1Z wrote:

> > Peter, when you said that the physical might be 'relations all the way
> > down', and I asked you what would you find if you went 'all the way
> > down', you replied 'primary matter'. IOW, you posit primary matter as a
> > 'bare substrate' to which are attached whatever properties theory or
> > experiment may suggest. Consequently, isn't it the case that you are
> > defining this 'bare substrate' (which by posit has no properties of its
> > own) as whatever-it-is that is RITSIAR (i.e. you might say that it's
> > what exists)?
>
> RITSIAR is supposed to be a free variable. Thus
> "RITSIAR = material existence" is a substantive, non-tautologous claim,
> as is
> "RITSIAR = Platonic existence"
>
> (Compare with "I"
> in "I am in Sussex"
> and
> "I am in Sierra Leone"

So, that's a 'yes' for primary matter = RITSIAR 1.
And another 'yes' for AUDA = RITSIAR 2.

You want to call RITSIAR 2 Platonic reality (and can call witnesses to
attest to this usage). Bruno doesn't seem to want to call it Platonic
(he seems to rely on different witnesses) but he's clear it's not
RITSIAR 1. RITSIAR 1 is 'where the matter is'. RITSIAR 2 is 'where the
numbers are'. Such ontic claims merely serve to ground the hierarchy of
predicative recursion: 'I am in Sussex' is predicated on 'I' and
'Sussex' pre-existing at some prior level, etc, etc, etc. Name your
turtle. Can't we just get on with investigating what either theory
explains or predicts, and stop arguing over words - isn't this why no
agreement is ever reached on this?

David

> David Nyman wrote:
> > 1Z wrote:
> >
> > > > > Where are these machines?
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Where the numbers are.
> > >
> > > Which is...? Presumably the answer is not
> > > "on blackboards" or "in the minds of mathematicians".
> > >
> > > Apparently its not a "magical realm" either.
> >
> > Peter, when you said that the physical might be 'relations all the way
> > down', and I asked you what would you find if you went 'all the way
> > down', you replied 'primary matter'. IOW, you posit primary matter as a
> > 'bare substrate' to which are attached whatever properties theory or
> > experiment may suggest. Consequently, isn't it the case that you are
> > defining this 'bare substrate' (which by posit has no properties of its
> > own) as whatever-it-is that is RITSIAR (i.e. you might say that it's
> > what exists)?
>
> RITSIAR is supposed to be a free variable. Thus
> "RITSIAR = material existence" is a substantive, non-tautologous claim,
> as is
> "RITSIAR = Platonic existence"
>
> (Compare with "I"
> in "I am in Sussex"
> and
> "I am in Sierra Leone"


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