David Nyman wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
>
> > > Peter, when you said that the physical might be 'relations all the way
> > > down', and I asked you what would you find if you went 'all the way
> > > down', you replied 'primary matter'. IOW, you posit primary matter as a
> > > 'bare substrate' to which are attached whatever properties theory or
> > > experiment may suggest. Consequently, isn't it the case that you are
> > > defining this 'bare substrate' (which by posit has no properties of its
> > > own) as whatever-it-is that is RITSIAR (i.e. you might say that it's
> > > what exists)?
> >
> > RITSIAR is supposed to be a free variable. Thus
> > "RITSIAR = material existence" is a substantive, non-tautologous claim,
> > as is
> > "RITSIAR = Platonic existence"
> >
> > (Compare with "I"
> > in "I am in Sussex"
> > and
> > "I am in Sierra Leone"
>
> So, that's a 'yes' for primary matter = RITSIAR 1.
> And another 'yes' for AUDA = RITSIAR 2.
>
> You want to call RITSIAR 2 Platonic reality (and can call witnesses to
> attest to this usage). Bruno doesn't seem to want to call it Platonic
> (he seems to rely on different witnesses) but he's clear it's not
> RITSIAR 1. RITSIAR 1 is 'where the matter is'. RITSIAR 2 is 'where the
> numbers are'. Such ontic claims merely serve to ground the hierarchy of
> predicative recursion: 'I am in Sussex' is predicated on 'I' and
> 'Sussex' pre-existing at some prior level, etc, etc, etc.

Ermm yes. But note that Bruno is claiming that
(the appearance of) matter arises from "Platonic" (my
and Plato's usage) existence. Whereas I am claiming
that (the concept of) numbers emerges
from matter (mathematicians).

So it is not just a case of where you are in the hierarchy,
it is case of which way up it is.

> Name your
> turtle. Can't we just get on with investigating what either theory
> explains or predicts, and stop arguing over words - isn't this why no
> agreement is ever reached on this?

The bone of contention is that Bruno thinks his
theory can be proved using only the assumptions that
a materalist would typically make -- that it is a Judo-throw
that turns the opponents weight against himself.

I think that loke most arguemnts, the plausability of
the conlcusions depends on the premisses.

> David
>
> > David Nyman wrote:
> > > 1Z wrote:
> > >
> > > > > > Where are these machines?
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Where the numbers are.
> > > >
> > > > Which is...? Presumably the answer is not
> > > > "on blackboards" or "in the minds of mathematicians".
> > > >
> > > > Apparently its not a "magical realm" either.
> > >
> > > Peter, when you said that the physical might be 'relations all the way
> > > down', and I asked you what would you find if you went 'all the way
> > > down', you replied 'primary matter'. IOW, you posit primary matter as a
> > > 'bare substrate' to which are attached whatever properties theory or
> > > experiment may suggest. Consequently, isn't it the case that you are
> > > defining this 'bare substrate' (which by posit has no properties of its
> > > own) as whatever-it-is that is RITSIAR (i.e. you might say that it's
> > > what exists)?
> >
> > RITSIAR is supposed to be a free variable. Thus
> > "RITSIAR = material existence" is a substantive, non-tautologous claim,
> > as is
> > "RITSIAR = Platonic existence"
> >
> > (Compare with "I"
> > in "I am in Sussex"
> > and
> > "I am in Sierra Leone"


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