Bruno Marchal wrote: > Le 11-nov.-06, à 01:09, 1Z a écrit : > > > No, because there are no possible worlds where (2^32582657)-1 > > is not a prime number. > > This is for me a typical "arithmetical realist" statement.
Most philosophers who use the "possible worlds" terminology do nothing PW's actually exist. Of course it is AR in the sense of appealing to mind-independent truth. And of course it remains unclear whether your AR is a claim about truth, or about existence. > You still want it both ways: keeping comp and primary material reality, > but I have already argued in detail that this cannot work in any > reasonable way. No you haven't. You argument requires an assumption of Platonism as well as computationalism. Computationalism alone is compatible with materialism. --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
