the
> > available information and *responding* perceptually to it. This makes
> > each dyad *informationally* closed with respect to other such dyads,
> > without reference to their 'temporal' or 'spatial' separation.
> 
> I don't see why. Are you saying they are still closed
> even if their information content is similar? Why should that be?
> How can I fail to have similar information content
> to myself five minutes form now? Why doesn't it apply
> spatially? Why doensnt each neuron have its own
> consciousness?
> 
> > Consequently, in a BU, you shouldn't expect to have an experience of:
> >
> > > A consciousness spread across time.
> >
> > if by this, you mean some sort of simultaneous awareness of multiple
> > 'I's. This would require an extra-hypothetical 'super-I' process or
> 
> There is *a* process which links spatially separated neurons
> into a single consciousness. I don't claim to know what it is.
> But if time is just like space, as the BU theory has it, why doesn't
> it apply across time.
> 
> > > We *do* have simultaneous consciousness -- just not
> > > the same consciousness.
> >
> > Which is precisely my point. Just as you *do* have simultaneous
> > consciousness of all OMs in which you are present  - just not the same
> > consciousness.
> 
> But the difference of your and my consiousness
> is explained by the difference in content. My consciousness
> five minutes from now cannot fail to be 99% the same as my
> consciousness
> now, information-wise.
> 
> >  There is no logical distinction between the two cases,
> > unless you are positing the existence of a soul. The distinction
> > between the OMs in which the 'I' is you, and those in which the 'I' is
> > me, is entirely informationally determined and delimited. There is no
> > other means of differentiation.
> 
> Which is precisely my point. My consciousness
> five minutes from now cannot fail to be 99% the same as my
> consciousness
> now, information-wise.

I think it is simpler to go back to your own clones-in-the-next-room example 
rather than introducing the complication of neurophysiology (or indeed 
physics). 
You are informed that your current stream of consciousness is either being 
generated by 

(a) a temporal sequence of clones, each of which lives for a second, then is 
instantly killed, and replaced by the next one in the series a microsecond later

or

(b) a spatial series of clones, each of which lives for a second, then is 
instantly 
killed, such that the whole experiment goes for a second but uses multiple 
adjacent rooms

You have to guess whether you are in experiment (a) or (b). If appropriate care 
is taken to provide you with no external clues do you think you would be able 
to 
guess the right answer with greater than 1/2 probability? 

Stathis Papaioannou
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