David Nyman wrote: > 1Z wrote: > > > > Peter, when you said that the physical might be 'relations all the way > > > down', and I asked you what would you find if you went 'all the way > > > down', you replied 'primary matter'. IOW, you posit primary matter as a > > > 'bare substrate' to which are attached whatever properties theory or > > > experiment may suggest. Consequently, isn't it the case that you are > > > defining this 'bare substrate' (which by posit has no properties of its > > > own) as whatever-it-is that is RITSIAR (i.e. you might say that it's > > > what exists)? > > > > RITSIAR is supposed to be a free variable. Thus > > "RITSIAR = material existence" is a substantive, non-tautologous claim, > > as is > > "RITSIAR = Platonic existence" > > > > (Compare with "I" > > in "I am in Sussex" > > and > > "I am in Sierra Leone" > > So, that's a 'yes' for primary matter = RITSIAR 1. > And another 'yes' for AUDA = RITSIAR 2. > > You want to call RITSIAR 2 Platonic reality (and can call witnesses to > attest to this usage). Bruno doesn't seem to want to call it Platonic > (he seems to rely on different witnesses) but he's clear it's not > RITSIAR 1. RITSIAR 1 is 'where the matter is'. RITSIAR 2 is 'where the > numbers are'. Such ontic claims merely serve to ground the hierarchy of > predicative recursion: 'I am in Sussex' is predicated on 'I' and > 'Sussex' pre-existing at some prior level, etc, etc, etc.
Ermm yes. But note that Bruno is claiming that (the appearance of) matter arises from "Platonic" (my and Plato's usage) existence. Whereas I am claiming that (the concept of) numbers emerges from matter (mathematicians). So it is not just a case of where you are in the hierarchy, it is case of which way up it is. > Name your > turtle. Can't we just get on with investigating what either theory > explains or predicts, and stop arguing over words - isn't this why no > agreement is ever reached on this? The bone of contention is that Bruno thinks his theory can be proved using only the assumptions that a materalist would typically make -- that it is a Judo-throw that turns the opponents weight against himself. I think that loke most arguemnts, the plausability of the conlcusions depends on the premisses. > David > > > David Nyman wrote: > > > 1Z wrote: > > > > > > > > > Where are these machines? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Where the numbers are. > > > > > > > > Which is...? Presumably the answer is not > > > > "on blackboards" or "in the minds of mathematicians". > > > > > > > > Apparently its not a "magical realm" either. > > > > > > Peter, when you said that the physical might be 'relations all the way > > > down', and I asked you what would you find if you went 'all the way > > > down', you replied 'primary matter'. IOW, you posit primary matter as a > > > 'bare substrate' to which are attached whatever properties theory or > > > experiment may suggest. Consequently, isn't it the case that you are > > > defining this 'bare substrate' (which by posit has no properties of its > > > own) as whatever-it-is that is RITSIAR (i.e. you might say that it's > > > what exists)? > > > > RITSIAR is supposed to be a free variable. Thus > > "RITSIAR = material existence" is a substantive, non-tautologous claim, > > as is > > "RITSIAR = Platonic existence" > > > > (Compare with "I" > > in "I am in Sussex" > > and > > "I am in Sierra Leone" --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
