Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 11-nov.-06, à 01:09, 1Z a écrit :
>
> > No, because there are no possible worlds where (2^32582657)-1
> > is not  a prime number.
>
> This is for me a typical "arithmetical realist" statement.

Most philosophers who use the "possible
worlds" terminology do nothing PW's actually
exist.

Of course it is AR in the sense of appealing to
mind-independent truth. And of course it
remains unclear whether your AR is a claim
about truth, or about existence.

> You still want it both ways: keeping comp and primary material reality,
> but I have already argued in detail that this cannot work in any
> reasonable way.

No you haven't. You argument requires an assumption of Platonism
as well as computationalism. Computationalism
alone is compatible with materialism.


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