Le 29-oct.-06, à 17:43, David Nyman a écrit :

> Peter, when you said that the physical might be 'relations all the way
> down', and I asked you what would you find if you went 'all the way
> down', you replied 'primary matter'. IOW, you posit primary matter as a
> 'bare substrate' to which are attached whatever properties theory or
> experiment may suggest. Consequently, isn't it the case that you are
> defining this 'bare substrate' (which by posit has no properties of its
> own) as whatever-it-is that is RITSIAR (i.e. you might say that it's
> what exists)? Bruno, aren't you making essentially the same claim for
> AUDA, in attempting to derive all properties from it?

P. Jones posit a primary matter having no properties, and he does not 
explain how things with properties can emerge from that.
I posit numbers (not AUDA which is just an acronym for the Arithmetical 
translation of the Universal Dovetailer Argument).
And numbers have well know properties of their own (they can be even, 
odd, prime, godel-number, etc.). And from those number properties I 
explain the possible n-person discourses. And from UDA one of them is 
the physical discourse, so it is "easy" to test comp through empiry.

> In your schema,
> if AUDA isn't RITSIAR (even if you'd rather define 1-ritsiar or
> 3-ritsiar separately), then is anything?

I don't understand really what you mean by "AUDA is not RITSIAR". AUDA 
is just the lobian interview, or if you prefer the complete 
mathematical formalization of the UDA reasoning. In some sense you can 
interpret it as the eventual elimination of the "yes doctor" hypothesis 
in the UDA argument (but here I do simplify a little bit).

>  Are these two views
> commensurable at all? Or are you saying that we can only maintain a
> Wittgensteinian silence on such questions?

Wittgenstein said to much, or not enough. He felt in the trap he was 
describing. The difference between G and G* can be used to make this 
transparently clear, and can even be used to argue that eventually 
Wittgenstein realize the point in his last writings (on certainty).



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