Le 29-oct.-06, à 12:21, 1Z a écrit :

> That's in the sense of abstract truth, not in the sense
> of real existence, then. (Remember: anti-Platonists
> agree that "2+2=4" is a necessary apriori truth,
> they just disagree that "2" exists).

I don't need to have that  "2" exists.

In that sense I am an anti-platonist, if you want.

I only need "2 exists", and then it is a simple exercise to derive it 
from "2+2 = 4":

2+2 = 4
Ex(x+2 = 4 & x = 2)

Or perhaps you are telling me that an anti-platonist does not accept 
the quantifier introduction inference rule (from A(t) infer Ex(Ax))???

  After all this would be coherent given that I have defined an 
(arithmetical)  platonist to be just someone accepting classical logic 
(in arithmetic). Lobian machine, like PA or ZF, are platonist, for 
example. You can see this, in the AUDA part, as a kind of "formalism" 
if you want. Judson Web, see the ref in my thesis" makes such a case.

But now, with all my respect I find those metaphysical if not magical 
marmalade a little bit useless. I propose indeed a more precise version 
of computationalism than usual, in the sense that I presuppose 
explicitly the classical Church Thesis, which by itself presupposes 
classical logic in the realm of numbers, but then I have made this 
explicit too for avoiding unnecessary complication with possible 
ultra-finitist in the neighborhoods.

Then I propose a reasoning which in a nutshell shows that IF there is a 
sense in which a turing machine can distinguish this from that, THEN 
she will will be forever unable to distinguish for sure "real" from 
"virtual" from "arithmetical" possible worlds, or states ... Indeed UDA 
already shows that the physical (the observable) must arise from a "sum 
on all that the machine can defined".

... so that  *betting on comp" at her tour, she can infer abductively 
from it that her basic reality is arithmetical, that her physics is 
comp-arithmetical, and that this is empirically testable. Indeed I get 
the logic of the observable propositions from interviewing her.

Peter, I got this in the seventies (except for theorem 14 in my french 
thesis), I defended this as a PhD thesis in France in 1998. I thought 
"acomp" to be refuted in the year. Some people have *pretended* that. 
It is a mathematically very transparent and clearly empirically 
falsifiable theory of quanta and qualia, but mathematically not so easy 
(I guess that was the price). Yet the first open problem (the 
axiomatization of "intelligible matter") has been solved recently: the 
logic Z, Z*, Z1; Z1* has been axiomatized.  My initial and still basic 
goal consists just in showing that the mind body problem is open, but, 
through some class of hypothesis (theories), mathematically 



You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to